

PARTIES AND PARTY LEADERS

BY

ANSON DANIEL MORSE

LATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN AMHERST COLLEGE

INTRODUCTION

BY

DWIGHT WHITNEY MORROW

The Amherst Books



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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
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D. W. M.

INTRODUCTION

ANSON DANIEL MORSE was born at Cambridge, Vermont, in 1846. His early education was received first at a district school near his home and later at Johnson Academy and St. Albans Union School. He then taught for a short time in a district school at Fairfax, Vermont, and entered Amherst College in 1866. His college course was interrupted by ill-health and he was graduated with the class of 1871. He taught in Williston Seminary from 1872 to 1875, and spent the year 1875-1876 in foreign study in German universities. In 1876 he began his work as a teacher at Amherst College. During the year 1876-1877 he was instructor in political economy; from 1877 to 1878 he was instructor in history; and from 1878 to 1892 professor of history and political economy. From 1892 to 1907 he was professor of history, and from 1907 until his death in 1916, professor emeritus of history.

Professor Morse was above all a student. He took a deep interest in politics, past and present. He wrote little, and, like Lord Acton, shrank from publishing the little that he wrote. Very early in his life he was attracted to the study of party and party government, and he continued his deep interest in that subject until his death. More than thirty years ago he planned a book on the general subject of party government, and he never wholly abandoned that design. A few years before his death he seriously considered the publication of the articles now printed in this book. He planned to revise them thoroughly, to deal especially with Jefferson and with Lincoln, whom he considered the two ideal party leaders for a democratic state, and to treat much more fully of the party history since 1876. Just at this time, however, the Great War came on. Morse's health had never been good,

and he had left but two years of his allotted three score years and ten. He gave those two years to his little book *Civilization and the World War*, published not by himself but by his family after his death. The work on political parties was laid aside and never again resumed.

The decision to publish these articles was not reached without some hesitation. If one who has written essays over a period of thirty years is urged to publish them in book form and has failed to do so, it may well be contended that those who come after him should respect his wishes. Especially can this be urged in the case of the writings of a man like Morse, whose whole life was devoted to the search for truth for its own sake, who hated slipshod work, who many times left things unpublished because he himself felt that he had not acquired the knowledge to complete them. Yet, on the other hand, Morse had hoped to publish these articles after a thorough revision. It may, perhaps, be a further argument in support of publication that every article included in the book was published at one time or another by Professor Morse himself. They are merely gathered together in this volume in the form in which he originally gave them to the public.

The particular occasion for publishing should also be noted. Amherst College reached its hundredth year in 1921. In connection with the centennial of the college it was decided to publish a series of "Amherst Books." Morse went to Amherst in 1866. He died in 1916. With the interruptions noted above, he was intimately associated with the college for just fifty years. Professor Woodbridge, the Dean of the Graduate Faculty of Columbia University, himself an alumnus of Amherst College, said in a centennial address at Amherst in June, 1921, that the college in its first hundred years had made three significant contributions to education in America. The first the work done in the early years of the college by Professor Edward Hitchcock and his students in geology, the second, the achievements in the middle period in history and political science, and the third the contributions to philosophy — not so much in philosophical research as in philosophical

teaching — by Professor Garman and his students. Morse was one of the men of the middle period who represented history and political science.

Amherst has always been a small college, but in the period between 1860 and 1880 it was much smaller than it is now. The classes rarely ran above fifty. The equipment was meagre. The teachers were few. In those years, however, this small college started on their subsequent careers a remarkable group of men in history and political science: Herbert Baxter Adams, John William Burgess, Munroe Smith, John Bates Clark, Anson Daniel Morse, Herbert Levi Osgood, Richmond Mayo-Smith, Frank Johnson Goodnow, John Franklin Jameson. Morse was the only one of this group whose life work was to be done at Amherst. Johns Hopkins may claim Adams and Jameson; Columbia may claim Burgess, Clark, Munroe Smith, Osgood and Mayo-Smith; both Columbia and Hopkins may claim Goodnow — despite the fact that Amherst gave flight to all of them.¹ But Morse belongs peculiarly to

¹ It is worthy of note that there was no regular department of history at Amherst College until Professor Burgess returned to Amherst to found the department in 1873. Professor Burgess in a private letter makes the following interesting comment upon the instruction at Amherst in his day:

“Two men at Amherst had great influence in holding me in the line of study to which I had consecrated myself on the battlefield at Chattanooga. They were Professor Julius Seelye and Professor Tuckerman. Seelye’s exposition of Schwegler’s History of Philosophy was, as every Amherst man of the last half of the 19th century knows, a veritable history of civilization. Tuckerman was the Professor of Botany, but he was a great reader of History and he gave the only instruction in general history afforded in the College at that period. All this, however, was but a foretaste, and, on graduation in 1867, I felt that I must look elsewhere and afar for the disciplines and knowledges, which would enable me to realize my vow and plan of 1863.”

After leaving Amherst in 1867, Professor Burgess first studied law and was admitted to the bar of Massachusetts, then taught for a short time at Knox College in Illinois. In 1871, after advising with the Honorable George Bancroft, Professor Burgess went to Germany and studied in Göttingen under Lotze and Waitz, then in Leipzig with Roscher in economic history, and with Wenck and Wuttke in general political history, and finally in Berlin, where for two years he worked with Zeller, Curtius, Mommsen, Droysen, von Trietschke and von Gneist. Professor Morse had left Amherst before Professor Burgess returned to found the history department. He was never a pupil of Professor Burgess, but he was a pupil of the German teachers of Professor Burgess.

Amherst. No collection of Amherst Books published as an outgrowth of the centennial could be complete if such of his writings as are available were not collected and published. It will be remembered, therefore, that this book is brought out primarily for the benefit of those two generations of men who sat at Morse's feet, and who received from him their first impulse to know for themselves and to appraise independently the vital factors in the development of men and societies of men upon this earth. If the writings are of interest or of value to a wider audience, it will be a source of added gratification and a further justification of their publication.

A great diversity will be noted in the nature and content of the articles published in this book. This is accounted for, not only by the periods at which the articles were written, but, what is more important, by the different audiences addressed. For example, the earliest article was written in 1886 to the limited group reached by the *Political Science Quarterly*, the latest article was written in 1912 for the large audience reached by the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Uniformity of style or analysis will hardly be expected. It is believed, however, that there is a philosophic unity to the articles which warrants putting them in one book.

Morse's studies in the history and theory of political parties go back to the beginning of his teaching at Amherst. Some of his writings on party leaders and party movements appeared prior to 1891. It was in 1891, however, that he published his first theoretical article on party with the title "The Place of Party in the Political System." At that time little had been written on the theory or philosophy of the political party.¹ In the words of Professor Merriam: "Although the

¹ Much in the way of pertinent comment on parties and their function is to be found in writings of English essayists from Swift, Bolingbroke and Hume to Macaulay, Bagehot and Leslie Stephen, and in the writings of the actual participants in government from Halifax to Lord Morley. De Tocqueville had written his *Democracy in America* in 1835. This notable study of the American political system was primarily descriptive. There was, however, a significant analysis of voluntary political and civil associations and of their importance in democratic countries. To De Tocqueville "parties are

party system is one of the characteristic features of American public life, it is a singular fact that no systematic description or discussion of the party developed until one hundred years after the system had been established. The critical study of

a necessary evil in free governments." The formal and legalistic discussion of political problems, which dated from Austin and Lieber and was carried forward in the work of Burgess, was occupied with legal and constitutional phases of government. Naturally, these writers were little concerned with the extra-legal political party. Friedrich and Theodor Rohmer, in the *Theory of Political Parties*, 1844, reflected the tendency to personify the state, which was characteristic of much of the political theory of the second third of the last century. Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, the distinguished German political scientist of the last century, accepted Rohmer's doctrines but added to them the analogy between the state and the organism and discussed political institutions, including the party, in what might now be considered exaggerated biological terms. Walter Bagehot proved that the party system was inevitable in representative government. Woodrow Wilson analyzed the actual working of the extra-constitutional party system in his *Congressional Government*, published in 1885. Considerable campaign literature on parties and party leaders had appeared. Finally, Bryce, in his *American Commonwealth*, 1888, described the American party system at some length, particularly examining the nature, development and operation of the party machine and the boss. But Bryce made little attempt to present a theory of the function of the party in modern political life.

Since 1891 there have been, of course, many contributions to the historical and analytical study of parties. J. P. Gordy's *History of Political Parties in the United States*, 1895, was a study of political history, including the programs of political parties in this country particularly from 1790 to 1815. President Lowell published his well known descriptive work on *The Governments and Parties of Continental Europe* in 1896. Henry Jones Ford's stimulating book, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics*, with special attention to English precedents, was first published in 1898. In 1900 appeared Professor Jesse Macy's book, *Political Parties in the United States 1846-1861*, which contained not only a careful study of the fall of the Whig party in America but also an analysis of the origin and nature of the modern political party. Frank J. Goodnow's notable work *Politics and Administrations* was published in 1900. This book is one of the most forceful statements of the importance of the party in American political life and of the necessity of according it public and legal recognition. In 1900 there also appeared Frederick W. Maitland's translation of Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, a lawyer's book which analyzed with the precision of a jurist the likeness of the state to the corporation, partnership or trust. This important book, together with some of the essays of Maitland, brought to the serious consideration of English readers the conception of the "Group Person" with a "Group Will." M. Ostrogorski in his *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, 1902, carried still further the investigations

the party and its philosophy is practically the creation of the twentieth century."¹

The failure of the general treatises on political science written before 1891 to deal with the important subject of the political party was noted by Morse and explained by him as due to the fact that modern political parties were not only comparatively recent in origin but were also in a sense still extra-legal. Despite the fact that the party, from a practical point of view, was that instrumentality of the people through which "the citizen receives the largest share of his political

of Bryce regarding the development of the boss and the machine in American democratic political society. In the same year Professor C. E. Merriam published his *History of American Political Theories*, in which he included the relation of the programs of the chief historic American parties to the development of American political doctrines. James A. Woodburn's *Political Parties and Party Problems*, 1903, was a summary of the growth and nature of American parties throughout our history. In 1904 appeared Professor Jesse Macy's *Party Organization and Machinery*, which dealt with the machinery of party organization in the United States. In both the original edition of this work and the subsequent editions the new procedure of legalizing the parties by direct primary laws was emphasized. In 1906, Professor Allen Johnson, a former student of Professor Morse, published in the *Yale Review* his significant article on "The Nationalizing Influence of Party," a function of the party which had been generally overlooked prior to that time. An analysis of the fundamental basis of the party system was made by A. F. Bentley in his *Process of Government*, in 1908. This book, like Maitland's later essays, laid stress upon the functional and class interest theory of party origins and activity, a view which Bentley had derived from the doctrines of such Austrian writers as Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, and their American adaptation by Professor A. W. Small.

In the years immediately following 1908 there was a great productivity in works dealing with one phase or another of party problems. Among the more notable of those works may be mentioned Woodrow Wilson's *Constitutional Government*, 1908; A. C. McLaughlin's *The Courts, the Constitution and Parties*, 1912; A. L. Lowell's *Government of England*, 1908; *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, 1913; and *Public Opinion in War and Peace*, 1923; P. O. Ray's *Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics*, 1913; C. A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, 1913; *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, 1915; and *The Economic Basis of Politics*, 1922; Robert Michels' *Political Parties*, translated into English in 1915; S. P. Orth's *The Boss and the Machine*, 1920; C. E. Merriam's *American Political Ideas, 1865-1917*, 1920; and *The American Party System*, 1922; and Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion*, 1922.

¹ C. E. Merriam, *The American Party System*, p. 365.

education " and through which he discharges " the larger portion of his political duties," it had been treated as an outlaw,¹ and, being treated as an outlaw, " it behaved as an outlaw." The political party in practice had been for some generations the most important agency in making the governments of the highly civilized states function. And yet, in the view of political philosophers and constitutional lawyers, it was not a part of the state at all. Students were usually absorbed in the recognized legal provisions of the constitutional system. The political party, although well developed by this time, was still an innovation. Like all enduring social and political institutions it had gradually evolved to meet an indispensable need of modern political life. Only long after it had established itself did it receive some degree of legal and constitutional recognition in the civilized countries and come more and more to be a subject for careful and significant analysis by political scientists and sociologists.²

" Party," Sir Henry Maine tells us, " is probably nothing more than a survival and a consequence of the primitive combativeness of mankind. It is war without the city transmuted into war within the city, but mitigated in the process. The best historical justification which can be offered for it is that it has often enabled portions of the nation, who would otherwise be armed enemies, to be only factions." ³ Morse's treatment of party deals very little with the fundamental differences which make men combative. While he recognized the deep roots of these differences,⁴ he was more directly concerned with the historical process which, to use Maine's

¹ Even George Savile, the First Marquis of Halifax, who was, perhaps, the first to analyze the party system from a philosophic point of view, wrote in the latter part of the 17th century: " The best party is but a kind of conspiracy against the rest of the nation." (H. C. Foxcroft, *Life and Letters of Sir George Savile*, Vol. II, p. 505.)

² " All great constitutional precedents are the parents of principle rather than its offspring; we deduce our theories from accomplished facts of our own creation, the creation of such accomplished facts being itself determined by no theoretical considerations, but by certain practical exigencies of the moment." (H. D. Traill, *William the Third*, p. 57.)

³ Sir H. S. Maine, *Popular Government*, p. 101.

⁴ *Infra*, p. 14.

words, had changed "armed enemies" within a state into "only factions."

When Morse speaks of party he is thinking of the durable organization which consciously appeals to a general electorate for the right to administer the government of a state. There was, of course, no party organization in this sense in the ancient theocracies or military despotisms. "Under governments which rest on force as well as under governments that base their claims on divine right, there is no room for party. Such governments see in party a denial of their pretensions and an aspirant to their seats."¹ In the Greek city-states, especially in Athens, there were political parties or factions, and Aristotle made a critical analysis of the genesis and nature of party and class activity, both of which he deplored.² But there was no permanent party organization in Athenian democracy, much less any recognition of the party as a governing factor in political society. The Romans produced vigorous parties or political factions, as Ferrero and others have explained in detail. Perhaps the situation at the time of the brothers Gracchi is as representative of the Roman party development as any period which might be chosen. But here again political factions and interests shifted rapidly. "The followers — it would hardly do to call them the supporters — of the Gracchi seem more like mobs than parties."³

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, when the world broke up into the feudal system, with a great church and the unifying tradition of Rome furnishing such world-order as existed, there was still no place for party government. The political relations of the Middle Ages were based chiefly upon personal allegiance, a condition somewhat intermediate between the bond of blood relationship, real or fictitious, in primitive society, and the political status of developed civil society. The chief struggle during the Middle Ages was that between the church and the state, but this conflict was mainly univer-

¹ *Infra*, p. 1.

² *Politics*, Jowett edition, Vol. I, pp. 59-60, 128-9, 146-7, 157, 160.

³ *Infra*, pp. 11-12, 20.

sal, and even its local expressions rarely produced any permanent party alignment upon the particular questions at issue. Guelph and Ghibelline, while originally referring to local Italian factions, were really representative of the western European struggle between imperialism and localism, and between secular and ecclesiastical authority. It is only when we come to the self-governing national state that we find any place for the modern political party. The contemporary political party consciously aims to administer the government by appeal to the electorate. Until there is an electorate, that is to say, until the people to some extent become participants in the conduct of the government, there is no place for party.

The fundamental idea in Morse's theory of party is that historically *party is a substitute for revolution*. From the time that the Greeks began the study of political science — and no theory of political science could possibly grow up until long after a political life had developed — the political philosophers have puzzled over the question of how to deal with an intolerable government. Whether the governor is one man or a group of men or representatives of the whole people, the question constantly recurs: how is the state to govern the governor? What is to happen when the governor becomes so unjust that men prefer the anarchy which goes with armed conflict rather than submit longer? Ever since the Middle Ages, when the church and the secular authorities constantly came in conflict, we find at one time the churchmen and at another the laymen trying to find a satisfactory theory to justify revolution. Sometimes, as in the theories of Manegold and John of Salisbury, the right is based upon the violation by the unjust governor of a contract with God. Therefore, the church must needs excommunicate him. Sometimes, as in the doctrine of Buchanan, Althusius and Locke, the right of revolution is based upon breach of contract, real or assumed, between the governor and governed. Therefore, the governed must needs revolt. Sometimes as with Kant, revolution is justified only as a moral right, with a frank admission that a legal right to revolt from the law-making authority is a contradiction in

terms. Sometimes, as in the view of Hooker, Grotius and Hobbes, it is denied that there is any right, either moral or legal, to resist government. Professor Pollock, who combines to an unusual degree the practical training of a lawyer with the imagination of a philosopher, tells us that:

The vast majority of men adhere to their established institutions, not because they admire them, not even because of any positive prejudice in their favor, but because they dread the unknown. They cling to any tolerable certainty for certainty and custom's sake, and when they break loose from their accustomed order it is a vehement presumption that their present state is not only imperfect but intolerable.¹

Yet, whatever may be the theory upon which revolution is justified, it is apparent that for much the greater portion of recorded history the only practical method of changing an unsatisfactory government was by revolution.

But revolutions are costly. They disturb the stream of human experience. They may rid us of some past and contemporary evils but they rarely carry over into the new era adequate machinery by which a recurrence of the same evils in the new situation may be avoided. There grew up in the 17th and 18th centuries in England, and there has been carried from England to almost every civilized government in the world, a procedure through which party government becomes in large measure a substitute for revolution.² In its fundamental aspect it is based upon a very simple principle. A and B and C do not like the way that X and Y and Z are conducting the government. Instead of killing X and Y and Z, they criticize them. X and Y and Z defend themselves so long as they can, and finally say to their critics: "Well, you try it then." Now, X and Y and Z may desire very much to stay in office to advance the interests of the State. Moreover, there may be very many advantages that accrue to the particular

¹ *History of the Science of Politics*, p. 95.

² Professor Macy considers the breakdown of the political parties of the United States in the period immediately preceding our Civil War as one of the factors leading to the great tragedy. The destruction of the parties left "no recourse in the settlement of difficulties but brute force." (*Political Parties in the United States, 1846-1861*, p. 73.)

persons who carry on a government. In primitive governments these advantages may be largely material. In advanced governments they may be largely intangible — the desire for distinction or glory or applause. Quite naturally, X and Y and Z are reluctant to hand over the administration of the government to others unless the difficulties of their position outweigh the advantages. Therefore, A and B and C make the position of X and Y and Z as uncomfortable as they can — “It is the business of an opposition to oppose” was the principle upon which Lord Randolph Churchill acted.¹ The criticism of the opposition may be truthful or untruthful; the opposition may be fair or unfair. But the vital point to note is that it terminates in recourse to an electorate rather than in an appeal to the sword. The historical development which has brought about this improvement in political conduct is interwoven with the development of parliamentary and representative government. There must be an electorate of some kind before there can be party government.

For many centuries prior to the 17th the English parliament had shared with the king in the government of the nation. In fact, as both Freeman and Marriott have pointed out, in the early part of the 15th century the parliament for a time won the controlling position, the king was subordinated to parliament, the king's council was actually nominated by parliament. The system collapsed because, in the words of Bishop Stubbs: “constitutional progress had outrun administrative order.”² Anarchy accompanied the effort of an unorganized deliberative assembly to rule a growing nation. After the disastrous War of the Barons, the English people were quite willing to let the strong Tudor family carry them along the pathway to the modern national state.³ But subsequent

¹ The actual phrase cannot be accurately attributed to Churchill. He did, however, say that if an Opposition is compelled to support the Government “the support should be given with a kick and not with a caress and should be withdrawn on the first available moment.” (Winston S. Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill*, Vol. I, p. 233.)

² Cited by J. A. R. Marriott, *English Political Institutions*, p. 51.

³ H. A. L. Fisher, *Political History of England, 1485-1547*; A. D. Innes, *England under the Tudors*.

history was to show that the experiments of the 14th and 15th centuries were not total failures. They were only premature.

With the coming of the 17th century the situation had materially changed. Under the leadership of the Tudors, the English people had become a powerful modern state. There was no longer the imperative necessity of a strong sovereign to prevent disintegration. Moreover, the new forces, which came in with the advent of the middle class and the intellectual awakening that followed the printing press, had made of the parliament quite a different thing from the parliament of two hundred years before. The struggle between Richard II and parliament was mainly a struggle between king and barons, but the struggle of the Stuarts with their parliament was chiefly a struggle between king and commons. The new merchant classes were stirring. They may have been impelled by their selfish interests or by their constitutional and ecclesiastical principles. At all events they were quite willing to support by their contributions the itinerant non-conformist preachers who were making such heavy inroads upon the church of England.¹ The whole 17th century is marked by the flood of pamphlets which came out in attack upon, and in support of, political and religious claims. Bagehot's "age of discussion" had arrived.

But nationality and debates could not at once secure the recognition of party principles and practices. John Eliot tried to organize a parliamentary opposition, and he was treated by James I as an outlaw. And, from the point of view of the king, he was an outlaw. He was against the king, and in the past the simple way of dealing with a man opposed to the king was to kill him, just as, if he were successful, he would kill the king and take his place. When the twelve members of the House of Commons called on James I at Newmarket in 1621 the stubborn Scotch king said ironically:

¹ See the earliest extant letter of Oliver Cromwell, written to Mr. Storie, of London, January 11, 1635. (Carlyle, *Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, Vol. I, Letter I.)

"Chairs! Chairs! here be twal' Kynges comin'!"¹ Looking at Pym and the other eleven, not as individuals, but in their capacity as representatives of parliament, James was not far wrong. When we get down to the stormy days of 1640 and Pym rises higher in power, the pamphleteers refer to him over and over again as King Pym. "Is there no king but Pym for to assent what shall be done by act of parliament?"² When the five members were driven from the House by King Charles and his soldiers in January, 1641, and came back a few days later in triumph from the City of London, Sir Edward Dering could write to his wife: "If I could be Pym with honesty I had rather be Pym than King Charles."³ Of course, all this is more than a personal tribute to Pym. In the large sense it is testimony to the new power in parliament of which Pym was the leader. When his opponents call him King Pym they are really accusing him of trying to get control of the government. And whether or not Pym fully realized it, that is what he was trying to do.

The record of the Stuarts with their parliaments is a sorry one. The king proceeds from blunder to blunder, and the parliament advances from claim to claim. As Professor Pollard puts it: The policy of the parliament was "offensive strategy and defensive tactics."⁴ They steadily moved their lines forward and waited in the advanced position for the king to attack them. Over and over again the Stuarts tell the parliament not to meddle in the mysteries of government — that such matters as the Spanish marriage and the foreign wars are beyond the competence of parliament. Such statements might have been made with some truth two hundred years before, but the times had changed. An incompetent court was now talking to a competent parliament. There is something tragic in the sorrowful statement of Clarendon, the one extremely able man who followed Charles I: — "One side seemed to fight for monarchy with the weapons of confusion,

¹ J. Forster, *John Pym*, in *Statesmen of the Commonwealth*, Vol. II, p. 20.

² J. Forster, *Arrest of Five Members*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

⁴ *History of England*, p. 138.

and the other to destroy the King and Government with all the principles and regularity of monarchy.”¹ A new thing had happened. Parliament had been for a generation the centre of the opposition to king and church. When the king left his capital, the nation, therefore, looked to parliament for orders. Parliament had become the executive. Parliament had become king, and for a few years it might be fairly said that the leadership of the government rested with the man who could best control by argument and organizing capacity the action of the deliberative assembly.

The cause of parliamentary government, of course, did not move forward uninterruptedly. Pym died, and no one was found to take his place. Then, with the great military success of Cromwell and the growing inefficiency of parliament, the governmental authority shifted to the military forces. Cromwell, at first indirectly and then openly, became the government. But Cromwell found the organization of a new type of government a much more difficult task than the destruction of the old form. The brilliant victories at Naseby and Marston Moor might remove an ancient tyranny, but the enduring institutions of a people are not made by cavalry charges. Milton, in his Ode to Cromwell, wrote that: “peace hath her victories no less than those of war.” But even the genius and energy of a Cromwell could not completely garner the victories of peace. Thomas Hill Green gives the reason in an arresting sentence. The victories of peace “are to be won not in days but in centuries, and by the energy not of feeling but of thought.”² For several years, a stern Puritan régime was forced upon England at the point of the sword, and then in 1660 Charles II was welcomed back to the throne by all classes. The pleasure-loving king said smilingly that “it had been his own fault that he had been absent so long, for he saw nobody that did not protest he had ever wished for his return.”³

¹ *History of the Rebellion*, Vol. III, p. 231.

² *Works of T. H. Green*, Vol. III, p. 354.

³ Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, Vol. VI, p. 264.

Clarendon came back with Charles II and made a strong effort to unite all elements, but contrary events were too strong for him. Clarendon was not an intolerant man. Perhaps the chief cause of his weakness and failures with the Cavalier parliament was his unwillingness to go as far as they wished in punishing the upholders of the Cromwell régime and repairing the losses that the Cavaliers had suffered under the protectorate. He was enough of a modern to desire to have his king follow the constitution and avoid encroachment upon existing parliamentary rights, but he was not enough of a modern to see that with the age of discussion the king must learn to govern through the parliament. Pym had insisted that the king's advisers were to be responsible to parliament. This was made one of the principal planks of the Grand Remonstrance. Clarendon tried to be responsible to both the king and parliament, and both deserted him. Danby paid more attention to parliament than Clarendon, but he was still the minister of the king. When we come to Somers there is a change. The parliament had clearly made William III king. Somers actually owed responsibility to parliament as well as to the king. A generation later Walpole, the first parliamentary prime minister, started his notable career, and for almost twenty years a commoner governed England in the name of the king. It is interesting to note that Walpole denied that he was prime minister, as Clarendon had made the same denial sixty years before, but it is equally clear that Walpole was prime minister in the modern sense, and that Clarendon was not. The vital thing which had happened was that which Pym had asked for in 1640. The advisers of the king had become responsible to parliament, and this made parliament the real executive.

But how was parliament to function? There was a narrow electorate to be sure. It has been well pointed out that this electorate was largely controlled by the great families of England. In the last generation a new emphasis has been put upon economic history, and the tendency is to explain that the landed interest, the church interest, or the new com-

mercial and moneyed interest governed England during the first half of the 18th century. But this only pushes the inquiry back one step. How were the men representing these interests able to get along with one another? In the 15th century parliament had control of the king's council, but the various groups in parliament could not agree. They had no machinery by which they could settle their differences without destroying each other. Nor was the situation much improved in the 17th century. Pym and Strafford were both educated men, one a graduate of Cambridge, the other of Oxford. They were both able men — extremely able men. It is possible at this date, when far removed from the subject of their controversy, to believe that they were both patriotic men. There were those who would have saved Strafford's life, but Essex's answer seemed convincing: "stone-dead hath no fellow."¹ The struggle was quite clearly "thy head or my head."

Men who feared for their own heads were not very careful of the heads of others. The spirit of the parliament in the early 17th century is well summed up in the sentence: "It will be time enough to settle rules to live by when we are sure to live."² Before a parliament could make any considerable headway in governing a nation it was necessary to make some progress in controlling its own fears and hates. In the proceedings to impeach Danby in 1678 the Earl of Carnarvon made a remarkable speech — attributed by one of his hearers to excessive indulgence in claret — in which he admirably summed up the results of the factional strife of the 17th century:

My Lords, I understand but little of Latin, but a good deal of English and not a little of the English history, from which I have learnt the mischiefs of such kinds of prosecutions as these, and the ill fate of the prosecutors. I could bring many instances, and those very ancient; but, my lords, I shall go no farther back than the latter end of Queen Elizabeth's reign, at which time the Earl of Essex was run down by Sir Walter Raleigh. My Lord Bacon, he ran down Sir Walter Raleigh, and your lordships know what became of

¹ Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, Vol. I, p. 341.

² Forster, *John Pym*, p. 142.

my Lord Bacon. The Duke of Buckingham he ran down my Lord Bacon, and your lordships know what happened to the Duke of Buckingham. Sir Thomas Wentworth, afterwards Earl of Strafford, ran down the Duke of Buckingham, and you all know what became of him. Sir Harry Vane, he ran down the Earl of Strafford, and your lordships know what became of Sir Harry Vane. Chancellor Hyde, he ran down Sir Harry Vane, and your lordships know what became of the Chancellor. Sir Thomas Osborne, now Earl of Danby, ran down Chancellor Hyde; but what will become of the Earl of Danby, your lordships best can tell. But let me see that man that dare run the Earl of Danby down, and we shall soon see what will become of him.¹

Danby went to the Tower, but not to the scaffold. In 1715, Oxford and Bolingbroke were impeached, and this was the last purely political impeachment. The effort to impeach Walpole in 1742 failed. As Morley puts it: "Political mistake has ceased to be a crime."² Thereafter men whose only offense was to run counter to a majority lost their offices but not their heads. Parliament learned to govern in the 18th century where it had completely failed in the 15th, and partially failed in the 17th, because the members of parliament were learning to organize themselves. So far as our past experience goes, the generalization of Guizot would seem to be justified: "A popular assembly can only become the habitual instrument of a strong and regular government when it is itself strongly and regularly organized and governed; and this can only be the case when it is divided into great parties, united by common interests and principles, and proceeding in a consistent and disciplined manner, under acknowledged leaders, towards determinate ends."³

The organization of the members of parliament into regular parties, which enabled parliamentary government to function, was not an easy task. The political party is not an exception to the general rule that enduring institutions are not made in a night. Macaulay and Guizot place the beginning of English parties in the parliamentary differences that arose at the beginning of the second session of the Long Parlia-

¹ *Parliamentary History of England*, edited by William Cobbett, Vol. IV, p. 1073 (30 Charles II, 1678-9). See also Osmund Airy, *Charles II*, pp. 233-4.

² J. Morley, *Walpole*, p. 43.

³ F. Guizot, *The Causes of the Success of the English Revolution*, pp.

ment in 1641.¹ Ranke, however, says that they came into full being as late as the reign of William III. Hallam dates the beginnings of Whigs and Tories from 1679. Professor W. C. Abbott places their origin between 1660 and 1675, that is, as early as the ministry of Clarendon. Certainly in the time of the Tudors there was no place for the actual party. In 1549 the erratic Lord Seymour desired a change in the government, and he tried to create an organization to bring it about. He received from former Chancellor Wriothesley the answer: "For God's sake, my lord, take heed what you do; I hear abroad that you make a party."² The first edition of Bacon's essays was published in 1597, and at that time Bacon could write of "faction or party" that "leagues within the state are ever pernicious to monarchies; for they raise an obligation paramount to obligation of sovereignty."³

But the struggle of men to associate themselves for specific political purposes had been going on successfully even under the Tudors. Professor Jameson has pointed out the important part that the "Association" played in the development of political action in England in the 16th and 17th centuries. The word "Association" in the prevailing usage at that time meant a "signed agreement to pursue a given course of public action." The time was not ripe for organization for the general conduct of the government. That was the function of the king and his council. But there were specific tasks that required concerted action. The Association prepared by Burghley and Walsingham for the protection of Queen Elizabeth in 1584 was signed not only by the principal officials in London but by prominent people in all the counties. The Scottish National Covenant of 1638; the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643; the Association attributed to Shaftesbury in 1681; Sir Edward Seymour's Association in 1688 designed in part to bring William of Orange to the throne; Sir Rowland Gwyn's Association in

¹ Macaulay, *History of England*, Vol. I, Chapter i; Guizot, *Causes of the Success of the English Revolution*, p. 10.

² J. A. Froude, *History of England*, Vol. V, p. 148.

³ F. Bacon, *Essay on Faction*, in *Works*, Vol. I, p. 170.

1696 to protect King William; the Associations in 1715 and 1745 to protect the House of Hanover; all of these were extra-legal. They owed their origin to similar devices in Holland and in France, and they formed an avenue of political action without recourse to the regular monarchical administration.¹

The extra-legal "Association" formed for a definite political purpose certainly antedated the party and was still used as a political device after parties became well established. As parliament slowly found its place there was need for something more than the sporadic "Association." Professor Abbott has given an excellent description of the gradual growth of parliamentary groups and parties between the restoration of Charles II in 1660 and the parliamentary session of 1675. "It was . . . obvious that individuals as such could have at best but a limited influence among five hundred of their fellows. Some new device to direct this new power was therefore necessary, and that, as it gradually appeared, lay in but one direction, organization."² Voluntary organizations of men became more and more imperative. Men were beginning to learn what Burke later so well expressed: "Where men are not acquainted with each other's principles, nor experienced in each other's talents, nor at all practised in their mutual habitudes and dispositions by joint efforts in business; no personal confidence, no friendship, no common interest, subsisting among them; it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, perseverance

¹ J. Franklin Jameson, "The Association," in the *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1917, pp. 305-12.

² "The Origin of English Political Parties," *The American Historical Review*, July, 1919, p. 588. The French publicist, Boutmy, feels that well-disciplined parties could not have been formed in the parliaments of the 17th and 18th centuries had it not been for a well-knit aristocracy. "It is not difficult to believe that under a popular form of government, the multiplicity of opinions, the divergence of interests, the shiftings of sentiment in the masses of the people would have reduced Parliament to a state of disorganized confusion, of moving chaos; that within the parliamentary body a multiplicity of petty groups would have formed for an instant only to dissolve again, that no main line of division could have been agreed on, no permanent classification arrived at." (Émile Boutmy, *The English Constitution*, pp. 176-177.)

or efficacy.”¹ The active participants in parliamentary life began to learn from rude experience that “no men could act with effect who did not act in concert; that no men could act in concert, who did not act with confidence; that no men could act with confidence, who were not bound together by common opinions, common affections, and common interests.”²

Precisely at what time a group of men acting in concert in political action attained an aim and a degree of organization entitling them to be called a political party is impossible to state. The extra-legal character of the party and the inability to agree upon a definition of it make it easy, as was shown above, to choose any one of a number of dates. Morse makes no effort to fix the beginning of party government at a definite time. He does, however, make this interesting comment: “Slowly and clumsily it (party) was fashioned during the quarrels between Cavalier and Roundhead. Awkwardly it began to claim and to fill its place under the later Stuarts and William III. But during the reign of the first and second Georges it came to be so well established that it could withstand the reaction led by George III.”³

But party government in parliament did not necessarily mean party organization of the electorate. English government was not sufficiently representative to make this possible. The relatively small number of people who voted were appealed to by the rival parliamentary parties, sometimes with reason and argument, sometimes with money or other material rewards.⁴ With the fall of Walpole in 1742 the first Whig party fell into disorganization. Its work was largely finished. After a period of confusion under lesser men, the first Pitt ruled England for several years, governing by genius rather than by party. His success at home was due in no small

¹ Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*, in *Works*, Vol. I, p. 422.

² *Ibid.*, p. 425.

³ *Infra*, p. 7.

⁴ For a thorough study see W. T. Morgan, *Political Parties and Party Leaders in the Reign of Queen Anne*; and “An Eighteenth Century Election in England,” in *The Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1922.

measure to the outside pressure of the foreign wars. He revived and stimulated the national sentiment of England and prepared the way for his son's appeal to the country. But England was not to enjoy the glories of a one-man government without paying the price. If a Patriot Minister, ruling almost alone, could govern the people, why could not one who thought himself a Patriot King do the same thing? George III tried to dominate parliament. The effort, which succeeded for a while, ended with the American Revolution, and then England settled down to a recognition of the principle that the ministers were responsible to parliament for the conduct of the business of the government, even though this business still continued to be called, for historical and sentimental reasons, the king's business.

The next important stage in the development of the English party and representative system came after the Reform Bill of 1832, which did away with the rotten boroughs and slightly widened the suffrage. It introduced the modern system of representative government in England. After that time, when there was a clash between ministry and parliament and an appeal was taken to the constituencies, the ministry resigned if the election went against them. In 1835, with the resignation of the Peel Ministry, we have the first clear instance of a whole ministry resigning after failing to obtain the support of the country in the general elections. Both the ministry and the House of Commons were thereafter directly responsible to the electorate.¹

But the electorate of 1835 was far different from the electorate of today in England. Even after the Reform Bill of 1832 only the property-owning classes or the more prosperous tenants could vote. The two important extensions of the suffrage granted by Disraeli and Gladstone in 1867 and 1884 tended to make control by the electorate more nearly identical with control by the people. These suffrage acts, particularly that of 1867, also had an important effect upon the development of English party organization. In order to circumvent a

¹ Sir T. E. May, *Constitutional History of England*, Vol. I, pp. 145-153.

clause in the act of 1867 the radicals of Birmingham, under the leadership of Mr. William Harris, organized in October, 1867, the famous "Birmingham Caucus." This scheme achieved remarkable success as a type of local political machinery. It came to be known as the Local Liberal Association and was widely imitated throughout England. Because of its success the Conservatives were also compelled to develop a similar type of local party machinery, and the Birmingham Caucus thus became the prototype of the more important forms of democratic party organization as it exists in England to-day.

The American colonies took their political ideas from the mother country but rapidly modified them to meet the novel conditions of colonial life. There was, of course, no widespread organization of parties until after the adoption of the Constitution. But the people were obtaining a constant training in political action. England helped the American colonies by what Burke so happily called a "wise and salutary neglect." The result was that for several generations the colonists had an invaluable training in local politics. Moreover, in America as in England, the extra-legal "Association" was used in the 17th and 18th centuries for effecting political ends. In 1689 the Protestant citizens of Maryland signed an "Association" in defense of William and Mary. Sir Rowland Gwyn's Association to protect William III was signed not only "by the rude fisherman of the Scilly Rocks" but also by the "citizens of New York and the tobacco planters of Virginia."¹ In 1745 Governor Gooch, of Virginia, proposed in his opening address to the House of Burgesses that the burgesses and inhabitants of Virginia enter into an Association to defend George II from the perils of the Jacobite rising. The period of agitation from 1763-1775 was particularly productive of associations. In 1769, when the Virginia House of Burgesses was dissolved by Governor Botetourt, an "Association" was formed and signed to refrain from the use of importations, and in 1774 one of the

¹ Macaulay, *History of England*, Vol. IV, pp. 533, 544-548.

first acts of the First Continental Congress was the preparation, the signing and the circulation of an "Association" in the nature of a non-importation agreement.¹

Although there was little place for party government in the colonies, groups, whether called parties or factions, existed from the beginning. As John Adams expressed it: "You say our divisions began with federalism and anti-federalism? Alas! they began with human nature; they have existed in America from its first plantation. In every colony, divisions always prevailed. In New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and all the rest, a court and country party has always contended."²

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution and for some time thereafter the political leaders in America looked upon factions or parties as detrimental. In this they followed in the footsteps of their English forefathers. Not only was there no provision in the Constitution for political parties, but the framers of the Constitution expressly tried to guard against them. They provided for an electoral college system to secure the election of the president, and seemed to expect that this would operate in a non-partisan manner. No mention of parties exists in the Constitution. James Madison, in the famous No. X of the *Federalist*, indicated that he believed parties and factions to be a leading menace to the new government:

Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it.

Madison took especial pride in stating that the new government contemplated for the American nation provided unusual safeguards against the detrimental influence of parties and

¹ Jameson, "The Association," loc. cit.

² *Infra*, p. 187.

factions. Other examples of the contemporary dislike and distrust of parties may readily be found.¹

Yet the system of government created by the constitution was one which inevitably necessitated the origin and development of the party system. There was not only a division of political authority and responsibility between the federal and state governments, but, following the dictum of Montesquieu, there was a strict separation of the three phases of governmental power in the federal government. The executive, legislative and judicial departments were, in formal theory at least, sharply separated and balanced against each other. It was necessary to have some form of organization which would give unity of policy and action in state and federal governments and would unify the three formally separated departments of government in the federal government. The party has been the organization which has served this double purpose. Finally, the new government was one in which there were a vast number of elective offices, which were of real importance. An organization was essential to provide candidates for these offices and to secure their election. The party also fulfilled this need.²

Washington took the members of his cabinets from both parties, as William III and Anne had done almost one hundred years before. The legitimate function of an opposition

¹ Writing from Paris on March 13, 1789, to Francis Hopkinson, Jefferson said: "I am not a Federalist, because I never subscribed the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever in religion, in philosophy, in politics, or in anything else where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction is the last degradation of a free and moral agent. If I could not go to heaven but with a party I would not go there at all. Therefore I protest to you that I am not of the party of the Federalists. But I am much further from that of the Antifederalists." (*The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, Vol. V, p. 456.)

Marshall, writing to his brother ten years later, said: "The fate of my election is extremely uncertain. The means used to defeat it are despicable in the extreme and yet they succeed. Nothing I believe more debases or pollutes the human mind than faction (party)." (A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, Vol. II, p. 410.)

² Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, pp. 204-213; C. A. Beard, *American Government and Politics*, pp. 126 ff.

party was not comprehended by him. The party spirit during his administration and the bitterness of the party recriminations — with those in his own official family actually employing pamphleteers to attack their political opponents — reminds one of the party strife during the reigns of William and Anne. In fact, party spirit so alarmed Washington that in his *Farewell Address* he thus warned his countrymen:

The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government. All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberations of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle and of fatal tendency.

And yet, within a generation after Washington's *Farewell Address*, it was a well-recognized practice to form associations with the design to control "the regular deliberations of the constituted authorities," for we must remember that one of those "constituted authorities" was the electoral college, and within less than thirty years elaborate party associations, reaching down into all the voting districts of the land, allowed the people to make of the electoral college only a recording mechanism.

Party machinery in our early national period took its origins from pre-Revolutionary caucuses in the colonial towns.¹ County conventions also developed in the latter part of the

¹ John Adams thus mentions an early caucus in pre-Revolutionary Boston: Boston. February. This day learned that the Caucus Club meets, at certain times, in the garret of Tom Dawes, the Adjutant of the Boston Regulars. He has a large house, and he has a movable partition in his garret which he takes down, and the whole club meets in one room. There they smoke tobacco till you cannot see from one end of the garret to the other. There they drink flip, I suppose, and there they choose a moderator, who puts questions to the vote regularly; and selectmen, assessors, collectors, wardens, firewards, and representatives, are regularly chosen before they are chosen in the town. Uncle Fairfield, Story, Ruddock, Adams, Cooper and a *rudis indigestaque moles* of others are members. They send committees to wait on the merchant's club, and to propose and join in the choice of men and measures. Captain Cunningham says, they have often solicited him to go to those caucuses, they have assured him benefits in his business, etc. (*The Works of John Adams*, edited by C. F. Adams, Boston, Little and Brown, 1850. Vol. II, p. 144.)

18th century. When it became necessary to organize state and national governments some form of party organization of such scope was rendered essential. The legislative caucus first supplied this need. The legislators were usually prominent men from all sections of the political community and represented the parties in the legislature. Owing to the difficulty of travel in those days it was a great convenience to have a group of party men from all sections of the state or country assembled in some central place. The legislative caucus naturally became the nominating convention and the one fairly permanent party organization and committee. In its federal form this was known as the Congressional Caucus, and it controlled the nominations for president from 1804 to 1824.

On account of the fact that parties were looked upon as extra-legal and extraneous bodies of sinister potency at this time — being in fact literally outlaws — the central organization of the parties — *the caucus* — was, naturally, severely criticized. It was hailed as “King Caucus” and the deposition of this usurping monarch was eagerly sought. It is not surprising, however, that most of the criticism of the caucus came from those who felt that they were losing thereby. Those who felt well satisfied with its results regarded it as simply a necessary evil essential to the operation of the party system at the time.¹

The destruction of the Congressional Caucus as a factor in national politics was accomplished as a part of the democratic-

¹ Professor McMaster thus summarizes the argument set forth by those who favored the caucus system: “We deprecate the caucus method of nomination. We admit that it has much the appearance of an unwarrantable assumption of the rights of the people. But it is not. The congressmen meet as citizens, acting in the interests of union and harmony, single out one man and bring him to the attention of the electors. The electors are not bound, though they are asked, to support him. They are quite at liberty to choose some one else. The caucus-system, moreover, has grown out of the nature of our free institutions. In a country where all are free to nominate, this piece of political machinery is necessary, in order to prevent a dozen men being put in nomination and defeat thus assured. Only when the people waver in their choice does the caucus become dangerous.” J. B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, Vol. IV, p. 365.)

frontier wave which brought Andrew Jackson to the presidency. Jackson believed himself at a disadvantage with the politicians who controlled the caucus. He and many of his followers were enraged by the contested election for president in 1824, as a result of which Jackson believed that he had been cheated out of the presidency. He and his supporters began a thorough-going attack upon the congressional control of the party nominating system. By the time of the campaign of 1828 the caucus had disappeared, and, by 1832, the national nominating convention had appeared in its place. The first national nominating convention was that of the Anti-Masonic party which met in Baltimore in 1831 and nominated William Wirt as its candidate for president. The Whigs met in convention later in the year and nominated Clay, and the next spring the Democrats followed and nominated Jackson. The convention system, existing along with the so-called local "caucus," was soon adopted in the many subdivisions of the government for the purpose of nominating candidates for lesser offices. Along with this came the development of permanent national, state and county committees to look after party interests in the intervals between the assembling of the periodic nominating conventions.

The effect of this constant co-operation in party management between men in different parts of the country had a most important effect in welding the country together. Men in widely separated localities were learning to work together. The men of New England, of the South, and of the frontier were learning to know one another. Moreover, in the fine phrase of Burke, they were securing "hard essays of practiced friendship and experimented fidelity."¹ And, whether they fully knew it or not, they were actually proving "that friendship was no mean step toward patriotism; that he who in the common intercourse of life showed that he regarded somebody beside himself, when he came to act in a public situation might probably consult some other interest than his

¹ Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*, in *Works*, Vol. I, p. 425.

own.”¹ Professor Allen Johnson has well pointed out the importance of all this in the making of the new nation and delaying the Civil War: “Party was the last bond between slaveholding and non-slaveholding States. Party ties held long after social institutions had broken asunder. The Methodist church split in 1844; the Baptist church in 1845. The first of the great parties to lose its coherence, the Whig, was practically intact until the election of 1852. The Democratic party maintained a national organization until 1860. It is highly significant that religious institutions which stood for Christian brotherhood should have been unable to maintain their integrity, while political parties with no such inner, cohesive force should have held together.”²

As the parties developed strength and coherent organization their abuses likewise increased. Offices began to multiply and it became common to distribute them as rewards for party activity. Bribery, corruption and graft became not uncommon. This led to the establishment of various forms of state control over parties. The secret or Australian ballot was introduced gradually after 1880. The Pendleton Civil Service Law, passed by Congress in 1883, and a body of civil service laws adopted in various States were directed to the correction of the abuses incident to uncontrolled party domination of offices. Primary laws, designed to break down the control of nominations by a narrow group of politicians, were enacted, beginning with the California law of 1866 and the Ohio law of 1871. But the active period of primary legislation came with the opening of the 20th century. It is too early properly to balance the good and evil results of the direct primary system. For our present purpose it is important, however, to note that the effect of the modern legislation is to deprive the party of its extra-legal character. Party may have gained the advantage of being taken out of the outlaw class, but has it not lost the advantage of flexibility

¹ Burke, *Ibid.*, p. 424.

² Allen Johnson, “The Nationalizing Influence of Party,” in *The Yale Review*, November, 1906.

in organization? Has not the growing confinement of party to rigid legal forms put some obstacles in the way of the formation of new parties? Effort formerly directed to the making of a new party may hereafter be spent in endeavoring to capture one of the old parties. The result has been somewhat to confuse party aims.

If one would fully appreciate the great change that the modern political party has made in government he must compare the ordinary processes of government today with the methods of government two or three centuries ago. It is very easy to point to abuses of party government, but the fair test is to compare its contemporary abuses with the evils which existed under the prevailing modes of government before party government came in with the adoption of representative and democratic institutions. We lose entirely the meaning of party government unless we look upon it as one step — and by no means the final one — in that long and difficult problem of organization with which men have been concerned ever since they began to live together in political societies. Two hundred and fifty years is a very short period in the history of civilization. It may help to realize how short a period it is if we adopt Professor Robinson's vivid clock illustration.¹ He assumes that the anthropologists are correct when they tell us that man has walked erect upon this earth for more than two hundred and forty thousand years. If the origins of that remote period be counted the beginning of our day, and the present time be counted high noon, then at about twenty minutes before twelve there appeared the beginnings of Egyptian and Babylonian civilization. At about one and one quarter minutes before twelve, the printing press was invented and the basis was laid by which learning was to be democratized. About forty seconds before our noon man began to use the modern political party in order to govern himself and his neighbors. It has been utilized for a very short period, and yet, with all its evils, it has brought mighty changes in the methods of government. With all its im-

¹ J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, p. 239.

perfections, it has been a great educating medium for large masses of people. It has transformed into active participants in government a great number of people who knew government two centuries ago only when they felt it on their backs. And, perhaps most important of all, it has substituted arguments for swords and given us the beginnings — perhaps as yet the very faint beginnings — of tolerance in political life.

Yet Morse was interested in more than the historical events which had made parties inevitable. He was even more concerned about the end toward which party government seemed to be moving. And this is only another way of saying that he was a philosopher as well as an historian. Any single occurrence may be looked upon as the result of all the events that have gone before, or it may be looked upon as one of the causes of events that are still to come. The historian is primarily interested in the things that have been; the philosopher in the things which are to be. The historian concerns himself with the questions: What has happened? and how? But the philosopher asks: What is this for? Looked at negatively, party may be called a substitute for revolution, but looked at positively we must have something more than that to justify its future existence. This point of view Morse constantly emphasized. To what end? is the question that he keeps pressing home. In the paragraph which comes nearest to a definition of a party he states that it "has for its immediate end the advancement of the interests and the realization of the ideals, not of the people as a whole, but of the particular group or groups which it represents."¹ There is something quite fundamental in this. In the large sense, a state is itself a party. It is but a part of the civilized world. It may be the ultimate aim of the state to promote civilization, but it should be the *immediate* aim of the state to promote the interests and ideals of its own people. The party is a group within the state, and it is not an improper but a proper immediate end of party to promote the interests and ideals of the group.

Now, this view of party was not common when Morse wrote

¹ *Infra*, p. 11.

in 1891. Bolingbroke had indeed defined party as "men associated together for certain purposes, and certain interests, which are not, or which are not allowed to be, those of the community by others."¹ But Burke had given the classic definition of party as "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed."² Professor Macy, who wrote in 1900, makes a distinction between the political faction and the political party: "Each aims at the control of the supreme power of the State. The faction aims at supreme power for personal motives, and the triumphant faction is, in its very nature, a personal government. The party aims at the control of the supreme power through the sacrifice of personal motives for the sake of the common weal. The party represents the entire State; it denies special privilege; it aims to do that which is best for all classes."³ Professor Ford, however, writing in 1898, says: "The distinction between party and faction seems to be this: party aims at administrative control, while faction is the propaganda of a particular interest."⁴ Professor Beard, writing in 1913, in referring to the party alignment at the time of the formation of the American Constitution, says: "The point is, that the direct, impelling motive . . . was the economic advantages which the beneficiaries expected would accrue to themselves first, from their action."⁵

Is any reconciliation possible in the divergent views referred to above? Burke and Macy make the aim of party the promotion of national interest. Ford seems to make the only test of party that it "aims at administrative control." In this he is on firm ground, but he throws us back into doubt when he apparently speaks of "faction" as

¹ Bolingbroke, *Idea of Patriot King* (1738), in *Works*, Vol. III, p. 84.

² Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (1770), in *Works*, Vol. I, p. 425.

³ J. Macy, *Political Parties in the United States 1846-61*, p. 7.

⁴ H. J. Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics*, p. 127.

⁵ Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, pp. 17-18. See also Professor Beard's *Economic Basis of Politics*, and his letter to the *New Republic*, September 27, 1922, pp. 128-9.

antithetical to party because faction is "the propaganda of a particular interest." What of that case where party aims at administrative control *in order to serve a particular interest*, which Professor Beard would seem to urge is the typical form of party activity? ¹ Does not some of the confusion of thought rest upon the fundamental difficulty in determining what we mean by such words as "interest" and "ideal"? When Professor Beard seems to argue that the direct impelling motive of the group of men who drafted the American Constitution or the group of men who formed the Jeffersonian Democratic Party was their own selfish interests he cannot mean anything more than that the evidence before him indicates that the men in question actually did serve their own interests. Whether or not they really believed that the service of their own interests was the best service of the state, he cannot know. When we speak of ideals, are we not required in real life to attach them to particular individuals whose aims we are trying to analyze? The *ultimate* ideal of any group of men may be to promote the interests of the state or the interests of civilization. Each group, however, may think that it is by the advancement of its own plans that the true interests of the state will best be promoted. Unless we admit that each group does at times have such a belief it is hard to understand in what sense we call its aim an ideal. An ideal that only embraced the good of the particular group would be very hard to distinguish from selfishness.

One thing, however, will seem clear to anyone who reads these articles by Professor Morse. When he speaks of the immediate aim of party as being the interest of the group he is using the word "interest" in no narrow sense. Almost always he expressly couples "ideals" with "interest." Looking backward, party is a substitute for revolution; but, looking

¹ We get little help in the solution of this problem from the active participants in party struggles. Whether we go to Bacon, Halifax and Brougham or to Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Marshall, there seems to be a constant confusion in the use of the words "party" and "faction." A cynical reader of history might well conclude that faction should be defined as the party of your rival.

forward, "to promote the health, to aid the development, to secure from the state for each group that degree of recognition and fostering care which are its need and due — this is the not ignoble end for which parties exist." We may well agree with Morse when he says: —

In many ways the relationship of a party to the group of citizens of which it is the political representative, is like that of the state to the people of whom this group forms a part. In a general sense what the state undertakes to do for the people, a party undertakes to do for a group. To promote the national interest, that is, the interest that is common to all, is the immediate end of the state; to promote the group interest is the immediate end of the party. In working toward its proper end the state organizes and protects the people and fosters their development; the party does precisely the same for the group. Each state in dealing with other peoples secures for its own as much influence, reputation and material gain as it can; each party in dealing with other parties does the same for the group under its charge. In early times no state recognized the rights of other states; the same is equally true of early parties. After many ages of sanguinary struggle states are rising to the consciousness of a world-unity and the obligations which this unity imposes on each towards all; the same has happened to parties. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the humanization of man — the noblest of all the fruits of progress — is more evident in the changed and changing interrelationship of states or in that of parties.¹

The last two articles in this collection of Morse's writings are added, despite the fact that they do not deal directly with party or party leaders. They do, however, treat of party issues which have been and are still of importance in American political life. They will be of interest to Morse's former students, not only as his views on important questions, but also as an illustration of his habit of thought and method of work. The discussion of "Commercial Union with Canada," which appeared only one-third of a century ago is already singularly out of date. Morse took the same view as that later taken by President Taft in 1911 on the proposed Reciprocity Treaty, namely that the commercial union might well lead ultimately to political union. If it should be urged now, as it can properly be, that this point of view strangely ignores the strong national sentiment of the Canadians, it must be remembered that in 1888 the view was still held that the prob-

¹ *Infra*, p. 23.

able future historical development of the English self-governing colonies would lead in time to complete independence. Since 1888, however, the trend has been strongly toward imperial unity, partly because of the vigorous policy of Chamberlain and his followers and partly because of the unifying effect of the Boer War and the recent World War. It is now generally agreed that President Taft injured rather than aided the cause of commercial unity with Canada by looking upon it — as did Professor Morse twenty years before — as a possible step toward political unity. It is hardly necessary to state, however, that neither Professor Morse nor President Taft ever conceived of political unity as possible except in obedience to the wishes of both countries. Political unity is not necessarily a phase of the question and need no longer even be considered, but a greater commercial unity not only with Canada but with our neighbors to the South is still a question which might well be studied by statesmen of all the countries concerned.

On the general question of protective tariffs, which are dealt with in the last two articles, the position of Morse is clear and sane. He was too much of a nationalist to overlook the advantage of protection in the early stages of our country in strengthening the Union. He sympathized with Hamilton's original policy, but he believed that the ends which Hamilton sought had been fully attained by the latter part of the last century. He believed, moreover, with Hamilton that the tariff was a bounty,¹ and that a bounty should not be given to a home producer indirectly by holding out his competitor's goods unless the government recognized the national advan-

¹ In "The Report on Manufactures" presented to Congress in December, 1790, in speaking of protecting duties, Hamilton said: "Duties of this nature evidently amount to a virtual bounty on the domestic fabrics; since, by enhancing the charges on foreign articles, they enable the national manufacturers to undersell all their foreign competitors." And again, when speaking of direct bounties, Hamilton, in the same work, says: "As often as a duty upon a foreign article makes an addition to its price, it causes an extra expense to the community for the benefit of the domestic manufacturer. A bounty does no more." (*Works of Alexander Hamilton*, Federal Edition, Vol. IV, pp. 143-4, 150.)

tage to be such as would warrant the giving of a bounty by direct payment. He further felt that, with the increasing size of the country and the growing complexity of its interests, the difficulties in practice of distributing the tariff benefits to accomplish this end were almost insuperable.

There is not space to attempt here a general estimate of Morse's life and character. Those who read the articles in this book will get a picture of a singularly well poised mind, with a long reach backward and a hopeful view of the future. Only those who knew him, who studied under him, who worked and lived with him will ever know his great modesty, his broad sympathy, his keen, eager inquiry for facts. To a deep love of books, he joined a rare capacity for working with and understanding those about him, whatever their walk in life. He was essentially a neighborly man. He studied the processes of government, not only in the books, but also in the activities and opinions of his daily associates. Because he got from his neighbors what he took to them — sympathy and courage and generous ideals — he had a deep faith in American democracy. One may very well wonder whether there are many college professors who, in discussing the effect of the sugar tariff, could go about in their home town and get the intimate facts of family life which are disclosed in the article on "Equality in Taxation."¹

On the larger aspects of Morse's political philosophy the articles speak for themselves. It may be sufficient to say here that he never wavered in his faith in the democratic movement, and that his faith was based upon a wide and deep knowledge of history. What he understood by the democratic movement is thus explained in his own words:

Historically the progress of a people begins with one or a few of its representatives. For a time, rightly and necessarily, the enjoyment of the "higher goods" of life which embody this progress is confined to the few. But where public conditions are healthful and progress is normal, participation in these "higher goods" soon begins to widen, and this process goes on until at last the humblest citizen becomes to the full measure of his capacity a sharer in

¹ *Infra*, 222-224.

them. This diffusion of the "higher" and the "highest goods" of civilization, first within national limits and then universally, is the aim of the democratic movement.¹

In his writings, in his classroom teachings, in his daily life in Amherst, he bent his efforts unceasingly to promote the democratic movement, and we might apply to Morse himself the words that he used in reference to another: "To protect and assist the process by which this is accomplished, determines for him the form and functions of government and the aim of public policy. For the divine right to rule, whether claimed by king, parliament or party, he substituted the divine indefeasible right of the people to grow."²

DWIGHT WHITNEY MORROW

ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY.
March 1, 1923.

¹ *Infra*, 159.

² *Infra*, 72.

PARTIES AND PARTY LEADERS

PARTIES AND PARTY LEADERS

I

THE PLACE OF PARTY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM¹

IT IS evident even to the careless observer that party fills a large space in the world of politics. In the United States, France, Great Britain, and indeed in all countries where party government is fully established, the citizen receives the larger share of his political education from party, and through party discharges the larger portion of his political duties. But despite its conceded importance in practical politics, very few have as yet turned their attention to the philosophy of party. As a rule even the best of the formal treatises on political science give it little or no consideration. This neglect may be due in some degree to the fact that the establishment of party government is of recent date, and also to the further fact that previous to the establishment of party government, party was regarded not as the servant but as the enemy of the state. It used to be thought of as having no rights in the political household. It led therefore the precarious life of an outlaw. Under governments which rest on force, as well as under governments that base their claims on divine right, there is no room for party. Such governments see in party a denial of their pretensions and an aspirant to their seats. This dislike of party on theoretic grounds was confirmed by its early conduct. Treated as an outlaw it behaved as an outlaw. Conventional morality it set at defiance. It grew up in the atmosphere of irresponsibility. Since its first

¹ *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. II, November, 1891.

work was to unsettle and destroy, it arrayed against itself all conservative influences both good and bad; and this hostility has always stood in the way of the discovery of its functions and the recognition of its services. It is clear that the framers of the Constitution of the United States did not make full allowance for the fact that the system which they planned would be worked by party; had they done so they would not have devised so futile an arrangement as the electoral college.¹

But whatever may be the excuse for past neglect, there can be no good ground for its continuance. We live to-day under party government. We want good government; and the first step towards securing this is to acquaint ourselves with the nature, the capacity and the limitations of our new ruler. But party is by no means identical with government. It is both something more and something less. It is one of a number of factors which taken together constitute the system found in every advanced state by means of which its political life and progress are maintained. But what place does party hold in this system? The first step towards an answer is to obtain a clear conception of the nature of the state and of the several factors which serve as the organs of its activity.

The state, for the sake of which the political system exists, may be defined as a people politically organized; that is, a people whose classes and individuals form an organic whole in and through which the political wants of each and all are satisfied. No people that lacks this political self-sufficiency can be a state. A community may be so organized that it can satisfy most of the wants which its members feel as citizens, and yet if it must go outside of itself in order to find satisfaction for even one of these, that community is not a state. In this sense — the sense which we employ when we speak of France and Russia as states — neither Canada nor Massachusetts is a state. But political self-sufficiency, although essential to every true state, does not imply isolation. A degree of interdependence among states in matters of a non-political nature is not only desirable but indispensable. Without it progress must be

¹ Bryce: *Hamilton and De Tocqueville*.

slow and inconsiderable. This useful interdependence is partly economic, partly intellectual, and partly moral and spiritual. That it obtain from other peoples their highest good and that it impart to them its own, is the condition on which alone any people can take a worthy part in promoting civilization. The traffic in ideas is safe enough unless it becomes one-sided. The habit of receiving and enjoying what others produce without producing and giving what others may enjoy is not less hurtful to a people than to an individual. The "ultimate end" for which each state exists is to contribute as much as possible to the progress of mankind, but its immediate end as well as its absorbing occupation, is to provide for its own development and welfare.¹

The organ through which the state provides for its ordinary wants is government. It will aid in the effort to obtain a true conception of government, to think of it as the agent whom the state commissions to do certain things in certain ways and for as long a time as the state sees fit to continue the commission. It will aid also to separate in idea the agent from the agency: the agent being the person or group of persons who govern, and the agency the post or group of posts which they fill. Government is the creature of the state. Its office is to serve the state. It has no rights as against the state. It is good in proportion to its obedience and in proportion to the efficiency and fidelity with which it provides for the interests committed to its charge.

But how shall the state secure this obedience and fidelity? In the earlier stages of political development the state did not as a rule secure them at all. Government regularly usurped the functions of the state and identified itself with the state. When Louis XIV. asserted that he, the king, was the state, he advanced a claim which accorded with the practice of most governments before his day and for some time afterwards. There had been, it is true, exceptional great rulers who held themselves to be the servants of their people, and there had been exceptional great periods of considerable duration when

¹ Burgess, *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, I, 83.

government was obedient to the state. But these were in the best days of Greece and Rome. Before and afterwards and nearly everywhere government was the master and the state, the people, was the servant or rather the slave. This, however, did not come by chance. It was the necessary consequence of the fact that the people were then in their political infancy. The governments were guardians who, since there was no court to call them to account, administered the estates of their wards in their own interests. This statement, however, does not apply without qualification to Latin-Christian Europe during mediæval times. Fortunately each people had then not one but three government-guardians, namely, the pope, the emperor or king, and the feudal lord. Each in turn interposed as the champion of the people against the oppression of the other two. The people under the protection and leadership of first one and then another of their masters, learned to understand, to value, and to fight for their rights, and in this way made some advance towards political manhood. How greatly this mediæval division of government contributed to progress may be seen in the political retrogression which followed, when, at the beginning of the modern period, the national king overcame both pope and baron and appropriated to himself the whole or nearly the whole of government. The peoples were at that time still very far from being able to cope with government. They possessed the principle of representative government; but nowhere could they avail themselves of it in resisting the encroachments of the king. In Spain and France the principle itself was disowned and for a long time almost forgotten. In England it remained, but for a considerable period Parliament was excluded from its highest functions, and degraded into an almost passive instrument of royal policy and caprice. The early Tudors oppressed the state; but, because they did this by means of Parliament, England was able to preserve what her neighbors lost, namely, an institution through which in better times the state could win back its freedom and its rightful authority over government. The English, moreover, were the first to outgrow the political

immaturity which had made oppression possible during the fifteenth and much of the sixteenth centuries. Amid the fierce conflicts of the Reformation period, and under the tactful though despotic guidance of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, the people learned to think for themselves; and the state, apart from government, came to have a mind and a will of its own. This was one step towards emancipation. The second belongs to the seventeenth century. Stated in its most comprehensive form, the result of the struggle between Parliament and the Stuarts and between Parliament and Cromwell was the overthrow of the theory of the divine right not only of kings but of government, and the establishment of the doctrine of the supremacy of the state over government. This, I think, is the innermost meaning of the Bill of Rights of 1689. This epoch-marking instrument signifies in the history of the English-speaking peoples the second and greater Restoration; not of the king "to his own," as in 1660, but of the people to their own. The victory won, the question which next arose was, how shall its fruits be secured? By what devices can the state make sure that government will always and fully execute its will?

The oldest and crudest of these is revolution. But this, although frequently useful, and at times indispensable, is always costly. It leaves behind a demoralization and exhaustion, from which the state recovers slowly and imperfectly. Revolution, moreover, can never be more than a partial remedy for the evil under consideration. Indeed its greatest service is to enable the state to regain for a short period its lost mastery over government, and while in possession of this to make those changes in the form and personnel of government which promise greater efficiency and more perfect obedience. But such changes are experiments; and there is usually much in the situation which works against their success. In the case of many, perhaps of most revolutions, the governments which they set up prove not less despotic than those which they overthrow.

The constituent convention — the agency through which the

state acts in the formal reconstruction of government — is most frequently resorted to in those crises when an impending revolution is to be averted, or when, in consequence of revolution, government is to be constituted anew. Employed in this way, the constituent convention is one of the most impressive and useful of the means at the command of the state, for asserting its rights and enforcing its will. But it is open to the same objections which apply to revolutions; indeed it is itself a revolution. It does not, and cannot, secure for the state the continuance of that control over government which in its name and for a moment it strongly asserts.

Another device also of ancient date, by which the state seeks to hold government in due subordination to itself, is a constitution. This, defined in simple terms, is a body of rules by which the state constitutes government and attempts to regulate its conduct. It is obvious, however, that these rules, whether accepted slowly, one by one, as custom gives them form and authority, or all at once when promulgated by a constituent convention, can never adequately express the will of the state. They can only tell what that will is in respect to the general direction of public policy. Particulars they cannot touch. Not only in respect to ordinary legislation and administration, but also in respect to the extraordinary measures which emergencies call for, a constitution, however comprehensive, and however careful in the matter of detail it may be, must still leave a very large field to the discretion of government, so that it becomes possible for government, while observing scrupulously the formal requirements of the constitution, to pursue a policy in many points contrary to the will, and hurtful to the interests of the state. And this can happen all the more easily, because in progressive states the development of the constitution cannot keep even pace with the development of the people. As a rule, strongly conservative interests associate themselves with established constitutional forms and resist for a long time and with success useful as well as injurious changes. Moreover, constitutions are not self-executing. Behind them there is need of a force separate

from and independent of themselves in order to carry their provisions into effect.

In some states the government may at will resolve itself into a constituent convention to the extent at least of making important changes in the constitution. This is true of England, France, and Germany. The result is greatly to strengthen government and to increase correspondingly the risk of encroachment upon the prerogatives of the state. Such states therefore stand in special need of some primary form of organization by which they can hold their governments in subjection.

The most effective of the several devices for accomplishing this end is party. Slowly and clumsily it was fashioned during the quarrels between Cavalier and Roundhead. Awkwardly it began to claim and to fill its place under the later Stuarts and William III. But during the reigns of the first and second Georges, it came to be so well established that it could withstand the reaction led by George III. The American colonies received the institution of party, as they did most of their political outfit, from the mother country. But in their hands it underwent after the formation of the Union a marked development, and to-day the American party system presents a perfection of organization not elsewhere to be found.

How does party accomplish this task of holding government in subjection to the state? Its more obvious functions are two; it educates and organizes public opinion, and it administers the government. Public opinion is what the people think and feel in respect to public questions; not what they think and feel when such questions are first presented; but their well-considered thought and their clarified feeling after they have studied these questions well, and have attained the mood which is favorable to wise judgment. Party is by far the most important of the agencies through which the crude first thoughts and blind first feelings of the people are transformed into the rational thinking and feeling which is public opinion. In the first place, party keeps the people fully informed in regard to public matters. What one party fails to discover or wishes to conceal, its rival is sure to unearth and proclaim. In

the second place, party discusses with freedom and thoroughness every public question in the presence of the people. In the third place, party discusses such questions not merely on the ground of a surface expediency but in the light of great principles. Indeed the ultimate end of party is to secure as the basis of public policy the adoption of the principles which it professes. The dissemination of these principles is therefore one of its chief employments, and enters largely into the discussions which it conducts. But the principles of the different parties considered collectively are the principles of the people. Despite the many objectionable features which mark the contests of parties, such as narrowness, exaggeration, and downright misrepresentation, the result of these contests is to bring the people closer to the fundamental truths of politics, and to make them sounder as well as better informed judges of what concerns the public welfare. In the fourth place, party not only secures the discussion of public questions before the people, but, what is more important, discussion by the people. In this way party lifts the common citizen out of the ranks of private life and imparts to him in some degree a public character. Lastly, party organizes the public opinion which it helps to form. It provides the means by which those who hold like views in regard to public questions can act together effectively in their support. It is able to do this because it possesses and exercises the right to designate those who fill the posts of government; and because, in the second place, it must take into its own hands the direction of every movement by which the constitution is modified.

The second of the two functions named is to administer the government. In the performance of this function the party in power, under the system of party government, holds the position and does the work which falls to the king under a system which is really — not nominally as in England — monarchical. In the discharge of this function the duty of the party in power as well as of the king is to apply in the wisest possible way the public resources to the satisfaction of the public wants, and to do this according to the

methods and with strict regard to the limitations prescribed by the constitution. It is not necessary to discuss here the debatable question whether party government in itself is a good form of government. It will suffice to direct attention to one remarkable difference between it and other forms of government. The party in power, in other words the government, is removable at will. In England this can be done at any moment when Parliament is in session; in the United States it can be done at least once in every four years. Moreover, in all countries where party government exists, the state is constantly checking, rebuking, or encouraging the party in power; and the party in power, that is the government, listens respectfully and obediently to every manifestation of its master's will. That this is not true under other forms of government is sufficiently obvious. States which are ruled by monarchs or oligarchies are usually forced to resort to revolution whenever it becomes necessary to depose the agent who governs.

To what place in the political system do these functions entitle party? The answer to this question is that party, or rather the party system, constitutes an informal but real and powerful primary organization of the state. Party stands closer to the state than any other factor of the political system. It is the first to interpret, and the first to give expression to the will of the state. And when that will is once made manifest party superintends its execution. If the state wills a change in the constitution, party puts in motion the constitutional machinery by which the change is effected. If the state wills a change in the policy of government, party takes the steps by which this, too, is accomplished. In short, it seems to me, that the obedience of government which the state used to secure at long intervals and for short periods, at great cost and very imperfectly by means of revolution and constituent assemblies, it now secures easily and far more durably and perfectly by means of party.

II

WHAT IS A PARTY?¹

FROM the beginning political development has depended on party. "The castes of the ancient world are the fossilized remains" of parties once active in a world still more ancient. The political interest of early Hebrew history centers in the struggle of an intensely national party, which sought to exclude foreign influences altogether, with a party which looked to Egypt and to the more civilized states of western Asia for ideas and support. And so it is always and everywhere; party is the manifestation of political life, and the indispensable means of its growth. In recent times, moreover, every advanced people has come to look to party — to an extent already great, and everywhere increasing — for government. But in order that political development may be sufficiently rapid and at the same time rightly proportioned and healthful, and that party government may be good government, it is necessary that the people, as well as the philosopher and the student, should have just ideas concerning this agent whose conduct so profoundly influences their welfare.

Without attempting to include every point that may properly enter into a complete definition, I offer, in reply to the question, What is a party? the following as a summary of its most important characteristics: A party is a durable organization which, in its simplest form, consists of a single group of citizens united by common principles, but, in its more complex forms, of two or more such groups held together by the weaker bond of a common policy; and which, contrary to the view

¹ *The Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XI, March, 1896.

usually held, has for its immediate end the advancement of the interests and the realization of the ideals, not of the people as a whole, but of the particular group or groups which it represents.

The definition rests upon, and in part gives expression to, a theory of party which deviates widely from those now current. Let us examine each of its propositions.

I. ORGANIZATION

Organization is the process which, for the purpose of effective work, converts many into one. In the case of party it is the birth-process; for, however large the number of those who think and feel alike may be, they cannot, until organized, do anything noteworthy in support of their common interests. There is, however, no particular form nor any definable amount of organization which is always requisite to the formation of a party. The form varies as greatly as does that of government; and the amount which will suffice under one set of conditions may prove quite inadequate under another. At times a loosely associated crowd, acting in the main from fitful impulse, has performed the functions, and therefore has deserved the name, of party; but in the more advanced states of the modern world this is no longer possible. Without a high degree of organization the largest body of citizens cannot at the present day do the proper work of party. The change which has taken place within a century seems almost startling. In respect to organization there is as little resemblance between the parties of the Federalist period and their compact, highly disciplined successors of to-day, as between the feudal levies of the crusading period and the armies which established the unity of the German empire. To go further back, the parties of classic antiquity impress the reader of history, and still more the modern party manager, as unwieldy and undependable in the extreme. This is true particularly of the ancient democratic parties. The followers — it would hardly do to call them the supporters — of the Gracchi seem more

like mobs than parties; and though Cæsar conquered in the name of democracy, he did so by means of the army which he was able to organize, rather than by the aid of a party, — a fact which goes far to explain and to justify his subsequent course.

Without doubt the increasing susceptibility to the influences that organize is a general characteristic of modern times; for we see it in all departments of human activity — social, ecclesiastical and industrial, as well as political. The stimulus to production through the higher forms and greater completeness of organization that has been made possible by this increasing susceptibility has done more than any other one thing to bring about the recent immeasurable enlargement of the wealth of the world. But with the good evil is mingled; and nowhere is this more evident than in politics. The increasing readiness with which men submit themselves to organization accounts in large measure for the rapid growth of party despotism, and, to a greater extent than is commonly supposed, is the source of that deplorable change which is transferring the control of parties from leaders, who embody their ideas, to managers or “bosses,” with whom rests, in an ever greater degree, the issue of their struggles.¹ Of the many problems associated with party few are so difficult to solve, and at the same time in such urgent need of solution, as this: How, in the face of the necessity for organization, and in view of the increasing readiness with which men make the sacrifices that organization involves, can the strongest and finest elements that belong to the character of the individual be maintained? Warfare upon “bosses,” however useful this may be, cannot cure the evil. So long as the conditions that produce “bosses” remain unchanged, to remove one is simply to make room for another. The true remedy is a change in the attitude of the citizen towards party.

The tasks which parties undertake require for their accomplishment not only a high degree of organization but also an

¹ Of course the control of a party naturally gravitates into the hands of those who are best able to promote its real or apparent success. It is

extended period of time. To propagate party doctrines; to secure through elections, or by revolution, the requisite control of the public powers; to incorporate, after such control is secured, by acts of legislation and administrative measures, its own principles with those which underlie the general policy of the state; and lastly, to stand guard against all enemies until the utility of its work is fully proved, and the work itself is definitely accepted, — these are the difficult, laborious, and time-consuming tasks which every successful party must discharge. Hence, whenever a group of citizens has a genuine call to form a party, the members know that they must submit to a degree of organization not far inferior to that of an army, and that the partnership into which they enter is for life.¹

II. PRINCIPLES AND POLICY

There are few terms applied to parties which are used so freely as these, and none concerning whose meaning there is such general disagreement. Quite often a measure of policy which a party has supported for a long time is mistaken for a principle. Even Webster speaks of protection and free trade as "party principles." But principles are always distinguish-

because organization has come to be so very important a factor in the attainment of what is accepted as success, that the man who can organize has risen to the high position in party management which he now holds. On the other hand, it is undeniable that a change for the worse has taken place in the national electorate of the United States. This change is due not only to the too rapid extension of the franchise, but also to a specific change in the character of citizenship. Individuality is decreasing; the average citizen of to-day relies less on his own judgment, and accepts in a more docile way the opinions of those with whom he is associated, than the average citizen of two generations, or even one generation ago. The extension of organization to different fields, and its rapid development in each of these, is, so to speak, making men more organizable — that is, less disposed to assert themselves as individuals, and more disposed to do as others do.

¹ The establishment of party government has done much to perfect both the science and the art of party organization; and it has done this by increasing the rewards, both moral and economic, of success. An admirable account of the organization of American parties is given by Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, Chap. 59.

able from measures of policy; the latter may embody and reveal, but cannot themselves be principles.

In the study of parties the first step should be to ascertain their principles; for until this is done it is impossible to understand or rightly to judge their conduct. The principles of a party I venture to define as *the durable convictions held in common by its members as to what the state should be and do*. For, in the last analysis, it is its convictions in respect to the most desirable form, institutions, spirit and course of action of the state, that determine the natural attitude of a party towards every public question. If we attempt to go further back and inquire whence these convictions come, we enter a region of speculation which is indeed attractive, but where guesses and surmisings take the place of exact and verifiable conclusions. A man's convictions are themselves definite and tangible; but who can point out with certainty their deeply hidden and inextricably mingled sources? For among these are the countless incalculable factors that constitute heredity, the bewildering complex of subtle but always powerful influences that we call environment, and lastly those elements of personal character that we cannot trace to heredity or environment, but which sometimes have a greater part than all things else in shaping a man's convictions. What in this respect is true of one citizen, is quite as true of the entire group to which we give the name of party.

The policy of a party, on the other hand, comprehends all that the party does in order to establish its principles; it includes therefore the whole of the party's conduct. Principles are disclosed in the end which is sought; policy in the means employed for the attainment of this end. The failure to distinguish between principles and policy accounts for much of the misapprehension and injustice that parties suffer. Not infrequently they are accused of betraying principles when they have simply made a change in policy. This was the case with the Federalist party. Its principles — that is, the convictions of its most influential members in regard to what the state should be and do — were aristocratic. To the minds of

its supporters, at least of those who directed the course of the party, the ideal state was an *aristocratic* republic. To realize in the New World such a state was, in so far as the Federalists acted from strictly party motives, the end for which they strove. Everything they did or tried to do which they thought conducive to this end, was, properly speaking, a measure of policy. Such were the establishment of the Constitution and the inauguration of a stronger general government; for by these means they thought to check the democratization of politics and society. And the same may be truly said of nearly all the celebrated measures of the Federalists; the end they had in view was the creation here under republican forms of a social and political structure which should resemble as closely as possible that of England.¹ Hence it is not just to accuse the Federalists of treachery to principles because, after their defeat in 1800, many of them ceased to support, and some actually turned against, the government which they had done most to create and make prosperous. The change in their conduct proceeded not from treachery but from fidelity to principles. It was because their principles were still aristocratic that they would not, and indeed could not, help to guard and strengthen the fortress they had built as a protection against democracy, but which had fallen into the hands of their enemies.

Another accusation of treachery to principles, which is now almost universally accepted as just, is that based on the course of the Democratic-Republican party from its accession to power in 1801 until the beginning of its disintegration in Monroe's second administration. In the purchase of Louisiana; in the support of an embargo which "destroyed instead of protecting" commerce; in the disregard during the War of 1812 of rights on which, under the guidance of the foremost leaders of the national democracy, the Democratic states of Virginia

¹ It may be objected that the Federalists individually and as a body acted often from motives of the purest patriotism. This is conceded, but my contention is that in every such case they acted not as partisans, not as Federalists, but as Americans, and that in many of these cases Democrats could and did unite with them. But of this more below.

and Kentucky had laid great stress in the Resolutions of 1798 and 1799; in the creation of the second Bank of the United States; in the passage of distinctly protective tariff acts; and in the favor shown to internal improvements: — in all these and other instances it is noted that the party interpreted the Constitution in a way against which it had previously made earnest protest, and supported measures which hitherto it had condemned habitually and in the strongest terms. But did these acts proceed from treachery to democratic principles? If they prove that the party had lost its earlier convictions as to what the state should be and do, and had come under the influence of new and different convictions, we must answer: Yes. If, on the other hand, the party was still true to the Jeffersonian ideal of the state — an ideal which was then as it now is the best embodiment of democratic principles, and in support of which the victory of the year 1800 had been won, we must answer: No. The view which seems to me most reasonable is, that the adoption of these and like measures signifies a change in policy rather than in principles. Most of them were promoted or at least approved by Jefferson himself; and no one accuses him of betraying democratic principles. The situation was this: unless the party could meet successfully the new and, owing to the Napoleonic wars, peculiarly trying responsibilities of office, it would lose the favor of the people, and therewith all hope of soon establishing its principles as the principles of the nation. It was, therefore, not through forgetfulness of these, but in order to save them, that it resorted to the measures we have named. Only when a party deliberately and consciously adopts a policy which tends to prevent their realization can it be accused justly of betraying its principles.

Parties often misjudge not only in regard to individual measures, but as to whole lines of policy; indeed, party history is filled to overflowing with errors of this kind, while it records few if any unmistakable cases of treachery to principles.

It is sometimes claimed that the principles of a party cannot change — that the identity of a party is maintained only

through the continued support of unchanging principles. While there is considerable truth in this view, the statement should be qualified. The convictions which are rooted in character — and only such deserve to rank as party principles — cannot change easily or rapidly; still, in all progressive countries the character of the people as a whole and of each division of the people is always in process of change. The conservatives grow more liberal; the liberals, more conservative; and all more tolerant and open-minded. The movement is slow, but its influence upon the convictions which men hold in regard to what the state should be and do is very considerable. The American conservative in the days of the Whigs differed not a little in principle from his political ancestor, the Federalist conservative; and the Republican conservative of to-day differs quite as much from the Whig conservative, whose general principles he has inherited. But while party principles do and should undergo change, the alterations cannot go so far as to destroy or obscure the type: a party with aristocratic principles may find its ideal of the aristocratic state differing widely from that which it held a generation earlier; but so long as the ideal itself remains aristocratic, its principles have not suffered essential change.

On the other hand, many, if not most, features of party policy may undergo total change. Protection until a half-century ago was the policy of the English Conservatives; since then they have supported free trade. There are, however, certain lines of policy so well adapted to aid, under all conditions, in the establishment of particular principles, that we may regard them as permanent. Of these public education is one of the best examples; for its influence must always promote the realization of democratic principles.

When a party is first formed, the bond which unites all its members is that of common principles. As parties grow, this bond is gradually, though never completely, exchanged for that of a common policy. In modern states no party can become a great party save by winning recruits from those who never accept its principles. The Democratic party of the

United States owed a considerable portion of its strength before the Civil War to its success in uniting, in support of a pro-slavery policy, the masses of the North, whose principles were democratic, with the ruling class of the South, whose principles were aristocratic.

III. THE END OF PARTY

In his *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*, published in 1770, just a century and a quarter ago, when the material by which to test the theory was less abundant and in some respects far inferior to what we now possess, Edmund Burke defined party as "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." In Burke's opinion, therefore, all parties have one and the same end, namely, to promote the "national interest"; they differ from one another only because each has its own way or method for promoting this interest.¹ This view presents parties as seeking not their own, but a higher and larger good, namely, that of the state; they come before us as zealous, high-minded servants, each working in his own way for the interest of a noble master. The picture is attractive, and our first feeling is that we would like to have it true. But is it true? Certainly there is much in party professions that may be urged in its support. Every party which thinks it has a fair prospect of winning office confines itself as closely as possible to the establishment of a single proposition, namely, that while other parties are bent on courses that tend to destroy the state, its own efforts are directed to the single end of promoting the general welfare. This is the substance of official platforms, of the letters of acceptance by party nominees, and of the effusions of the partisan stump and journal. In every one

¹ I think the context makes it clear that when, in the quotation cited, Burke speaks of "a *principle* in which they are all agreed," he means a method or course of action. It is evident that this part of the definition summarily describes not the end itself, but the way of its attainment.

of these utterances the keynote is devotion to what Burke calls the "national interest."

If, in determining what is the end of party, it were proper to accept as true what each party claims for itself, the view of Burke would be established impregnably; but this we cannot do — and for reasons which are conclusive. In the first place, parties put forth their self-laudations when the immediate purpose for which they strive can be attained only through gaining the good-will of the general public. At such times they are in the position of courtiers, and subject to precisely the temptations to which courtiers succumb. In the second place, each, while appropriating to itself the exclusive championship of the cause of the people, describes its rivals one and all in terms which would fitly apply to public enemies; but there is no reason why in such cases self-praise should be any more trustworthy than accusations. In short, what parties say of themselves, as well as what they say of one another, is so biased by self-interest as to deserve little if any weight.

If at first sight the assent of intelligent and conscientious citizens to these confessedly interested utterances would seem to give them claim to consideration, even this is nevertheless forbidden by the reflection that such citizens are divided into groups each of which denies what the others accept.

It must, however, be conceded that the authorship of the definition we are considering, and its wide, not to say general, acceptance, raise a strong presumption in its favor; but profound and wise as he was, Burke undoubtedly erred in some of his conclusions. What assurance have we that he is right in his view of party? If true, the definition must hold of every party, both present and past. Let us apply the test. Do our American parties of to-day conform to Burke's ideal? Is it the national interest that the Democratic, the Republican and the Populist parties are seeking to promote? Or is it some other interest or set of interests, large and important indeed, but not so large or so important as the interest of the nation? Is zeal for the good of the whole people, or for that of

a limited division of the people, their master motive? There can be but one answer. Each is the representative, the special champion, of a particular group of citizens for whose ideas and interests it seeks the recognition and fostering care of the state; to secure this recognition and fostering care is the end for which it came into existence and towards which all of its rational conduct tends. Moreover, what we find true of parties in the United States is also true of those of England, Italy, France and Germany. In none of these countries is it the comprehensive interest of the state as a whole for which any party stands, but the interest of one, or at most a few, of the elements that constitute the state; and this applies to the parties that call themselves national as fully as to the others. How relatively small this interest sometimes appears as compared with the national interest, is best seen in the many-membered party system of Germany.

But the party of Burke no more resembles the party of the past than it does the party of to-day. For some centuries the plebeians and patricians of Rome constituted two distinct parties, and their struggles decided to a great degree the fortunes of the Roman state. And during the whole of this long period it was never for the sake of Rome, to make her great and prosperous, that they intrigued and fought; on the contrary, it was a narrower good, namely, the interest of a class, which furnished the party motive. But if this was true of the earlier and better days, what shall we say of the later period of the republic, when, after the old patriciate had been replaced by a plutocratic oligarchy and the masses had sunk into a shameless proletariat caring only to be fed and amused at the public expense, the party struggle assumed a more savage form and at last degenerated into a series of frightful civil wars? No reasonable student of the times of Marius and Sulla will maintain that either of the two great parties which they led sought through the policy of bloodshed and proscription to promote the welfare of the state. If we turn to the civil conflicts of the Reformation, we find in those of France and the Netherlands, as well as in those of Germany and, to a great though

lesser extent, in those of Scotland, England and Scandinavia, that the interest of a creed, rather than the national interest, was the end for which always one, and sometimes both, of the parties contended. Equally clear is it that in the French Revolution the Jacobins, in undertaking to destroy the higher and middle classes, were seeking to advance, not the interest of France, but simply the mistakenly supposed interest of the lower classes. In no other way can we satisfactorily account for the changed attitude of the Federalist party of the United States toward the national idea after their defeat in 1800. They cared more for the aristocratic principle of Federalism than for the nation; otherwise they would have remained true to the nation despite the rejection of their principle.

It is moreover a common observation that when states enter on a period of decline, party struggles grow more violent and become always an important and sometimes a chief factor in hastening the process of destruction. It was so in the states of Greece, in republican, as distinguished from imperial, Rome, and in the Eastern Empire. It is certainly not easy to reconcile this fact with the view that the end of party is to promote the general welfare. When, however, a state is in a really healthful condition, the appearance of a great national emergency is the signal for the abatement of party strife. This happened at the outbreak of our Civil War, when Democrats and Republicans worked together to save the Union, each party laying aside to a considerable extent and for the time being the policy for which it had labored previously. This is illustrated in the organization, without prohibiting slavery, of the Territories of Colorado, Dakota and Nevada in 1861, when the Republicans had control of both houses of Congress. The sinking of the partisan — I do not use this word as a term of disparagement — in the patriot was nobly exemplified by President Lincoln. His letter to Horace Greeley under date of August 22, 1862, tells what was true of him in this respect from the first day to the last of his term of office:

“ My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union with-

out freeing any slave, I would do it — if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it — and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union."

Other notable instances are to be found in the coöperation of Whigs and Democrats in the compromise tariff act of 1832, in the more general compromise measures of 1850, and in the patriotic course of the Democrats in the crisis that followed the disputed election of 1876. But it is precisely at such junctures as these, during which parties do work together to promote the national interest, that they are least like parties. Indeed, at such times strictly party ends are held in abeyance, and parties lose temporarily their most distinctive traits. As soon, however, as the crisis has passed they resume their natural character, and devote themselves to the ends for the sake of which they came into being. On the other hand, the readiness to sacrifice the national interest to that of the limited group which a given party represents always increases with the growth of party spirit; that is, when a party is most a party it is most ready to disregard and even to attack the interest of the people as a whole.

To sum up: the true end of party — the end, I would repeat, of which it is itself conscious — is, in ordinary times, to promote not the general interest, but the interest of a class, a section or some one of the many groups of citizens which are to be found in every state in which there is political life, an interest which is always something other — and generally, though not always, something less — than the national interest.

But why should the state be divided into groups with separate and sometimes conflicting interests? Why cannot there be throughout the nation one interest, one mind, one aspiration and one public policy, for whose establishment all shall work together harmoniously? Some dream of this, but not wisely; for the Creator has so made man that his progress

depends on diversity. A society in which all should feel, think and act alike would soon almost cease to feel, think and act. Such a society could not be composed of individuals; it would itself be the only individual. Instead of a rich, varied, continuous, ever-advancing development, it would be capable of energetic activity only when first created, and this would be followed by an exhaustion and lethargy from which there could be no recovery, because in its members the principle of life and growth would have perished. The health and progress of the state as a whole depends on the health and development of the groups of citizens which are its elements. To promote the health, to aid the development, to secure from the state for each group that degree of recognition and fostering care which are its need and due, — this is the not ignoble end for which parties exist.

In many ways the relationship of a party to the group of citizens of which it is the political representative, is like that of the state to the people of whom this group forms a part. In a general sense what the state undertakes to do for the people, a party undertakes to do for a group. To promote the national interest, that is, the interest that is common to all, is the immediate end of the state; to promote the group interest is the immediate end of party. In working toward its proper end the state organizes and protects the people and fosters their development; the party does precisely the same for the group. Each state in dealing with other peoples secures for its own as much influence, reputation and material gain as it can; each party in dealing with other parties does the same for the group under its charge. In early times no state recognized the rights of other states; the same is equally true of early parties. After many ages of sanguinary struggle states are rising to the consciousness of a world-unity and the obligations which this unity imposes on each towards all; the same has happened to parties. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the humanization of man — the noblest of all the fruits of progress — is more evident in the changed and changing interrelationship of states or in that of parties.

To give in briefest compass the substance of the views above set forth, I would say that, just as a state is the political self-realization of a people, so a party is the political self-realization of a group of citizens within the state.¹

¹ The limits necessarily assigned to this article have made it impossible to treat with fulness any one of its several topics. Two of the most important, namely, the growth of parties through the substitution of a common policy for common principles, and the relationship of party to the state, have been introduced rather than discussed. Others, such as the analysis of party policy, the relation of party to government and the claims of party upon the citizen, each of which stands in a vital relationship to the theory, are omitted altogether.

III

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF PARTY¹

IN the life-history of a great political party there are five natural division or chapters: the first deals with its origin; the second, with the period between organization and advent to power; the third, with its experiences while in power; the fourth, with its experiences while in opposition; the fifth, with the causes and circumstances of its dissolution.

The study of a considerable number of parties, conducted according to this plan, will show that they, not less than plants or animals, follow a certain course of development; in this development that the different stages of growth and activity are under the control of definite laws, and succeed one to another in a fixed order; that there is, in fact, a typical party life to which every party tends to conform, just as there is a typical life for each of the countless organisms of the natural world.

I. THE ORIGIN OF PARTIES

In the history of the United States² there are four periods, each of which is marked by the rise of new parties. The

¹ *The Yale Review*, Vol. II, May, 1893.

² A pioneer in this line of investigation is Friedrich Rohmer, a Swiss. His writings on party appeared in their first form in 1842. They were afterwards edited and published by his brother, Theodore Rohmer, under the title *Lehre von den politischen Parteien*. Rohmer found a disciple and expositor in the eminent jurist and political philosopher, J. C. Bluntschli. The latter has embodied in his book on the *Charakter und Geist der politischen Parteien* a full statement of Rohmer's views. The substance of this book may be found in an English form in the article on "Political Parties," in the *Cyclopædia of*

first began near the close of the Revolution and terminated early in the second administration of Washington. It gave birth to two parties, the Federalist and the Republican or, as it was called later, Democratic-Republican party. The second period covers the years from 1820 to the beginning of Jackson's second administration in 1833. Within this space the Anti-Masonic and the National Republican or Whig parties were organized. The third period began in 1840 with the first appearance of the Liberty party in a presidential campaign, and closed with the formal disruption of the Democratic party in 1860. In addition to the Liberty party, these years witnessed the rise of the Know-Nothings and the modern Republicans. The fourth period began in 1876 and has not yet closed; thus far its progeny consists of the Greenback, the Labor, and the Prohibition parties, and the People's party.¹

A study of these periods will show that the progress by which a new party is formed is the following: in the first place a considerable body of citizens becomes dissatisfied with the policy of the government and the policies advocated by existing parties. The cause of this dissatisfaction is that they have become converts to a new policy which promises to do more for the welfare of the state, or the welfare of the class or section to which they belong, or — and this is always the case when a great party is about to be formed — for both the welfare of the state and that of the particular interests with which they are most closely associated. They then seek recognition and support for their views from existing parties; when, however, it becomes clear that these cannot be obtained, they organize and enter the political arena as a new party.

Political Science, Political Economy and United States History. The services of Rohmer and Bluntschli in extending, if not introducing, the study of party from a psychological standpoint are of great value.

¹ The facts cited are taken almost wholly from American political history. The reasons for this are two: first, the home field is more familiar; second, the writer believes that party has attained a fuller development and has revealed its nature and tendencies more clearly here than in any other country.

The date when the first successful steps towards organization are taken is usually determined by some event that either makes the need of the new policy seem more urgent than before, or else proves beyond the possibility of doubt that no existing party can be won over to its service. It was, for example, the part taken in 1854 by the Southern Whigs in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise that determined the date of the organization of the Republican party.

But organization does not provide the materials which enter into the structure of a new party. In order that these may be ready at the proper moment, there is need of a long period of preparation; hence the true beginnings of a party are to be found, not at the date when it is organized, but in a greatly extended earlier period; they must be sought for in the birth and growth of ideas and convictions which gradually create in the mind of the citizen a new ideal of public policy. The psychic history of the youngest of modern parties dates back to the dawn of civilization.

Another fact which a survey of these periods brings to light is that the rise of new parties is associated with — is indeed an integral part of — a general reconstruction of the party system of the state. To me it seems clear that this was the case even in 1787. I believe that, before the Convention of that year assembled, the colonies and later the States, had what may be justly called a party system. It is true that this system was little more than an association of local parties, and that its members, judged by the standard of the present, were very imperfectly organized. Nevertheless it possessed the characteristics and performed the functions which are the distinguished features of a party system, and it was the reconstruction of this earlier state party system on a new basis that gave the United States her first national party system. In respect to the second, third, and fourth periods there is no ground for question; in each the destruction of old parties and radical changes in those that survive establish beyond question the fact of a thoroughgoing reconstruction of the general party system.

Between 1820 and 1833, the last remnant of the old Federal party disappears, the Democratic-Republican party dissolves into its original elements; and when the process of reconstruction is completed, we find not only the new Whig and Anti-Masonic parties, but also two Democratic parties, each of which has characteristics that distinguish it sharply from the party that Jefferson organized. Each claimed the old party name, but the larger, whose leader was Jackson, and whose support was drawn chiefly from the masses of the North and West and the border States, may be called the National Democratic, and the smaller, which was led by Calhoun, and was aristocratic rather than democratic, sectional rather than national in spirit and policy, may be designated as the State Rights Democratic party. At times these two Democratic parties coöperate, at other times, they antagonize one another; the principles, however, on which they rest are distinct and irreconcilable.

In the third period the work of reconstruction went further in the direction of change than in the second. The great Whig party despite — some would say because of — the leadership of Clay and Webster, became a complete wreck. The National Democratic party was first preyed upon by schism in the North and then compelled to break partnership with its ally, the State Rights Democratic party of the South. The short-lived, but for a time influential, Know-Nothing organization was distinctive in method as well as spirit and policy. The Liberty and Free-soil parties were the first in the North that owed their birth to the sectional idea. The new Republican party, through its relationship to anti-slavery sentiment and to those ideas of human equality and brotherhood of which Jefferson was an apostle, differed far more from the Whig party, from which indeed it drew the larger element of its supporters, than the Whig from the Federalist party. Of the period just before the Civil War more truly than of any other in our history it can be said in respect to parties and politics, that "old things are passed away," and "all things are become new."

Of the fourth and last period but little need be said. In

1876, it became evident that the issues which led to and grew out of the Civil War were practically settled. Then began that fourth reconstruction of the party system that is still in progress; its results in modifying old parties and in creating new ones are already very considerable. No intelligent observer fails to note that the Democratic and Republican parties of to-day differ widely from the great parties of the war period; and that in the Prohibition, Greenback, Labor, and People's parties we have organizations that are wholly new.

But granting that the rise of new parties is a phenomenon which signifies that a general reconstruction of the party system is in progress, the question naturally suggests itself: are there laws that determine the time when these reconstructions are to take place, and the character of the changes which they are to effect? I believe that there are such laws, and that they admit of clear statement. The life-history of the state, like that of the organisms of the natural world, is made up of a succession of periods of activity, alternating with periods of rest. Each of these double periods covers a definite phase in the development of the state; to each belongs its own distinctive wants; and these wants call into being and determine the character of the political parties whose mission it is to provide for their satisfaction. But these wants, and with the wants the agencies by which they are satisfied, change as the state passes from one phase of its career to the succeeding phase. This is the explanation of that periodical reconstruction of the party system which, as we have seen, involves not only the creation of new parties but the modification or destruction of old ones. In 1787, the Union had completed the first distinct phase of its career, and was about to enter on the second. It had achieved independence; it had now to provide for unity, and for safety against the attacks of foreign states. To satisfy these wants the Federalist party came into being, and gave to the country the Constitution and the administrations of Washington and Adams; but while rendering these inestimable services, the Federalists

treated the rights of the commonwealths and those of the individual citizen with too little consideration. They were aristocratic in spirit, and supported what seemed at that time a policy of extreme centralization. To prevent them from carrying this policy to an unreasonable length and to protect the rights that were being endangered, the party of Jefferson was organized. At the beginning of the second period of party-reconstruction it is clear that the public wants of the years from 1787 to 1815 have been provided for, and that the wants which are now to engage the attention of the people are of a different character. There is no longer any danger from France or England. The conflict between the Union and the individual state, which was so dangerous in 1787, has given place to a conflict, which at first seems far less serious, between section and section. The masses demand a fuller participation in the control of government; the manufacturing classes ask for higher protection; the newer communities of the West, for the aid of the national government in constructing interstate roads and canals. The old parties — one of them deeply discredited by the part it had taken in the War of 1812, and now far advanced in dissolution, the other swollen to an unwieldy size by accretions from its rival, and distracted by the quarrels of its leaders — could not provide for these new and imperatively urgent wants. Hence the second reconstruction of the party system. A like experience is repeated in the third and fourth periods; in the third, the old system was shattered on the rock of sectionalism; and on this same rock a new system was built up. The party changes of the eventful years from 1840 to 1860, numerous and wide-reaching as they were, may all be accounted for by the fact that the two civilizations within the Union, the one based on free labor and having its seat in the North, the other based on slave labor and having its seat in the South, were about to close in mortal combat.

The inauguration of President Hayes marks the beginning of a distinctly new period. The tragical sectional issue had been fought out and settled. New issues growing out of the

conflicting economic interests of different classes and sections are crowding to the front; already they have led to the formation of several new parties whose chosen battle ground is the industrial and financial policy of the national government. These same economic issues have also produced important changes in the old parties. Moral questions, too, are claiming a share of the public interest. The evils of intemperance have brought about the organization of a party which seeks to make prohibition the law of the land. In the strong reaction against the corrupting influence of the spoils system we find the source of a movement which is promoting higher ideals of government and citizenship, and at the same time is combating with increasing effectiveness the tyranny of party.

This survey of the distinctive issues of the four periods, hurried and imperfect as it is, will, I think, justify the conclusions: first, that a general reconstruction of the party system and with this reconstruction — belonging to it in fact as an essential and prominent feature — the rise of new parties, may be looked for confidently, whenever the state has completed a particular phase of its development and is about to enter upon another and different phase; and second, the character of this reconstruction, involving usually the destruction of one or more of the old parties, and always the modification of those that survive, as well as the creation of new parties, is determined by the nature of the issues which belong to the peculiar phase of development on which the state is about to enter.

II. BEFORE ADVENT TO POWER

The second chapter in the history of a great party covers the years between the early stages of organization and advent to power. The length of this period varies greatly. In the case of the Federalist it covered about two years. Their opponents had a longer probation; the first steps towards the organization of the early Republican party were taken during the ratification campaign of 1787 and 1788; their advent to power was delayed until 1801. The Whigs and the later Re-

publicans waited longer for office than the Federalists, but not so long as the early Republicans. The length of this period is a matter of importance, because the success of a party in the later stages of its career depends upon the thoroughness with which it performs its first tasks. These tasks are two, the completion of its organization, and the propagation of its views.

The object to which during this period party activity is mainly directed is the conversion of public opinion to the view of public policy which the party represents. At this stage, therefore, its chief employment is agitation. This fact determines to a great degree the character of the leadership of the party. Naturally those men come to the front who are themselves most fully possessed by the party idea and can present this idea with greatest effect. The party leader needs in addition tact in dealing with men and a talent for organization. There is, however, in the work which he is called upon to do little or nothing that is degrading. On the contrary many and strong influences conspire to raise him to a high level of character and conduct. There is something almost apostolic in the mission which consists in the propagation of principles that are calculated to promote the welfare of the state. Hence it is that, while a party is engaged in the task of converting public opinion, we find the clearest presentation of party ideas and the purest devotion to party principles. The influence of this work upon the rank and file of the new party is like that upon its leaders; in their case, too, it develops power and ennobles character. A large proportion of those who, moved by devotion to the public welfare, break old political ties in order to join a new party, do so under a strong sense of sacrifice; they are sure to encounter more or less of persecution from the parties with which they have acted hitherto. So it comes about that a party contains at this period a larger percentage of men of high political character than ever afterwards. Moreover the influence for good is not confined to the party itself. Modern conditions are such that the process of converting public opinion to the sup-

port of a new policy — and that is what a new party must accomplish, before it can attain to office — involves in some degree the education of the whole people. Even those who are not won are compelled to meet arguments and to look at public questions from new standpoints; and the result is freshened interest in public questions and more intelligent thinking. In short it is within this period that the party makes its largest contributions to the intellectual and moral life of the people; it is at this time that a party does most to break up “that intellectual and moral stagnation” which John Stuart Mill calls “the most formidable danger of a completely settled state of society.”

The situation has, however, at least two drawbacks. The very clearness with which a party apprehends the idea which it champions may make it inhospitable toward other ideas that are not less essential to the public welfare. It is at this time completely under the dominion of the idea that gave it birth, and too frequently the result is narrowness of view, inconsiderate treatment of those who hold conflicting opinions, and an intemperate warmth of advocacy. Public opinion is and should be conservative. There are few circumstances that bias good citizens against a new party so much as signs of a want of sound judgment in its advocates. When these advocates present themselves as candidates for office, they compel the people to ask how the general interests are likely to prosper under their guidance; and the answer decides to a great extent the attitude of the public mind towards the principles they represent. The fault of the leader is the fault of the follower. His danger, too, lies in the direction of such a degree of narrowness and such an excess of zeal that sober minded citizens become distrustful of the principles and the policy, because they cannot respect the judgment and good sense of those who support them. How many were kept back from joining the early anti-slavery organization by the fanatical words and deeds of too zealous anti-slavery men!

A second temptation to which a party is sometimes exposed at this stage is that of bargaining with a rival. The concession

thus obtained may be considerable, but the way of obtaining it is open to serious objections. In the first place, it is obvious that what is won in this way is insecure. In the second place, the method itself is an affront to public opinion. In countries where party government prevails the only way in which a party can legitimately accomplish its purpose is through securing the approval of public opinion; and the party that at this stage resorts to other ways, clouds its prospect of ever obtaining this approval.

These years between organization and advent to power are for party the period of youth. It presents the many bright and the few dark features that characterize that period; and the period itself can never return.

III. IN POWER

When a party is placed for the first time in control of the government, its situation undergoes a radical change. Hitherto it has been absorbed in efforts to win public opinion to its particular view of public policy; now it is confronted by three tasks, two of which are wholly new, and one, partly so. In the first place it must govern; this means that it must discharge all those ordinary duties of government which have no natural or necessary relationship to party; it must provide for the public safety, for domestic peace, for national financial obligations, for the general welfare. It is, for the time being, the responsible representative of the state, and is bound to protect and promote each and all of its many interests. The second of the new tasks is to translate party policy into public policy. In an important sense this is the end for which it came into being. The main ground on which it asked for and received office was to secure an opportunity for doing this very thing. Hence it is under obligation to embody as soon and as fully as possible its own views of public policy in legislation and administrative measures. The third task is to maintain itself in office. It is impelled to this not only by love of power, but also from considerations that relate to the public good.

The very fact that the state has entrusted a particular party with the control of government implies that the state has need of the services of this party in that position. But in order to render these services, a somewhat extended term of office is requisite. Changes in public policy should be introduced neither hastily nor all at once, but gradually and considerately. A course of action that generally disturbs the existing order and unnecessarily hurts established interests is the characteristic of revolution; but it is perhaps the chief merit of party government that it secures the benefits of revolution while avoiding the evils of the revolutionary method. Hence a party newly installed in office is under the constraint of high motives in seeking to remain there, until it has had an opportunity, not only to introduce those changes for the sake of which it sought office, but to introduce them in the way that is calculated to bring most of good to the people and of credit to itself.

This change of tasks leads to changes, some for good, others for evil, in the spirit and method of a party. Previous to advent to power the general course of party experience tends, as before noted, to narrowness; while in power, this tendency is checked or rather reversed. Then it had only one of the public interests to care for; now, through being charged with the duties of government, it is under obligation to care and provide for them all. The assumption of office leads necessarily to broader views, to a juster sense of proportion, to wider sympathies. It fosters, too, that habit to which party spirit is so inimical, but which is the foundation of true statesmanship, — the habit namely of looking at public questions from the standpoint of the general interest. In the place of the single idea or group of closely related ideas, the single interest or group of closely related interests, to the promotion of which its whole thought and activity were being directed through the preceding period, until it almost lost the capacity for seeing other perhaps equally important ideas and interests, and became altogether incapable of rating them at their true value, — in the place of this restricted and narrowing service it finds itself, as chief steward of the state, in

charge of and responsible for everything that pertains to the public welfare. Here again higher and lower motives conspire to bring about one result. There is nothing that a party in power can do that will endanger its own position so much as to carry into office the same narrowness of spirit and policy which was natural and to a degree useful during the preceding stage of agitation. The parties that have done this have had disturbed and short terms; and have usually perished by violence. In illustration it is sufficient to cite the parties of the French Revolution. It is true that, even in the discharge of those duties of government which have no relationship to party policy, every party betrays more or less of partisan bias; certain public interests always receive a disproportionate amount of fostering care, while others not less important are neglected; but this is one of the defects that inhere in the very nature of party government.¹

In one respect the influence of the first task, namely that of governing, on the spirit of party is for evil. The very greatness of the trust committed to it and the exaltation of its position tend to make it arrogant; the strength of this tendency increases with the length of its term of power and with the magnitude and success of its work. Under favoring circumstances a party can become so inflated with this spirit as to look upon itself as having a "divine right" to office. But one further step in this direction is possible, and that is to identify itself with the state; and this step, if we mistake not, has been nearly or quite taken more than once in the history of the United States.

Office broadens the policy not less than the spirit of party; under its influence party policy grows more and more comprehensive, until it includes many of the important ideas and interests that are championed by its rivals. There is indeed

¹ The remedy is to be looked for in some degree in the amelioration of party spirit—it has grown less proscriptive, more tolerant, more catholic, with each succeeding generation since the introduction of party government; in some degree, however, we must still continue to rely upon rotation of parties in office by which those interests that are neglected under one administration receive due care from its successor.

no way by which a party in office can do so much to weaken other parties as by doing well the work for the sake of doing which they are seeking office. The party in power should not, however, carry the policy of comprehension so far as to include what cannot be reconciled with its own fundamental principles; for in doing so it is sure to alienate its most trustworthy supporters.

It is in connection with the third task of a party in power, namely that of maintaining itself there, that the machine becomes a prominent factor. Success in a general election is naturally interpreted as a proof that public opinion has been won to the support of the victorious party; its followers are now in the majority; the immediate problem is not so much to make converts as to hold together in compact unity converts already made; hence to quite a degree organization takes the place of propagandism; the skilful organizer and the dexterous manager follow in the wake of the advocates of principles and policies; the party appeal is less and less to the free judgment of the citizen and more and more to the prejudices and self-interest of the partisan. This natural tendency is accelerated and perverted by treating as spoils the influence and emoluments that pertain to office. Some degree of despotism is, without doubt, inseparable from efficient organization; but that extreme and odious despotism which has given rise to the term machine as descriptive of party management is the fruit of the spoils system.

What is the natural term of power for a given party? To this question no answer can be given that will apply to all parties. If the party in question can incorporate quickly its own policy with the policy of the state, the term should be short and continuous; if, however, this incorporation must wait for the growth of a favorable public sentiment, it should proceed slowly and be made a little at a time; in this case a series of terms of power of varying length is essential. For the Federalists, one term sufficed; for the Democrats, many have proved too few. There is one other consideration which, however, has nothing to do with party policy,

that may influence the frequency with which a party is called to office and the length of its stay there; and that is its capacity for governing. In times of emergency the task of governing takes precedence, and the capacity to govern is the highest of qualifications. There can be no question that short and frequent terms of power are favorable to the health and longevity of parties.

The period during which a party holds the reins of government bears a close analogy to that portion of the life of man which follows youth and precedes decline; it is clearly the period of brightest power and greatest productiveness.

IV. IN OPPOSITION

The defeat which transfers a party from office to the rôle of opposition is usually interpreted as a rebuke. It signifies that the people are dissatisfied. In such a juncture two questions present themselves: first, what are the grounds of dissatisfaction? second, how can they be removed? A defeat that carries with it the loss of office is followed, in the case of a party which possesses the elements of health and has before it the prospect of a future, by a period of earnest self-examination, and then by such modifications of policy and methods as seem most conducive to restoration. This reorganization sometimes includes its leadership. The party chiefs who are most fully identified with features of policy that have brought the party into disfavor are compelled to take less conspicuous positions or even to withdraw altogether from its management. This is the rule, but there are exceptions; it sometimes happens that the defeat signifies that the people have acted from temporary feeling rather than from well settled convictions, or that the policy presented is one towards which the people are moving but have not yet reached that point in their progress where they are able to give it their support. In such cases there is no need of change in policy or leadership. On the contrary the retention of both is conducive to success. This, according to the view of many, was the situ-

ation of the British Liberals in 1886. But whether the result is a modification, more or less thorough, of its course, or persistence in it, there is something wholesome in the process of self-examination and in the study of the political situation from the standpoint of defeat. These penitential exercises check some of the evils that are inseparable from office; others they bring fully to an end; their tendency is to sober, to chasten, to rationalize. The work of renovation proceeds all the more successfully, because the experience of defeat weakens the influence of the baser and strengthens that of the nobler elements within the party.

But the key to the new situation is to be found in the change of tasks. This is quite as complete and significant as that which took place, when the party passed for the first time from the phase of agitation to the possession of office. While in power, the task of governing constituted at all times a very large and exceedingly important share of its work, and at particular times absorbed the whole of its attention. Now this is laid aside altogether. The second of the two greater tasks which fell to its lot while in power, namely that of embodying its own policy in public policy by means of legislation and administrative measures, is likewise laid aside. Even the defensive tactics by which it strove to keep itself in office must now be exchanged for a very different mode of warfare. The new tasks are these: first, to defend against the attacks of its successful rival the work it accomplished while in power; second, to hinder that rival as far as possible in the work of remodeling the public policy; — it is right and necessary that it should do this; for in no other way can it be true to its own ideal of what is best for the state; third, to win back again as quickly as possible the lost position. In ordinary times these three tasks, each of which is new, occupy fully the attention and absorb fully the energies of the party in opposition. Now as before the change of tasks is followed by changes in character. First of all the party in opposition becomes conservative: its immediate object is the preservation of its own work; but in protecting this, it finds that the constitution, because

of the limitations which it has placed upon government and therefore upon the party in control of the government, is its strongest fortress; hence the party in opposition becomes in a special way the defender of the constitution as well as of recent governmental policy. In looking at the processes by which the political education of the people is carried on, it becomes clear that a very high value should be placed upon this relationship to the constitution, which can be established only when a party is in opposition. The reverence which the people feel for the constitution and for law in general may be traced in large measure to this source. While in power, the constitutional limitations are often regarded as vexatious hindrances; but in opposition, these same limitations assume a new and wholly attractive character.

In the performance of the second task, namely that of hindering the efforts of its rival to incorporate its own policy in legislation and administrative measures, and in the performance of the third task, namely that of putting itself in the rival's place, the party in opposition renders important services. But some of the methods which it employs for the attainment of these ends are harmful in the extreme; while holding the party in power to the strictest accountability, it does everything in its power to prevent it from providing for the public welfare. This too common attitude of the party in opposition is thus naïvely confessed by Col. Benton in his *Thirty Years' View*.¹ Writing of the administration of John Quincy Adams he says: "I belonged to the opposition which was then keen and powerful and permitted nothing to escape which could be rightfully, sometimes wrongfully, employed against him." These tactics long pursued destroy candor, pervert the powers of judgment, and tend to develop all the hateful traits of the habitual fault-finder.

If the period of opposition is greatly protracted, other evils manifest themselves. A succession of defeats weakens the confidence of most men in party principles and policy. Hence there may be observed in parties that have passed through

¹ Benton, I, 159.

this experience a change of attitude towards public questions. In the place of a frank committal, of bold attack or courageous defence, we find hesitancy, timidity, equivocation. This is an unmistakable sign of moral degeneracy, which, if it proceed very far, must quite incapacitate a party for ever taking up again the tasks of government.

What is the natural term of opposition for a party? If the changes which it is to make in public policy have been effected only in part, it should return to office, as soon as the country's need of the remaining changes is greater than that for the services of the party in power; if it has fully incorporated its own policy with the public policy, it should remain in opposition as long as may be necessary in order to protect its accomplished work, and then the time for its withdrawal will have come. To these rules there is one exception; if the party in opposition has a superior capacity for government, it may in times of emergency be recalled to office without regard to its policy as a party.

In this period we cannot fail to note the signs of declining powers. The task of conserving follows the task of producing, and belongs to a later and less vigorous stage of life.

V. IN DISSOLUTION

There is a theory of party which has found wide acceptance that would prolong the life of certain great parties indefinitely, or rather, to speak quite within bounds, would enable these parties to continue, until the state to which they belong perishes. According to this theory the state has need of two permanent organizations, one, the party of progress, and the other, the party of conservatism. As long as the state lasts, it should always be making progress, hence it will always have need of a progressive party; but its need of a conservative party, whose function is to keep intact whatever is good in the existing order, and to hinder the progressives from rash and unwise innovations, is no less permanent.

The error in this view consists in the assumption that the

party of progress and the party of conservatism are the same in the different stages of the development of the state; whereas the truth is that the party of progress in one stage is naturally the conservative party of the succeeding stage. What is it that enables us to identify a particular organization at different points in its career? Identity of name does not of necessity signify identity of character. The only satisfactory way by which to establish this identity is through an examination of party principles; if these are the same, the party is the same; if these have undergone essential change, the party has undergone a corresponding change. Each party comes into being, in order to secure the recognition of certain principles; every great party comes into being, in order to secure the adoption of principles that are essential to the welfare of the state during the particular phase of its development which gives birth to that particular party. So long as it is engaged in securing the recognition of these principles, it is the party of progress; as soon as this recognition is complete, the party becomes conservative; its main function thenceforth is to guard the work that it has already done; but in doing this it becomes naturally the protector of the established order as a whole. This function continues, until either its work is so thoroughly accepted that the risk of successful attack upon it passes away, or another party that can discharge better this conserving function appears upon the scene, or lastly, that the time has arrived when the work under consideration has ceased to be of service. Whenever any one of these events happens, the conservative mission of that party is at an end.

But these two functions, first, that of making such changes in the public policy as are necessary in order to bring it into accord with the principles of a party, and second, that of guarding the changes until they are fully accepted or cease to be needed, comprise the whole of a party's mission, and when its mission is fulfilled, the party must die. In the history of the United States two of the four great parties and a considerable number of minor parties have already disappeared. The immediate cause of dissolution is to be found

in the exhaustion of vital energy; but this exhaustion is due to that fine and just economy of the state, in accordance with which at the birth of each party, and from time to time during its career, enough and only enough energy is bestowed to enable it to accomplish its appointed tasks. As soon as these are completed, the supplies are withheld or diverted to other parties whose work is still to do. This happens, not only whenever the work which a party consciously undertakes is fully done, but also whenever another party that appears later on the scene can take up and prosecute this work more effectively. The Federalist party dissolved, because its work was done; the useful things which it set out to do, it accomplished so thoroughly that its successor in office did not dare — and soon did not even wish — to disturb them. The Liberty and Free-soil parties, on the contrary, dissolved, because the Republican party could do better than they themselves the work which they undertook.

Without dwelling further on the fact and cause of party mortality, what shall we say in reply to the question, Are there signs that betoken the dissolution of a party? Yes, but they vary greatly in respect to trustworthiness. Perhaps the surest one of them all is inability to provide for a new and dominant want of the state. In 1800 the time had come for the people to take a large part in the control of government; the good of the masses as well as the good of the Union as a whole demanded this; but the Federalists, who believed in confining the management of public affairs to the wealthier and better educated classes, could not provide for this want. In 1854 the time had come when the issue between the two labor systems of the country, or rather of the two civilizations that were based upon these labor systems, could no longer be settled, or even for any considerable period postponed, by compromises; but the Whig party had employed this method in dealing with that issue, until it believed in and could practice no other; hence it had to give place to a new party, the corner stone of whose policy was to settle the issue in question through giving victory to the free labor system.

Another sign is the appearance of faction. This, however, does not always portend dissolution. It is indeed a common phenomenon, whenever a party has become swollen beyond its proper size by the reception of incongruous elements, — elements, that is, whose principles are at variance with those which are distinctive of the party. As soon as the influences which led to the union cease to operate or become appreciably weakened, dissensions and secessions naturally follow. This happened to the Democratic-Republican party between 1815 and 1829. During the preceding fifteen years, owing to the pressure of danger from foreign enemies, and in some measure also to the unwise course of the Federalists, the party received into its membership many who were not in principle Democratic. With the close of the War of 1812, the pressure which had shaped public policy with little or no reference to party principles ceased. These principles then came again to the front as guiding and indeed controlling factors in the determination of public policy. So long as a protective tariff was a war measure, all good citizens could give it their support; as soon, however, as it became a measure whose wisdom must be decided mainly on economic grounds, difference of party principles, as well as the clashing of interests between class and class and section and section, had to be reckoned with. As these differences develop, it would become impossible for Clay and Calhoun to work together as members of the same party. The Republican party had a like experience after the war, and for like reasons. In all such cases the appearance of faction has no sinister meaning; it is, in fact, a sign that the party is making preparation for the renewal of its proper activity, — a preparation in which separation from those who do not accept its principles is a first and essential step. But when faction arises, not so much from difference of principle as from a loosened hold on principles, when motives that are mainly personal or sectional take the place of principles, the factions thus arising are symptoms of a disease that is dangerous, if not mortal.

A third sign is pessimism. A party which is in vigorous

health and has within itself the energy and hopefulness which win confidence and promise success will always make the best of even the least promising situation. It is when the energy of a party is spent, and when, too, it has lost touch with the movement of the times that the Cassandra faculty is called into exercise. It is true that young parties are sometimes pessimistic, but some parties, like some persons, are "born old."

The fact that parties are mortal is unwelcome. We all belong to parties and, in varying but usually high degree, desire for our own an unlimited existence. But reflection should convince us that this is not for the best. The good of parties, not less than the good of the state, demands that, when the work of a party is fully done, it should then withdraw and make room for another party, whose work belongs to the present and the future. The state cannot afford to maintain what has ceased to be of use, and the moment the work of a party is done, it falls under the control of the agencies of decay; its last days are never its best days; on the contrary its conduct steadily deteriorates, until there is danger that the incapacity and perversity which mark its end will efface the memory of its earlier services. This is particularly true of great parties. The very prominence of the rôle they act during the period of their usefulness makes it harder for them to withdraw decorously, when new actors are to take their places. In point here is the unworthy exit of the Federalists. Moreover the strongest partisan may find consolation in reflecting that, if his party like himself is mortal, its good work, as truly as his own, will endure as a part of the moral treasure of his people and of mankind.

IV

THE POLITICS OF JOHN ADAMS¹

AT THE age of twenty-three John Adams wrote in his diary the following words:

“Aim at an exact knowledge of the nature, end and means of government. Compare the different forms of it with each other and each of them with their effects on public and private happiness.” This programme he carried out. To the end of his life “no romance was more entertaining” than politics. They were to him the “divine science, the grandest, the noblest, the most useful . . . in the whole circle” of sciences; and his study of them was characterized by breadth and depth as well as zeal. The principles of government, so he wrote his kinsman, Samuel Adams, are to be found by the observation and study of “human nature, society and universal history.” He acquainted himself thoroughly with the political theories of the great writers, ancient and modern — the works of Lord Bolingbroke, for example, he read through more than five times although, in his opinion, the author was “a haughty, arrogant, supercilious dogmatist”; but he owed far more to the direct study of “human nature, society and universal history” than to the conclusions of the philosophers. As a rule he quotes to refute; and his work presents in every part unmistakable signs of an original, independent, and profound thinker.

Public events soon gave to these studies a fresh impulse and at the same time a practical turn. Two years after the entry given above, John Adams listened to the plea of James Otis against the Writs of Assistance. It was an event of profound

¹ *The American Historical Review*, Vol. IV, January, 1899.

significance to colonial America and indeed to the British empire.

"Otis's oration against writs of assistance," wrote John Adams long afterwards, "breathed into this nation the breath of life . . . American independence was then and there born; the seeds of patriots and heroes were then and there sown. . . . Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take up arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain."¹

One result of the plea of Otis was to direct attention to the question of the rights of the colonists. It was a time when the doctrine of natural rights was beginning to work its way into general favor; there was, indeed, considerable risk that it might become in America, as later in France, the basis of popular resistance to governmental oppression. The validity of this doctrine when reasonably interpreted and applied, is well established; but in practical use it is dangerous and greatly demoralizing. Indeed, it can hardly be doubted that if resistance to the oppressive policy of Great Britain had rested solely or mainly on the doctrine of natural rights, it must soon have degenerated into mob violence, and could not have developed into a successful revolution.

At this time John Adams was a young lawyer with an abundance of time for reading and thought. He was a graduate of Harvard, had taught school and studied law at Worcester, had enjoyed intercourse with a number of stimulating men; and, for his years, had read and re-read a phenomenal number of good books. His letters and diary show that he had made great progress in self-acquaintance; that his aims were of the highest; that he revered the truth; and that he criticized himself with unsparing severity. The important historic events of his early manhood were the Seven Years' War and the philosophical movement in Europe; and these had helped to confirm in him the disposition to take broad views and to trace things to their sources.

¹ John Adams, *Life and Works*, X, 362.

In the year 1765, with the solid equipment just described, John Adams, at the age of thirty, entered the service of his country. He wrote in August a series of articles, four in number, for the *Boston Gazette*, which were reproduced in the *London Chronicle*, and later were published together under the title, *A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law*. The *Dissertation* began with a statement of the views of the writer upon the relation of the Stamp Act to general history, to the history of the colonies, and to their higher interests, civil, religious, and intellectual; it closed with advice as to the means proper for meeting the emergency created by the adoption of the policy embodied in this act. This production did much to prepare the people for the critical times that were just ahead; it discloses at the outset of his long career of patriotic service, the very heart and mind of the author. Our immediate interest, however, is to learn what it tells of his system of politics.

The *Dissertation* opens with the inquiry, What is the source of oppression? This is found in that "noble principle" of human nature which is also the source of freedom, namely, "the love of power." This principle has always prompted the great of the earth to free themselves from every limitation to their power, "has stimulated the common people to aspire at independency, and to confine the power of the great within the limits of equity and reason." In this struggle the poor people have usually failed, because, owing to their ignorance, "they have seldom been able to frame and support a regular opposition." The great have taken advantage of this, and have labored "in all ages, to wrest from the populace . . . the knowledge of their rights and wrongs, and the power to assert the former or redress the latter. I say *Rights* for such they have . . . antecedent to all earthly government, *Rights* that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws — *Rights* derived from the Great Legislator of the Universe."

In these early paragraphs appear certain views that lie at the foundation of the politics of John Adams. The first is that slavery and freedom proceed from one and the same prin-

ciple in human nature, namely the love of power; later in the *Discourse on Davila*, the more comprehensive phrase, "thirst for distinction," is substituted for "love of power"; but the change does not imply any departure from the original idea. A second view of the utmost importance to the comprehension of the system, is that love of power is an "aspiring, noble principle, founded in benevolence." From this it follows that the aim of a wise public policy must be not to extirpate "the love of power" in the human heart, but so to direct and regulate its operation that it shall issue in freedom. It is certainly one of the noblest characteristics of John Adams that he felt habitually a profound reverence for human nature, and finds in the primary passions of man the proofs of divine wisdom. A third idea is that the common people have rights which are indefeasible. What these are he does not tell us here. But elsewhere he makes it evident that they include the right to equality with the great in the legal protection of person and property, the right to equal participation in law-making, the right of veto upon unfriendly legislation, and the right to education at the public expense. The second portion of the *Dissertation* is historical. The canon and feudal law were invented by the great for their own advantage. In the canon law we have "the most refined, sublime, extensive and astonishing constitution of policy that was ever conceived by the mind of man," and the Romish clergy framed it "for the aggrandizement of their own order." The feudal law was formed for the same purposes as the canon law; it held the common people "in a state of servile dependence" and "of total ignorance of everything divine and human excepting the use of arms and the culture of their lands." Then the supporters of these two systems made a "wicked confederacy," and "one age of darkness succeeded another, till God in his benign providence, raised up the champions who began and conducted the Reformation." At that time knowledge began to spread "in Europe, but especially in England," and as it spread, "the people grew more and more sensible of the wrong that was done them by these systems . . . till at last under the execrable race of the

Stuarts, the struggle between the people and the confederacy aforesaid of temporal and spiritual tyranny, became formidable, violent and bloody. It was this great struggle that peopled America. It was not religion alone, as is commonly supposed; but it was a love of universal liberty, and a hatred, a dread, a horror of the infernal confederacy before described, that projected, conducted and accomplished the settlement of America. It was a resolution formed by a sensible people — I mean the Puritans — almost in despair. . . . After their arrival here, they . . . formed their plan, both of ecclesiastical and civil government, in direct opposition to the canon and feudal systems. . . . Whatever imperfections may be justly ascribed to them, which, however, are as few as any mortals have discovered, their judgment in framing their policy was founded in wise, humane and benevolent principles. It was founded in revelation and in reason too. It was consistent with the principles of the best and greatest and wisest legislators of antiquity. Tyranny in every form, shape and appearance was their disdain and abhorrence. . . . They were very far from being enemies to monarchy; and they knew as well as any men the just regard and honor that is due to the character of a dispenser of the mysteries of the gospel of grace. But they saw clearly that popular powers must be placed as a guard, a control, a balance, to the powers of the monarch and the priest, in every government. Their greatest concern seems to have been to establish a government of the church more consistent with the Scriptures, and a government of the state more agreeable to the dignity of human nature. . . . They knew that government was a plain, simple, intelligible thing, founded in nature and reason, and quite comprehensible by common sense. . . . They were convinced by their knowledge of human nature, derived from history and their own experience, that nothing could preserve their posterity from the encroachments of the two systems of tyranny . . . but knowledge diffused generally through the whole body of the people. . . . For this purpose they laid very early the foundations of colleges. . . . But the wisdom and

benevolence of our fathers rested not here. They made an early provision by law that every town consisting of so many families, should be always furnished with a grammar school. They made it a crime for such a town to be destitute of a grammar schoolmaster for a few months, and subjected it to a heavy penalty. So that the education of all ranks of people was made the care and expense of the public, in a manner that I believe has been unknown to any other people, ancient or modern. . . . The consequences of these establishments we see and feel every day. A native of America who cannot read and write is as rare an appearance as a Jacobite or a Roman Catholic, that is, as rare as a comet or an earthquake. It has been observed that we are all of us lawyers, divines, politicians and philosophers.”¹

For our purpose it is not the accuracy and justice of the account in which the writer describes the rise of the canon and feudal law that chiefly concern us; what we care to note is the conception of the significance as an event in the history of the world, of the planting and peculiar development of the Puritan colonies in America. To their founders he ascribes the loftiest aims; in their devotion, steadfastness of purpose, unflinching courage, and eminently practical wisdom he sees the noblest spiritual traits; and in their achievements the highest form and furthest advance of human progress. The mission of the new world has dawned upon him in all its grandeur: “I always consider the settlement of America with reverence and wonder, as the opening of a grand scene and design in Providence for the illumination of the ignorant, and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth.”²

The Stamp Act proves the existence of “a design to enslave all America.” How shall we baffle this design? Only by imitating the examples of those who founded the colonies; like them we must “diffuse knowledge generally through the whole body of the people.” For “liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right, from the frame of their nature, to knowledge, as their great Creator,

¹ *Works*, III, 449-456.

² *Ibid.*, III, 452.

who does nothing in vain, has given them understandings, and a desire to know; but besides this they have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers. Rulers are no more than attorneys, agents, and trustees, for the people, and if the cause, the interest and trust, is insidiously betrayed, or wantonly trifled away, the people have a right to revoke the authority that they themselves have deputed, and to constitute abler and better agents, attorneys and trustees. And the preservation of the means of knowledge among the lowest ranks is of more importance to the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country. It is even of more consequence to the rich themselves, and to their posterity."

Without knowledge the spirit of liberty "would be little better than a brutal rage. Let us tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore, the means of knowledge. Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write. . . . Let all become attentive to the grounds and principles of government, ecclesiastical and civil. Let us study the law of nature; search into the spirit of the British constitution; read the histories of ancient ages; contemplate the great examples of Greece and Rome; set before us the conduct of our own British ancestors, who have defended for us the inherent rights of mankind against foreign and domestic tyrants and usurpers, against arbitrary kings and cruel priests. . . . Let us read and recollect and impress upon our souls the views and ends of our own more immediate forefathers, in exchanging their native country for a dreary, inhospitable wilderness. Let us examine into the nature of that power, and the cruelty of that oppression, which drove them from their homes. . . . Let us recollect it was liberty, the hope of liberty for themselves and us and ours, which conquered all discouragements, dangers, and trials. . . . Let the pulpit resound with the doctrines and sentiments of religious liberty. . . . Let the bar proclaim 'the laws, the rights, the generous plan of power' delivered down from remote antiquity, inform the world of the mighty struggles and

numberless sacrifices made by our ancestors in defence of freedom. . . . Let them search for the foundations of British laws and government in the frame of human nature, in the constitution of the intellectual world. There let us see that truth, liberty, justice, and benevolence, are its everlasting basis. . . . Let the public disputations (in the colleges) become researches into the grounds and nature and ends of government, and the means of preserving the good and demolishing evil.”¹

This prologue, which reveals the character as well as the political principles of John Adams, furnishes the key to his career. The attitude here taken is that of a statesman who studies public questions in their largest aspects, who asks how they relate themselves to the past, to the future and to those interests of the people which concern character and destiny; and this attitude he maintains to the end.

The first period in the public career of John Adams covers the years from the Stamp Act to the first Continental Congress, 1765 to 1774. In September of the year first named he wrote the *Instructions* of the town of Braintree to its representatives in the General Court. In these he set forth in clear terms that theory of nullification which has played so great a part in American constitutional history. The Stamp Act violated — so the writer held — fundamental constitutional rights, rights well-defined, long enjoyed and essential to the welfare of the people. He declared the Stamp Act unconstitutional because “we have always understood it to be a grand and fundamental principle of the constitution, that no freeman should be subject to any tax to which he has not given his own consent in person or by proxy. And the maxims of the law, as we have constantly received them, are to the same effect, that no freeman can be separated from his property but by his own act or fault. We take it clearly, therefore, to be inconsistent with the spirit of the common law, and of the essential fundamental principles of the British constitution, that we should be subject to any tax imposed by the British Parliament; because

¹ *Works*, III, 462-463.

we are not represented in that assembly in any sense, unless it be by fiction of law, as insensible in theory as it would be injurious in practice, if such a taxation should be grounded on it."

But if these remonstrances should not be heeded: . . . "We further recommend the most clear and explicit assertion and vindication of our rights and liberties to be entered on the public records, that the world may know, in the present and all future generations, that we have a clear knowledge and a just sense of them, and with submission to Divine Providence, that we never can be slaves."¹

That these instructions adequately expressed the conviction of his fellow-citizens was soon made evident; forty towns in addition to Braintree accepted them as their own, and Samuel Adams incorporated some of the stronger passages in the instructions which he drew up for Boston.

This work of political education was carried on, not, however, without considerable interruptions, throughout the period of resistance. One of the most important services in this line was a number of articles signed "Novanglus" in reply to a series written by the loyalist, Daniel Leonard, over the signature "Massachusettensis." Leonard's arguments had made a deep impression; to remove this John Adams, who found on his return from Congress "in the month of November, 1774 . . . the *Massachusetts Gazette* teeming with political speculations, and "Massachusettensis" shining like the moon among the lesser stars . . . instantly resolved to enter the lists." These articles, while of uneven merit in respect to argument, served well the end for which they were written.² Another important function of Mr. Adams during these years was that of legal counsellor to the patriotic party. His advice was sought and followed in the graver controversies with Governor Hutchinson; and it was he who originated the brilliant and wholly successful project to impeach Chief Justice Oliver.³ His part throughout was that of a law-abiding citizen. He discountenanced the numerous acts of violence directed

¹ III, 466.

² IV, 5-177.

³ II, 328-332.

against the persons and property of the Loyalists; his approval of the destruction of the tea in Boston Harbor rested on political grounds; his defense of Captain Preston and his soldiers exhibited in the clearest light his respect for legal rights and his purpose to do his duty at whatever cost to popularity. Until 1774 he was a lawyer seeking professional success and at the same time serving his countrymen as their unsalaried teacher and adviser in matters pertaining to constitutional rights and the higher politics. In 1774 came a great change. He was chosen a delegate to the first Continental Congress. Henceforth for twenty-seven years, and without a break, he was to give his entire services to his country. Instantly the field widened; the continent took the place of the single colony; he journeyed to Philadelphia as a son of Massachusetts, an inquisitive and sometimes sharply critical observer of the strange peoples and manners that he met there and on the way thither; he returned from Philadelphia a continental American.

The second period extends from the assembling of the first Continental Congress to the treaty in which Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the United States, 1774 to 1783.

The work of John Adams at Philadelphia is too well known to call for detailed rehearsal in this place.¹ He took part in the measures looking to reconciliation, but had little or no faith in their efficacy. He labored strenuously and with success for two ends: union of the colonies, and separation from Great Britain. In so doing he brought himself into disfavor with Dickinson and other conservatives, but at the same time laid the foundations of that influence which later made him the strongest of the leaders of the Continental Congress. His motive in proposing the appointment of Washington to the command of the army was to promote the union of the colonies. He formed durable friendships with representative

¹ In Judge Chamberlain's excellent essay entitled *John Adams, the Statesman of the American Revolution*, we have for the first time what seems to me an adequate estimate of the revolutionary service of John Adams.

men from the different colonies. Through these friendships the way was opened for the propagation of his ideas on the proper structure of government. The Declaration of Independence was in one sense a personal vindication; but his letters, written at this period, speak only of the joy and exultation of the large-souled patriot who is also a seer and prophet:

"When I look back to the year 1761, and recollect the argument concerning writs of assistance in the Superior Court, which I have hitherto considered as the commencement of this controversy between Great Britain and America, and run through the whole period from that time to this, and recollect the series of political events, the chain of causes and effects, I am surprised at the suddenness as well as greatness of this revolution. . . . It is the will of Heaven that the two countries should be sundered forever. It may be the will of Heaven that America shall suffer calamities still more wasting, and distresses yet more dreadful. If this is to be the case, it will have this good effect at least. It will inspire us with many virtues which we have not, and correct many errors, follies, and vices which threaten to disturb, dishonor, and destroy us. The furnace of affliction produces refinement in states as well as individuals. And the new governments we are assuming in every part will require a purification from our vices, and an augmentation of our virtues, or they will be no blessings. The people will have unbounded power, and the people are extremely addicted to corruption and venality, as well as the great. But I must submit all my hopes and fears to an overruling Providence, in which, unfashionable as the faith may be, I firmly believe. . . . The second day of July, 1776, will be the most memorable epocha in the history of America. I am apt to believe that it will be celebrated by succeeding generations as the day of deliverance, by solemn acts of devotion to God Almighty. It ought to be solemnized with pomp and parade, with shows, games, sports, guns, bells, bonfires and illuminations, from one end of this continent to the other, from this time forward for-

evermore. You will think me transported with enthusiasm, but I am not. I am well aware of the toil and blood and treasure that it will cost us to maintain this Declaration and support and defend these States. Yet, through all the gloom, I can see the rays of ravishing light and glory.”¹

During the middle portion of this period Mr. Adams was chairman of the Board of War and a member of many other important congressional committees. Although possessing in but a moderate degree the talents for organization and administration which distinguish his later rival, Alexander Hamilton, he brought to these tasks certain qualities of mind and character which in a situation of appalling difficulty were of the highest value; he never doubted; he never quailed; he always had a plan; and his own faith and courage he communicated to others. In a very high degree he was the source of the moral energy without which the Revolution must have failed. These qualities he carried abroad and to them he owed his remarkable diplomatic success in Holland. At the court of France it soon appeared that he could not work with Franklin — so unlike and antipathetic were they by nature; nor could he reach an understanding with Vergennes, so that his record there was one of well-meant, unsparing but unsuccessful efforts. This failure, however, was nobly redeemed by the part he took in the negotiations for peace. To him in a special sense, his country owed her rights in the fisheries and a considerable portion of her territory. One graphic pen-picture of himself as a maker of this treaty is included in his diary. When discussing the American demands in regard to the fisheries an English negotiator proposed to substitute the word “liberty” for “right.”

“Upon this I rose up and said, ‘Gentlemen, is there or can there be a clearer right? . . . When God Almighty made the banks of Newfoundland at three hundred leagues distance from the people of America, and at six hundred leagues distance from those of France and England, did he not give as good a right to the former as to the latter? If Heaven in the

¹ *Familiar Letters*, p. 193-194.

creation gave a right it is ours at least as much as yours. If occupation, use, and possession give a right, we have it as clearly as you. If war, and blood, and treasure give a right, ours is as good as yours.' ”¹

It is safe to say that the United States have never had a representative at a foreign court who better understood American rights or defended them more manfully. His country “was destined,” so he believed, “to be the greatest power on earth”; and his claims for her were based on that belief. This was one of the reasons — perhaps the chief one — for his dislike of Vergennes:

“I told him, Mr. Hartley, one of the British negotiators, the Comte de Vergennes and I were pursuing different objects; he was endeavoring to make my countrymen meek and humble, and I was laboring to make them proud; I avowed it was my object to make them hold up their heads and look down upon any nation that refused to do them justice.”²

In a letter to the President of Congress, dated Paris, September 5, 1783, he writes of national pride as follows:

“We may call this national vanity or national pride, but it is the main principle of the national sense of its own dignity, and a passion in human nature, without which nations cannot preserve the character of man. Let the people lose this sentiment, as in Poland, and a partition of their country will soon take place. Our country has but lately been a dependent one, and our people, although enlightened and virtuous, have had their minds and hearts habitually filled with all the passions of a dependent and subordinate people; that is to say, with fear, with diffidence, and distrust of themselves, with admiration of foreigners, &c. Now, I say, that it is one of the most necessary and one of the most difficult branches of the policy of Congress to eradicate from the American mind every remaining fibre of this fear and self-diffidence on one hand, and of this excessive admiration of foreigners on the other.”³

Bitter indeed were his reflections upon that fortunately

¹ *Works*, III, 333.

² *Ibid.*, III, 365.

³ *Ibid.*, VIII, 144.

disregarded act of Congress which virtually transferred the negotiation from its own ministers to a foreign court:

"Congress surrendered their own sovereignty into the hands of a French minister. Blush! Blush! ye guilty records! blush and perish! It is a glory to have broken such infamous orders."¹

It fairly summarizes the foreign policy of John Adams to say that in the course of his diplomatic career we find him the earnest advocate of every principle of foreign policy recommended more than a decade afterwards in Washington's Farewell Address.

But even more important to the welfare of the United States than his services in Congress and abroad, great as they undoubtedly were, was the part he took in the reconstruction of government in the several colonies. The opportunity made a deep impression upon Adams. To Patrick Henry he wrote: "You and I, my dear friend, have been sent into life at a time when the greatest law-givers of antiquity would have wished to live. . . . When, before the present epocha, had three millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the happiest and wisest government that human wisdom can contrive?"² This work began a few months before the Declaration of Independence, and in determining its character John Adams had far more influence than any other man. Moreover, in directing the reorganization of government in the States, he was helping to lay the foundations of a national government for the United States.³

¹ *Works*, III, 359.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 200.

³ The materials for a study of the political system of John Adams are: 1. A letter to Richard Henry Lee, dated Philadelphia, November 15, 1775 (*Works*, IV, 185-187). 2. A letter to George Wythe, written in January, 1776, which was published under the title, *Thoughts on Government* (IV. 193-200). 3. A letter to John Penn in response to a request from the colonial legislature of North Carolina for the views of Mr. Adams on the "nature of the government it would be proper to form in case of the final dissolution of the authority of the Crown." This letter reproduces the substance of the *Thoughts on Government*, but in some places gives a fuller statement of the views of the writer (IV. 203-209). 4. *Report of the Constitution or Form*

John Adams held that in a properly constructed government there should be three branches, the legislative, executive and judicial. The legislative branch should consist, first, of an assembly to represent the people or the democratic element; second, of a senate to represent the aristocratic element; and lastly, of an executive to represent the state in its entirety; to act as umpire in cases of dispute between the aristocratic and democratic branches of the legislature; and to be the protector of each in case of an attempt at encroachment by the other. Each division of the legislature should possess an absolute veto. The judges should be appointed by the executive; should hold their offices during good behavior; and should not be subject to intimidation in the matter of salary. It is obvious that in its general framework this structure corresponds quite closely with that of England. Notable differences, however, are the

of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This was written in September, 1779, and contains the ideas of Mr. Adams on the subject of government in their most complete and systematic form. Especially valuable is that portion of the report which contains the Declaration of Rights. Of the thirty articles, the third only, which provides for public worship, was not included in the original draft by Mr. Adams. Most of the changes made later by the committee and the Convention affect the expression rather than the substance of the author's views. He had also the leading part in drafting the second part of the Constitution, or the Frame of Government (IV. 213-267). In order to appreciate the importance of Mr. Adams' *Model of Government for Massachusetts* and of the earlier sketches in the *Thoughts on Government*, it is necessary to remember that at the time they were prepared each of the American commonwealths was regarded as a sovereign state and that the constitution proposed was designed for such a state (IV., 217). 5. *A Defence of the Constitution of Government of the United States of America*, in three volumes. The first volume was published in 1787, the second and third in the following year (IV., 269-588; V., VI. 1-220). 6. *Discourses on Davila*, published in 1790 (VI., 221-399). The *Defence* and the *Discourses* have the same object, namely, to establish by an appeal to history the soundness of the author's views on government as set forth in the *Thoughts* and *Model*.

Of great value too as expositions of the system are four letters of John Adams and Samuel Adams on government (VI., 405-426); three letters to Roger Sherman (VI., 427-442); a series of thirty-two letters to John Taylor (VI., 443-521), and a *Review of a Proposition for Amending the Constitution*, submitted by Mr. Hillhouse to the Senate of the United States in 1808 (VI., 525-550).

more complete and uniform representation of the people, and the substitution of the elective for the hereditary principle in constituting the senate and executive. In respect to representation and the exclusion of the hereditary principle the system reproduces that of the colonies; in respect to the dependence of the senate and executive upon the people, the system conforms to that of Massachusetts (under her first charter), Connecticut and Rhode Island. The right of the executive to an absolute veto was copied from the theory of the English constitution and from the actual practice in most of the colonies; in England it had not been exercised for nearly a century; but in all the colonies, except Rhode Island and Connecticut, both the royal and proprietary governors had used it so freely and in many cases so improperly, that it had become exceedingly obnoxious. It will be noted that the structural principle underneath this system is the independence of the several parts.

Turning to the views of Adams in regard to public policy we find that the end of government is the "happiness of the people." But the happiness of the people consists "in virtue," hence the effort of the statesman should be to secure the happiness of the people by the development of the "best character." The influence of a public man or measure upon the character of the people is to him a matter of prime importance. In furtherance of this end, namely, the development of the best character, public policy should foster religion, morality, and learning.¹

¹ Article second of the Declaration of Rights which forms the first division of the Constitution of Massachusetts, affirms it to be "the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME BEING" (*Works*, IV. 221). He wished to make the Christian religion a qualification for the office of governor, senator, and representative of Massachusetts. In his inaugural address as President he declares it to be his fixed resolution "to consider a decent respect for Christianity to be among the best recommendations for public service." (*Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, I, 232). Although to the end of his days a "meeting-going animal," he was no bigot in matters of religion. He wished the Continental Congress to have nothing to do with religion, except "to say their own prayers" and appoint each year a public Fast and Thanksgiving. In both the Constitutional Conventions of which he was a member, he was ready to go further than his associates in establishing religious freedom.

John Adams made religion fundamental in his system of politics. He believed that the foundations of every political system are to be looked for in certain enduring convictions in respect to God, Nature and Man. Beneath systems of tyranny lie the conceptions of deity as cruel and despotic, of the natural world as ill regulated and unfriendly, of man as weak and unworthy; beneath systems of freedom lie the opposed convictions, that God is just and merciful, that the laws which govern the universe have their source in wisdom and goodness, and that in the nature of man there is a divine element which invests every human being with dignity, with rights and duties and with an infinite capacity for progress towards the ideally perfect.

There is no recorded word of John Adams which expresses a doubt of the existence of God, or of His justice, goodness, and active agency in the government of the world; on the contrary his diary, letters, and public utterances as well as his conduct prove that by nature and conviction he was deeply religious, and that he regarded true religion as the indispensable basis of human welfare private and public. He could not, however, accept the Calvinistic views which in his day still ruled New England theology. They contradicted too sharply his sense of the divine justice and goodness; it was for this reason that he decided soon after graduation from college to abandon the plan of entering the ministry and to prepare himself instead for the profession of the law. But in rejecting certain features of Calvinism he did not reject religion; on the contrary the rejection was for him a step towards a more natural and perfect development of the religious life. The best statesman in his view was he who most clearly discerned and most faithfully copied the divine plan of government.

"Statesmen . . . may plan and speculate for liberty," so he wrote at the age of eighty-five, "but it is religion and morality alone, which can establish the principles upon which freedom can securely stand." His view of the Christian religion as a factor in political education appears in one of the latest

entries in his diary: "One great advantage of the Christian religion is, that it brings the great principle of the law of nature and nations — Love your neighbor as yourself, and to do to others as you would that others should do to you — to the knowledge, belief, and veneration of the whole people. . . . No other institution for education, no kind of political discipline, could diffuse this kind of necessary information, so universally. . . . The duties and rights of the man and the citizen are thus taught from early infancy to every creature."¹

In a letter to his wife dated November 5, 1775, he discourses on the relations of religion to patriotism as follows: "A true patriot must be a religious man. I have been led to think . . . that he who neglects his duty to his Maker may well be expected to be deficient and insincere in his duties towards the public. Even suppose him to possess a large share of what is called honor and public spirit, yet do not these men, by their bad example, by a loose immoral conduct, corrupt the minds of youth and vitiate the morals of the age and thus injure the public more than they can compensate by intrepidity, generosity and honor?"²

And yet no religious man of his day was more tolerant in matters of religion, and in particular doctrinal matters, than he.

Other essential features of a sound public policy are a generous provision for the education of the people, liberality towards institutions of higher learning and fair compensation for public service. Adams held that the people could not afford to accept uncompensated service; to do so was inconsistent with their self-respect, and in the end would prove costly and demoralizing.

The third period extends from the treaty of peace to the election of Mr. Adams as President, 1783 to 1796. He remained abroad five years after signing the treaty. One was spent in diplomatic service in Holland, the others as minister

¹ *Works*, III, 423.

² *Familiar Letters*, 122.

plenipotentiary at the court of St. James. In the drama of history, it was a great moment when John Adams, the former arch-rebel, first stood in the presence of George III. as the representative of a free people, once the loyal subjects of His Britannic Majesty; and who could know and feel its significance so well as he to whom this august scene was the consummation of all that he had hoped and toiled for? His own account shows how profoundly his whole nature was stirred; and nobly did he bear himself; when he declared "I have no attachment save to my own country," even the King was moved, and uttered the true-hearted words: "No honest man will have any other." But this proved to be only a transient gleam of good sense and magnanimity on the part of the monarch; the perverseness through which he had alienated and lost the colonies, led him and his ministers to refuse the rational and mutually beneficial propositions of Mr. Adams in regard to commerce. The minister and his family were made to feel both at court and in society, and in a very personal way, the dislike and disesteem in which their country was held. Even Burke and Camden, whom Americans justly revered, seemed to the sufferer participants in the ignoble persecution. But what had these unhappy experiences to do with the politics of John Adams? It is possible, perhaps probable, that they account in some measure for that feeling of settled distrust towards English policy, that pessimism in respect to the future of England, and that prompt rejection of every measure of foreign policy which would in any degree make the United States dependent upon England that marked his course henceforth, — for, in short, that policy towards England which was a chief cause of difference between himself and the Federalist party.

Baffled in his efforts at the English court and moved by ill news from America where the democracy was seeking, especially in Massachusetts, to overthrow the balanced system of government in the establishment of which he had taken so distinguished a part, John Adams seized the occasion offered by the belated publication of M. Turgot's criticisms of the American governments, to write a defence of the principles on

which they were founded. He began this work in October of 1786, and finished it in late December of 1787. The first volume, entitled *A Defence of the Constitutions of the Governments of the United States of America*, reached Philadelphia in time to influence the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution of 1787. The work is a defence on philosophical and historical grounds of the balanced system of government already described. In a special sense it is a defence of the aristocratic and executive elements of government; for these were then under attack. The general result of an extended survey of the history of governments, ancient, mediæval and modern, and of theories of government set forth by writers on politics, may be stated as follows: Every simple government, whether democratic, aristocratic or monarchical, is of necessity despotic: among such; as reason would teach us to expect, history clearly proves that the democratic is the worst. What actually came to pass a few years later in that phase of the French Revolution named the Reign of Terror, the writer foretold as the natural result of the attempt to establish a purely democratic government. Moreover, although the plan of a simple democracy has been tried in a number of instances, it has never yet succeeded; nor in the nature of the case, can it ever do so. Despotism is equally inevitable under a simple aristocracy or monarchy. Nor can we find a single instance of good and stable government under systems which unite any two of the three principles while excluding the third; for in such equilibrium is impossible! a struggle for ascendancy is sure to follow; and this must always issue after the overthrow of the weaker principle in the despotism of the stronger. A feature of the *Defence* which aroused the distrust of radical democrats at home was the emphasis laid upon the value of the aristocratic element in the state. To seek to do away with aristocracy is idle; for it is a creation of nature. Whatever a man possesses that gives him an advantage over others makes of him an aristocrat. There is nowhere a society without its aristocratic section. To this belong those who have beauty, the well-born, the rich, the talented, the virtuous. Boston has

her nobles — so he wrote Samuel Adams — as well as Madrid. “Hereditary powers and peculiar privileges enter in no degree necessarily into the definition of Aristocracy”; and the Americans have wisely discarded them. The views of John Adams upon aristocracy have been so widely misapprehended that they should be stated in his own words. In 1814, in a series of letters to John Taylor, he gave what is perhaps the most comprehensive of the many definitions that may be traced to his pen:

“By natural aristocracy, in general, may be understood those superiorities of influence in society which grow out of the constitution of human nature. By artificial aristocracy, those inequalities of weight and superiorities of influence which are created and established by civil laws. Terms must be defined before we can reason. By aristocracy, I understand all those men who can command, influence, or procure more than an average of votes; by an aristocrat, every man who can and will influence one man to vote besides himself. Few men will deny that there is a natural aristocracy of virtues and talents in every nation and in every party, in every city and village. Inequalities are a part of the natural history of man.”¹

“This natural aristocracy among mankind, has been dilated on, because it is a fact essential to be considered in the institution of a government. It forms a body of men which contains the greatest collection of virtues and abilities in a free government, is the brightest ornament and glory of the nation, and may always be made the greatest blessing of society, if it be judiciously managed in the constitution. But if this be not done, it is always the most dangerous, nay, it may be added, it never fails to be the destruction of the commonwealth. . . . There is but one expedient yet discovered, to avail society of all the benefits from this body of men, which they are capable of affording, and at the same time, to prevent them from undermining or invading the public liberty; and that is, to throw them all, or at least the most remarkable of them, into one assembly together, in the legislature; to keep

¹ *Works*, VI, 451.

all the executive power entirely out of their hands as a body; to erect a first magistrate over them, invested with the whole executive authority; to make them dependent on that same executive magistrate for all public executive employments; to give that first magistrate a negative on the legislature."¹

Strongly too did he emphasize the necessity for an executive deriving his authority directly from the people, completely independent of the legislature, capable of representing "the majesty, persons, wills and power of the people in the administration of government and dispensing of laws," and powerful enough to maintain "the balance between the Senate and House, or in other words between the aristocratical and democratical interests."

As happened when the state governments were formed, so now at the framing of the national Constitution the views of John Adams were accepted only in part. To the Senate was given a participation in executive functions which Mr. Adams predicted would transform the President of the United States into a slave of party, and at the same time would corrupt the Senate. Legislative participation in the appointing power he thought as baneful to government as rust to iron, as arsenic to the human body. He also thought it a great defect of the Constitution that it did not give to the President the absolute veto.

The election of John Adams to the Vice-Presidency in 1788, and re-election four years later, prove that despite the unpopular doctrines of the *Defence*, he was still, in the esteem of the people, second only to Washington. During these comparatively tranquil years he gave cordial support to Washington and the Federalist party. In 1790 while the French Revolution was still under the control of the moderates, he took his pen in hand and in a series of *Discourses on Davila* pointed out the grave not to say ruinous errors committed by the leaders of that fateful movement. He did more: in order to make the reasonableness of his condemnation evident, he formulated more fully than in his earlier writings the theory of social man on which his system of politics rested:

¹ *Works*, IV, 397, 398.

"Men, in their primitive conditions, however savage, were undoubtedly gregarious; and they continue to be social, not only in every stage of civilization, but in every possible situation in which they can be placed. As nature intended them for society, she has furnished them with passions, appetites, and propensities, as well as a variety of faculties, calculated both for their individual enjoyment, and to render them useful to each other in their social connections. There is none among them more essential or remarkable, than the passion for distinction. A desire to be observed, considered, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his fellows, is one of the earliest, as well as keenest dispositions discovered in the heart of man. . . . The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want of nature as hunger; and the neglect and contempt of the world as severe a pain as the gout or stone.

"The poor man's conscience is clear; yet he is ashamed. His character is irreproachable; yet he is neglected and despised. He feels himself out of the sight of others, groping in the dark. Mankind take no notice of him. He rambles and wanders unheeded. In the midst of a crowd, at church, in the market, at a play, at an execution, or coronation, he is in as much obscurity as he would be in a garret or a cellar. He is not disapproved, censured or reproached; he is only not seen. . . . If you follow these persons, however, into their scenes of life, you will find that there is a kind of figure which the meanest of them all endeavors to make; a kind of little grandeur and respect, which the most insignificant study and labor to procure in the small circle of their acquaintances. Not only the poorest mechanic, but the man who lives upon common charity, nay, the common beggars in the streets; and not only those who may be all innocent, but even those who have abandoned themselves to common infamy, as pirates, highwaymen and common thieves, court a set of admirers, and plume themselves upon that superiority which they have, or fancy they have, over some others. There must be one, indeed, who is the last and lowest of the human species. But there is no risk in asserting, that there is no one who believes and will

acknowledge himself to be the man. To be wholly overlooked, and to know it, are intolerable. When a wretch could no longer attract the notice of a man, woman or child, he must be respectable in the eyes of his dog. 'Who will love me then?' was the pathetic reply of one, who starved himself to feed his mastiff, to a charitable passenger, who advised him to kill or sell the animal. In this 'Who will love me then?' there is a key to the human heart; to the history of human life and manners, and to the rise and fall of empires.

"This passion, while it is simply a desire to excel another, by fair industry in the search of truth and the practice of virtue, is properly called Emulation. When it aims at power, as a means of distinction, it is Ambition. When it is in a situation to suggest the sentiments of fear and apprehension, that another, who is now inferior, will become superior, it is denominated Jealousy. When it is in a state of mortification, at the superiority of another, and desires to bring him down to our level, or to depress him below us, it is properly called Envy. When it deceives a man into a belief of false professions of esteem or admiration, or into a false opinion of his importance in the judgment of the world, it is Vanity. These observations alone would be sufficient to show, that this propensity, in all its branches, is a principal source of the virtues and vices, the happiness and misery of human life; and that the history of mankind is little more than a simple narration of its operation and effects."¹

From such principles it followed that those Frenchmen who were striving to suppress the inequalities which arise from this universal "thirst for distinction" were at war with nature. Indeed, Adams held that the only equality practicable and desirable is equality before the laws. "Too many Frenchmen," so he wrote Dr. Price, "after the example of too many Americans, pant after equality of persons and property. The impracticability of this God Almighty has decreed."² Such views and sentiments however wise ran counter to the strong tides of American political passion. The result to him-

¹ *Works*, VI, 232-239.

² *Ibid.*, IX, 564.

self of giving them utterance he afterwards described in a letter to Jefferson:

"In truth my Defence of the Constitutions and Discourses on Davila were the causes of that immense unpopularity which fell like the tower of Siloam upon me. Your steady defence of democratic principles, and your invariable favorable opinion of the French Revolution, laid the foundation of your unbounded popularity."¹

And yet despite this immense unpopularity with the democratic masses, despite the well-grounded fear of many Federalist leaders that this man of strong will and independent views might prove unmanageable, and despite the treacherous plan to give to Pinckney the place which the voters allotted to him, John Adams was chosen as the successor of Washington.

With this event opened the last chapter of his public career. Throughout the previous period, fidelity to his country and to his political system had made him the advocate of a policy that coincided with that of the Federalists; but now the tie between him and the leaders of the Federalist party, particularly those whose homes were in the North, was about to be broken. The forces that did this were two: first, a difference of view in respect to foreign policy; and second, a disagreement as to the proper functions and rights of the executive. We need not rehearse here the story of the struggle between the President and his cabinet, the latter acting under the direction of Hamilton and in collusion with leading Federalist senators; it will suffice to point out that when the secretaries undertook to thwart the President in his purpose to renew negotiations with France, and also when they sought by a clandestine appeal to Washington to secure the appointment of Hamilton to the virtual command of the army, they arrogated to themselves rights which the Constitution had conferred upon their official chief. Pickering, Wolcott, and McHenry were not prompted by motives of personal ambition. They were doing the will of a division of the Federal party whose leader was Hamilton; their plan was to transfer to him the

¹ *Works*, X, 54.

high functions which belong to the President. No one questions now that John Adams was in the right in renewing the negotiations with France. In the long series of services that he rendered his country, this was certainly one of the most heroic and beneficent. Nor does any one question now his view of the functions of President and cabinet. But in bestowing peace on his country and in maintaining the rights of her chief magistrate he alienated an important section of the Federal party.

The party revolution of 1800 brought the public career of John Adams to a close, but not, however, until he had named John Marshall as Chief Justice, a nomination second in importance in its bearing on the welfare of the Union only to that which was made by him a quarter of a century earlier, when he proposed the name of George Washington as commander-in-chief of the Continental army.

With the possible exception of Daniel Webster no other American statesman of the highest rank has retired so hated and unfriended as did John Adams. The followers of Jefferson regarded him as a monarchist and a persecutor of democrats; the followers of Hamilton as a traitor to the cause of Federalism. But the truth is that his course from the beginning was singularly consistent. His simple creed was this: in order that a state may prosper it must have in its government a democratic element, an aristocratic element and an executive; each of these must be checked in its attempts to encroach upon the others. In the first and second periods he was a champion of the endangered American democracy and a leader in the reconstruction of the colonial governments on the lines given above; in the third period he was a champion of the aristocratic interest against the encroaching disposition of the democracy; in the fourth period he fought for the independence of the executive gravely menaced during its first half by the machinations of Hamilton and his followers; and he was surely in the right. We name only half the truth in claiming for America the mission to produce a finer type of democracy; a strong and healthful democracy without a strong and health-

ful aristocracy is impossible; the two are essential parts of one organic whole. A higher type of aristocracy, — an aristocracy open to every aspiring soul, without legal privilege, based on merit, assigning its highest honor to highest service, welcoming the lowly-born Lincoln as heartily as the patrician-born George Washington, — to produce such an aristocracy is the only way to produce a healthful, happy, useful democracy; and to help to establish this type of aristocracy throughout the world is the highest service which America can render to mankind, but this — just this, was what John Adams wished and worked for.

It is narrated that five days before that memorable fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence on which both he and Jefferson were to die, John Adams gave as a toast to be presented at the celebration to be held by his fellow-townsmen, the words INDEPENDENCE FOREVER. "In this brief sentiment," says his biographer, "Mr. Adams infused the essence of his whole character, and of his life-long labors for his country." But independence, however characteristic of the spirit and method, does not seem to me an adequate description of the "essence" of his labors. It is true that he maintained always an unusual degree of personal independence, and that he strove with all his might for "independent independence" in his country's behalf — but only as the necessary means to a certain end; and this end was the attainment of the "best character." The key to the politics of John Adams is the right and duty incumbent upon each citizen, each class, the people as a whole and mankind, of complete self-realization. To protect and assist the process by which this is accomplished, determines for him the form and functions of government and the aim of public policy. For the divine right to rule, whether claimed by king, parliament or party, he substituted the divine indefeasible right of the people to grow.

V

ALEXANDER HAMILTON¹

ONE CANNOT note," writes Professor Bryce, "the disappearance of this brilliant figure, to Europeans the most interesting in the early history of the Republic, without the remark that his countrymen seem to have never, either in his lifetime or afterwards, duly recognized his splendid gifts."² Our failure to do justice to Hamilton is undeniable; and it is all the more conspicuous and deplorable because it relates not alone to his gifts, but also, and in an even higher degree, to his services. Of this fact the traditional ingratitude of republics is not a satisfying explanation. From Washington to Lincoln there are many names which prove that the American people can properly appreciate those who serve them. They have not done so in the case of Hamilton, because, in respect to matters of prime importance, he misunderstood them, and they in turn misunderstood and disagreed with him. But peoples, like individuals, feel gratitude towards those benefactors only whom they both understand and approve. The origin and in part the consequences of this misunderstanding and disagreement can be made clear by a brief review of Hamilton's political work.

The public life of Hamilton began in 1774. He was then a student at King's, now Columbia, College. On July sixth of that year he made an extempore address at a meeting of patriots. In the following December appeared the first of his

¹ *The Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. V, March, 1890.

² *American Commonwealth*, I, 641.

political writings, — a pamphlet in reply to Tory criticism upon the Continental Congress; it was entitled *A Full Vindication*. A few weeks later a second and longer pamphlet was entitled *The Farmer Refuted*. Both were widely read and had a marked influence. The author, although probably under eighteen when he wrote the *Vindication*, was already a statesman. For grasp of principles, mastery of facts, clearness of statement and cogency of reasoning, these papers deserve high rank in the political literature of the Revolution. What, at that time, were the politics of this youth, who, up to 1772, had been an inhabitant of the West Indies? Had he, within the short space of two years, become an American? In arguing against the claim that Parliament had an unlimited right to legislate for the colonies, he wrote:

“All men have one common original: they participate in one common nature, and consequently have one common right. No reason can be advanced why one man should exercise any power or preëminence over his fellow-creatures more than another, unless they have voluntarily vested him with it. Since, then, Americans have not, by any act of theirs, empowered the British Parliament to make laws for them, it follows they can have no just authority to do it.”¹ It is not the burden of a particular tax which the colonies resent:

“The Parliament claims a right to tax us in all cases whatsoever; its late acts are in virtue of that claim. How ridiculous, then, it is to affirm that we are quarrelling for the trifling sum of three pence a pound on tea, when it is evidently the principle against which we contend.”²

He even went so far as to claim that in the last resort the duties of the colonists were determined by their interests:

“As to the degrees and modifications of that subordination which is due to the parent state, these must depend upon other things besides the mere act of emigration. . . . These must be ascertained by the spirit of the constitution of the mother country, by the compacts for the purpose of colonizing, and

¹ *Alexander Hamilton, Works*, Ed. Lodge, I, 6.

² *Ibid.*, I, 7.

more especially by the law of nature, and that supreme law of every society — its own happiness.”¹

He frequently appealed to the natural rights of man. He tells his Tory opponents:

“The fundamental source of all your errors, sophisms, and false reasonings is a total ignorance of the natural rights of mankind. Were you once to become acquainted with these, you could never entertain a thought that all men are not, by nature, entitled to a parity of privileges.”²

And in a passage which contains an element of poetry as well as profound philosophy he wrote:

“The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself.”³

Such utterances seem to answer in the affirmative the question: Did Hamilton begin public life as an American? The sentiments are those of Otis and Henry. It is easy, however, to draw from them false inferences. The words have a democratic ring, but there is little that is peculiarly American in them. They express universal rather than American democratic principles. Most of them a Frenchman might have uttered. Moreover, the circumstances under which he wrote make it clear that when Hamilton spoke of the rights of man, he had in mind communities rather than individuals. His quarrel was not with the aristocratic institutions of Great Britain, but with her policy. The question whether the English colonies in America had individually the right of self-government in respect to taxation was then the formal ground of dispute; and this question is radically distinct from that other one in regard to form of government which the colonies were soon to face. To this latter question, the determination of which involved a decision for or against democracy, we have no proof that Hamilton at this time had given serious attention. If he had done so, it could have been only in a speculative way. It seems not unreasonable to assume that he

¹ *Works*, I, 63.

² *Ibid.*, I, 83.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 108.

accepted democratic ideas in so far as they sustained the claim of the colonists to the right of self-taxation, and, in possible contingencies, to independence; but he did not consciously commit himself further. We know that certain strongly marked traits of his character inclined him from the beginning not only against democracy, but also against resistance to Great Britain. In the advertisement of *The Farmer Refuted*, Hamilton significantly declares that he knows his opinions have not been influenced by prejudice, — because he remembers the time when he had strong prejudices on the side he now opposes. His change of sentiment, he firmly believes, proceeded from the superior force of the arguments in favor of the American claims.¹

Perhaps the most serious blemish of these early writings is an appeal to anti-papist feeling. But this was “a fault of youth”; throughout most of his later writings, and particularly in those which belong to his best period, from 1780 to 1797, Hamilton seeks to allay rather than to excite prejudice. Aside from their use in promoting resistance and preparing for revolution, and their significance as a revelation of character and talent, the chief interest of these papers consists in the fact that in every line they present the writer as in full sympathy with the people of his adopted country. This harmony, however, did not rest upon a durable basis; what made it for a short time possible, was a highly exceptional condition of public affairs in which those political interests wherein Hamilton and the people thought alike, overshadowed those wherein they could never agree. In 1774 the spirit of nationalism was dominant; local and particular interests were, for the time being, forgotten. But American particularism was not dead; it only slept; it was sure to awaken soon, and then the variance between Hamilton and the people must begin.

During the struggle for independence, Hamilton, although occupied with important military duties, found time to enter upon the task to which his life thereafter was to be devoted and, we may truly say, sacrificed — the task, namely, of giv-

¹ *Works*, I, 53.

ing to the United States a national government, and therewith a national character and policy. In a letter dated September 3, 1780, to James Duane, a member of the Continental Congress, Hamilton gave his views "of the defects of our present system, and the changes necessary to save us from ruin." "The fundamental defect," he wrote, "is a want of power in Congress." This was due, in his opinion, to three causes:

"An excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made the particular States show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands, — and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety or necessity; a diffidence, in Congress, of their own powers, by which they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions, constantly making concessions to the States, till they have scarcely left themselves the shadow of power; a want of sufficient means at their disposal to answer the public exigencies." ¹

To the plea that Congress "had never any definite powers granted them" he replies:

"The manner in which Congress was appointed would warrant, and the public good required that they should have considered themselves as vested with full power to preserve the republic from harm. They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty, which were always cheerfully submitted to; the Declaration of Independence, the declaration of war. . . . All these implications of a complete sovereignty were never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the whole conduct of administration. Undefined powers are discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which they are given; in the present case the independence and freedom of America." ²

Of the Confederation, then under discussion and soon to be established, he says:

"It is neither fit for war nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty in each State over its internal police will

¹ *Works*, I, 203.

² *Ibid.*, I, 208.

defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious.”¹

His enumeration of the powers which properly belong to Congress summarizes quite fairly the powers which, according to the interpretation of Hamilton and the early Federalists, were actually conferred on the general government by the Constitution of 1787:

“Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance and to the management of foreign affairs; the right of declaring war; of raising armies, officering, paying them, directing their motions in every respect; of equipping fleets, and doing the same with them; of building fortifications, arsenals, magazines, etc., etc.; of making peace on such conditions as they think proper; of regulating trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried on; granting indulgences; laying prohibitions on all the articles of export or import; imposing duties; granting bounties and premiums for raising, exporting or importing, and applying to their own use the product of these duties — only giving credit to the States on whom they are raised in the general account of revenues and expenses; instituting admiralty courts, etc.; of coining money; establishing banks on such terms and with such privileges as they think proper; appropriating funds; and doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance; transacting everything with foreign nations; making alliances, offensive and defensive, treaties of commerce, etc., etc.”²

He favored a more efficient executive, with the following secretaryships: Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, Finance, Trade.³ A paragraph, prophetic of one of the greatest of its author's achievements, advocates the establishment of a national bank. During the years 1781 and 1782 the substance of this letter was given to the public in a series of essays, six in number, which received the name of *The Continentalist*.

The letter to Duane makes it clear that, in 1780, the views of the writer had already come to differ widely from those generally held by the American people. It is true that he and

¹ *Works*, I, 205.

² *Ibid.*, I, 214.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 215.

they were moving in the same general direction, that is, towards national unity and national government, — but not at an equal pace. He was advancing rapidly, constantly, and with confident step; they, slowly, reluctantly, with many misgivings and backward turnings. It is certainly remarkable that at the age of twenty-three, and before the adoption of our first constitution, namely the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton should have detected and exposed its inadequacy, should have foretold its failure; and that he should have thought out, in its most important features, that second and durable constitution which went into operation nine years later. In 1780 Hamilton, although far ahead, was still in the same pathway with the people.

Even before the war closed Hamilton had come to regard the States as a highly inconvenient and mischievous element of the political system. He now entered on a course of experiences which confirmed this view, and, at the same time, caused him to distrust and dislike democracy. In 1782 he became a member of Congress, and struggled manfully to commit that body to a national policy. But his efforts were in vain. Now that the pressure of war was removed the reaction towards State rights carried everything before it. His colleagues admired, but would not support him. In the States the democratic element began to get control and to abuse its power flagrantly.

In 1784, while a private citizen engaged in the practice of the law, Hamilton made a heroic stand against the persecution of the Tories. *The Letters from Phocion*, which this persecution called forth from him, after dwelling upon the inhumanity, the unlawfulness and the impolicy of persecution, direct attention in closing to its influence upon the future of the state:

“Early habits,” he wrote, “give a lasting bias to the temper and character. Our governments, hitherto, have no habits. How important to the happiness, not of America alone, but of mankind, that they should acquire good ones!

“If we set out with justice, moderation, liberality and a scru-

pulous regard to the Constitution, the government will acquire a spirit and tone productive of permanent blessings to the community. If, on the contrary, the public councils are guided by humor, passion and prejudice, . . . the future spirit of government will be feeble, distracted, and arbitrary. The rights of the subject will be the sport of every party vicissitude. . . . With the greatest advantages for promoting it that ever a people had, we shall have betrayed the cause of human nature.”¹

This solicitude for the future and for the world; for the permanent effects of a particular policy upon the character of the people and the government, and thereby upon the welfare of mankind, — is a strongly marked trait of Hamilton and proves the high quality of his statesmanship. Moreover the stand he took not only in these letters but in defending in a celebrated case the legal rights of the hated Loyalists, showed that Hamilton did not share the prejudices of the multitude and had the courage to stand alone, if need be, against the multitude. But these considerations do not fully explain his course. His tolerant attitude towards the Tories was in part due to the circumstance that he, more justly than most, could understand, and even respect, the motives which had kept them steadfast in their loyalty to Great Britain. This circumstance points to a radical difference between Hamilton and other Americans. His nationalism was as strong and fervent as theirs; but it rested on another and in some respects a broader basis.

Meanwhile the Confederation was being tested. It is needless to recount here the humiliating events of the period from 1780 to 1787. At its close most citizens who had learned to think and feel “continentally” agreed with Hamilton that the Confederation was “neither fit for war nor peace.” Disgrace and danger at last made the people ready to consider the propriety of strengthening the federal government. In the events which led to the Convention of 1787, Hamilton had a conspicuous and useful part. In the Convention itself he presented and in a powerful speech advocated an aristocratic

¹ *Works*, III, 504.

and highly centralized form of government. Let us look at some of its features: tenure of office for both the President and the Senators of the United States was to be for life. They were to be chosen as now by electors, but these electors were themselves to be chosen by voters having a considerable property qualification. To the President was given an unqualified veto; that is, the President could prevent any measure from becoming law; in the Senate the exclusive right to declare war was vested. The national government was to appoint the governors of the States, and these, like the President, were to have an unqualified veto on state legislation.¹

So far as Hamilton took part in the debates of the Convention, his views were in accord with the principles embodied in this plan of government. His first impression of the Constitution and his forecast of the course of events in case of its adoption, may be gathered from a paper written within a few days after the close of the Convention:

¹ Vide *Works* I, 334. The grounds of Hamilton's views on government are indicated by the following quotations from the brief of his speech:

"Society naturally divides itself into two political divisions—the few and the many, who have distinct interests.

"If government (is) in the hands of the few, they will tyrannize over the many.

"If (in) the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they should be separated.

"This separation must be permanent.

"Representation alone will not do.

"Demagogues will generally prevail.

"And if separated, they will need a mutual check.

"This check is a monarch.

"Each principle ought to exist in full force, or it will not answer its end.

"The democracy must be derived immediately from the people.

"The aristocracy ought to be entirely separated; their power should be permanent. . . .

"They should be so circumstanced that they can have no interest in a change—as to have an effectual weight in the constitution."—*Ibid.*, I, 357.

"Gentlemen say we need to be rescued from the democracy. But what (are) the means proposed?

"A democratic Assembly is to be checked by a democratic Senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate.

"The end will not be answered—the means will not be equal to the object.

"It will, therefore, be feeble and inefficient."—*Works*, I, 359.

"If the government," he wrote, "be adopted, it is probable General Washington will be the President of the United States. This will ensure a wise choice of men to administer the government and a good administration. A good administration will conciliate the confidence and affection of the people, and perhaps enable the government to acquire more consistency than the proposed Constitution seems to promise for so great a country. It may then triumph altogether over the state governments and reduce them to an entire subordination, dividing the larger States into smaller districts. The organs of the general government may also acquire additional strength.

"If this should not be the case in the course of a few years, it is probable that the contests about the boundaries of power between the particular governments and the general government, and the momentum of the larger States in such contests, will produce a dissolution of the Union. This, after all, seems to be the most likely result."¹

In 1780 Hamilton had occupied a position which the people were scarcely able to attain eight years later. In 1787 he occupied a position towards which the people were not progressing—from which indeed their line of advance was steadily deviating. From this time onward the gulf between public opinion and his opinions was to widen constantly.

But in 1787 there was only one course which nationalists could pursue, and that was to support the proposed Constitution. This Hamilton did in a way which, had he done nothing else for his country, would have made him one of the most famous and deserving of Americans. He wrote the greater portion of *The Federalist*,—the unique excellence of which is universally conceded,—and, by dint of courage and argument, he extorted a vote to ratify from the unfriendly convention of New York. His predictions respecting the Presidency came true. Washington made a "wise choice of men to administer the government." As Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton entered upon the great work of his life. Here for the first and only time in his career, the situation favored the

¹ *Works*, I, 402.

freest exercise of his highest powers. Hitherto, with the single exception of his first youthful efforts, he had always been hampered by wide differences of view between himself and those with and for whom he worked. This was the case when he wrote *The Continentalist*, when he wrote the *Letters of Phocion*, when he served in Congress and when he was a member of the Convention of 1787; and it remained true, although its effects were less apparent, during his labors to secure ratification. But at the head of the fiscal department of the administration, he found the situation radically changed. As compared with the earlier times he had, in spite of the growing divergence of view between himself and the people, a free hand. Behind him were Washington and the Federalists; before him was a task which, although great and difficult, — or rather because of its greatness and difficulty, — was to him infinitely attractive; the task, namely, of administering the new and reluctantly accepted national government in such a way as to make the nation itself united, strong, prosperous and respected.

All students of the Federalist period are acquainted with the admirable way in which Hamilton organized his department, with that comprehensive financial policy which was a chief agency in restoring economic prosperity and in consolidating the Union. In this policy Hamilton provided for meeting in full existing national and state obligations; for easing the burden of payment by a wise funding scheme; for obtaining a national revenue as we are now doing by means of imposts and excises; for aiding the operations of the Treasury and facilitating the credit transactions of the people through the establishment of a national bank; and for increasing the economic and thereby the political independence of the country through a protective policy. It would be difficult to overrate the far-reaching educational influence of these measures. There is one chapter in the history of certain American States which no one who cares for the good name of our people likes to read, — the chapter, namely, which narrates the dealings of these States with their creditors. But when we read of repudiation by individual commonwealths, it is consoling and en-

couraging to remember the honorable course in respect to financial obligations which the national government has thus far pursued. This policy of public honesty was inaugurated by Hamilton. Other statesmen, it is true, and the general sense of the people were on his side; but he led the movement, and on him fell the heaviest blows of the truly formidable opposition. Probably no feature of his plan was attacked so often and so vehemently as the funding scheme; and yet, without this or its equivalent, adequate provision for the public indebtedness could not have been made. One of Hamilton's strongest motives for an honest public policy was the tendency it would have to make honesty and fair dealing elements of American character. In his *First Report on the Public Credit*, in January, 1790, he said:

"In so strong a light . . . do they (the maxims which uphold public credit) appear to the secretary that on their due observance, at the present critical juncture, materially depends in his judgment the individual and aggregate prosperity of the citizens of the United States; their relief from the embarrassments they now experience, — their character as a people; the cause of good government."¹

In the summer of 1792 (July 29) Washington sent Hamilton a list of objections to the financial policy of the administration. These objections Colonel Mason of Virginia had communicated to the President, and it was supposed that they represented the views if not the authorship of Jefferson. To these Hamilton made reply on August 18. The paper is remarkable in many ways. The answers to the twenty-one objections were prepared in haste and were copied, so Hamilton wrote Washington in the accompanying note, "just as they flowed from my heart and pen without revision or corruption." For this very reason their value as a portrayal of opinions and character is all the greater. In meeting the twentieth objection, that "the owners of the debt are in the Southern, and the holders of it in the Northern division," Hamilton made the dignified and characteristic reply:

¹ *Works*, II, 49-50.

"If this were literally true, it would be no argument for or against anything. It would be still politically and morally right for the debtors to pay their creditors."¹

Hamilton recognized to the full the immense value of credit both in national and private economy; and he recognized further that character, moral as well as industrial, is the most solid and durable foundation of credit. Moreover, in order to estimate justly both the difficulty and the value of his service to the moral and economic welfare of the American people, it is necessary to remember that he lived in a revolutionary age, when the influences which tend to weaken the sense of obligation are unusually active and powerful. That Hamilton's ideal of public honesty was higher than the popular ideal, and that his courage and firmness in supporting his ideal were remarkable, will hardly be questioned by those who realize the demoralization which followed the close of the Revolutionary War — a demoralization which led to and was increased by the stay laws and legal tender acts, which in many States debauched the conscience of the citizen then in much the same way that state repudiation has debauched it in more recent times. It would, however, be wide of the mark to assert that the opposition to Hamilton was due in any considerable degree to his championship of national honesty. The dislike aroused by the funding scheme and by other features of his policy rested in the main on other grounds. In the *Report on the Public Credit* already quoted the writer says:

"To promote the increasing respectability of the American name; to answer the calls of justice; to restore landed property to its due value; to furnish new resources both to agriculture and commerce; to cement more closely the union of the States; to add to their security against foreign attack; to establish public order on the basis of an upright and liberal policy, — these are the great and invaluable ends to be secured by a proper and adequate provision . . . for the support of public credit."²

This enumeration of ends is not unlike that in the preamble

¹ *Works*, II, 274.

² *Ibid.*, II, 52.

to the Constitution. To our ears it is strictly orthodox. But in 1790 it suggested to many what indeed in one sense it was, a plan of campaign against State sovereignty; and at that time State sovereignty was one of the strongest prepossessions of the American people.

The forcible suppression of the Whiskey Insurrection taught a people who hitherto had obeyed only local governments, colonial or state, that they must respect and submit to the authority of the new national government. Other measures, particularly the funding scheme, the Bank and, later, the policy of protection, made large classes and powerful interests the permanent allies of the national government, and therefore depressed correspondingly the importance of the States. In all this the government gained, but Hamilton lost. The people were benefited by the discipline, but they did not like the man who administered it. The feeling of the masses may be gathered from the wrathful words of Jefferson, their truest representative. December 28, 1794, he wrote Madison:

"The excise law is an infernal one. The first error was to admit it by the Constitution; the second, to act on the admission; the third and last will be to make it the instrument of dismembering the Union and setting us all afloat to choose what part of it we will adhere to. The information of the militia, returned from the westward, is uniform, that though the people there let them pass quietly, they were objects of their laughter, not of their fear; that a thousand men could have cut off their whole force in a thousand places in the Alleghany; that the detestation of the excise law is universal, and has now associated with it a detestation of the government; and that a separation which perhaps was a very distant and problematical event, is now near and certain, and determined in the mind of every man."¹

In recalling the relation of Hamilton to protection it is important to observe that his chief motive as set forth in the famous *Report on Manufactures* was to strengthen the Union; he does not mention as a reason for protection that on which

¹ *Jefferson, Works*, IV, 112.

the advocates of the present system place their main reliance, namely, its alleged tendency to raise wages. But the end which Hamilton wished to secure through protection is now fully attained. No one questions to-day the unity or the strength of the United States. The recent complimentary assertion of the Russian ambassador at Berlin, that the United States "have nothing to ask and nothing to fear," if not absolutely true, is still far truer of us than of any other people. Our danger is not that we shall suffer injustice, but that tempted by our strength we shall perpetrate injustice.

In respect to foreign policy Hamilton was in hearty accord with Washington. He held that the United States should seek peace and favorable commercial relations with other countries; that they should hold themselves aloof from the quarrels of foreign states; that they should resent foreign interference in our domestic affairs, and that they should resist the extension of European and seek the increase of American influence in the Western world. He was, however, eminently prudent. His first aim was peace. Unlike Napoleon, the soldier in him was subordinate to the statesman. At the close of the War of Independence he was friendly to France. Even at the beginning of the French Revolution his good will towards that country was marked; but when the Jacobins came into control his early sympathy changed into aversion and hatred, and he began to look on England as the defender of what was best in modern civilization. In this too he differed from the majority of his fellow-citizens. They remained, even during the reign of terror, steadfast in friendship for France and in enmity towards England.

Concerning the wisdom and utility of Hamilton's course as a cabinet officer, the conflict of opinion which raged fiercely in his day has almost ceased. Time has amply vindicated both his intentions and his methods. The accusation that he plotted to re-establish monarchy was altogether false. The testimony of contemporaries and his own correspondence establish what indeed there never was reasonable ground for doubting — his loyalty to the republican system. That his measures were wise

is proved both by their immediate effect and their later adoption by his enemies. Apart from the charge that he was a monarchist, the substance of the indictment against Hamilton is that to a hurtful degree he sought to strengthen the federal government and to weaken the States. But when Hamilton retired from office was the federal government too strong? Was it so at any subsequent time down to the close of the Civil War? Were the States at any time previous to 1865 too weak to discharge the functions which properly belong to them? On the contrary, is it not true that within the period named the public interest suffered oftener from excess of power in the States, than from excess of power in the federal government? And if since 1865 centralization and consequent depression of the States may seem to any one to have proceeded too far, is not the evil traceable to causes quite outside of Hamilton's policy? It is moreover a fair question whether the Union could have withstood the shock of secession had it not been for the strength which Hamilton gave to the national government.

After his retirement from the cabinet Hamilton continued his practice of seeking to educate public opinion through essays published in the newspapers. Under the signature of "Camillus" he discussed and defended in a masterly way the treaty which Jay had recently negotiated with England. The essays numbered thirty-eight and had, in the decision of the very important question at issue, an influence which may be compared with that of *The Federalist* on ratification. Many other essays appeared during the years 1796, 1797 and 1798, most of which bore on the controversies with France. In some of these one notes a marked change of tone. Denunciation is a prominent feature. The appeal is no longer to the people as a whole but to the Federalists. This change, it is true, was a natural consequence of the development of parties and the growth of partisanship; none the less it signifies loss and deterioration.

To these closing years of the century belongs the unhappy chapter which narrates the quarrel with John Adams. We

cannot exonerate Hamilton. His intrigues against Adams in successive presidential campaigns, although they may have been prompted by zeal for the public welfare, were unnecessary and mischievous. The pamphlet attack in 1800, which tried to prove that the Federalist candidate was unfit for the Presidency, and then advised the party in spite of his unfitness to vote for him, showed that its author, under strong temptation, was capable of jeopardizing the success of his party for the sake of gratifying personal animosity. His earlier relations with Adams' cabinet tended to pervert for the time being the natural functions of that very important body. Adams had inherited his cabinet from Washington. Its three most important members, Pickering, Wolcott and McHenry, were at the outset unfriendly to Adams and soon became sharply hostile. They looked upon Hamilton as the real head of the Federalist party and maintained with him a close correspondence. Their letters contain much bitter criticism of the President, and betray now and then something very like treachery. Hamilton undertook with the aid of the secretaries two things: first, to direct the policy of the administration; second, to obtain matter which he could employ in his warfare upon Adams. The mere statement of the facts condemns him and his allies. Although justly rated as a man of honor, Hamilton was guilty at times of strange lapses, and this was one of the gravest. The intrigue was an act of political libertinism; its essence was infidelity.¹

¹ Mr. Lodge takes a different view: "The fact that he was not on personally good terms with Adams does not affect the matter. Hamilton was fully entitled to write private letters to members of the cabinet, and they had a right to receive them. The fact that the secretaries, after they found themselves in opposition to the President, ought to have retired, is a wholly distinct matter, and must be discussed on different grounds. If they chose to be guided by Hamilton, a private individual and unofficial leader, that was their affair, not his." — Henry Cabot Lodge, *Alexander Hamilton*, American Statesmen Series, p. 234.

It seems to me, on the contrary, that if these men, over whom Hamilton had an almost controlling influence, chose to do a public and official wrong, it was emphatically "his affair"; simply as a good citizen he was under obligation to dissuade them. The measure of Hamilton's responsibility appears

Again, Hamilton's course towards Adams subjects him to censure as a party leader. Good leadership requires the fullest use of every means which can be honorably employed to promote party success. John Adams was an important factor in the political situation. He was confessedly one of the greatest of Americans. He stood nearer to the people than most of the Federalist leaders. He, better than they, could mediate between the aristocratic conservative classes and the multitude. But Hamilton's treatment of Adams was calculated to lessen, and undoubtedly did lessen, the possible service both of Adams and himself to Federalism and to the Union. His attempt to be the power behind the throne, while he was the enemy of its occupant, was, to say the least, a wide deviation from the honorable and patriotic course which he usually pursued.

The year 1800 marks the darkest period in the life of Hamilton. During its early months he made the attack upon Adams. On May 7, he wrote to John Jay, the Federalist governor of New York, as follows:

"You have been informed of the loss of our election in this city . . . the moral certainty is therefore that there will be an anti-Federal majority in the ensuing legislature; and the very high probability is that this will bring Jefferson into the chief magistracy, unless it be prevented by the measure which I shall now submit to your consideration, namely the immediate calling together of the existing legislature. . . . Scruples of delicacy and propriety, as relative to a common course of things, ought to yield to the extraordinary nature of the crisis. They ought not to hinder the taking of a legal and constitutional step to prevent an atheist in religion and a fanatic in politics from getting possession of the helm of state. . . . The calling of the legislature will have for its object the choosing of electors by the people in districts; this will insure

when we reflect that he instigated the misconduct of Wolcott and Pickering and was their accomplice; and that he himself had served in the cabinet under Washington, and knew better than most what was due to the President from a member of the cabinet.

a majority of votes in the United States for a Federal candidate. . . . In weighing this suggestion you will doubtless bear in mind that popular governments must certainly be overturned, and, while they endure, prove engines of mischief, if one party will call to its aid all the resources which vice can give, and if the other (however pressing the emergency) confines itself within all the ordinary forms of delicacy and decorum.”¹

Upon the back of this Machiavellian letter Jay wrote the following words: “Proposing a measure for party purposes which it would not become me to adopt.” In December Hamilton was himself again. The presidential election had been transferred to the House of Representatives and the Presidency lay between Jefferson and Burr. The Federalists, with whom the decision rested, were disposed to support the latter. To prevent this degradation of the party, the office and the nation, Hamilton exerted himself to the utmost, and with success.

The substance of the remarkable letters through which Hamilton sought to save the Presidency from Burr may be expressed in these words: “Democracy is a terrible evil; but, since the government must be democratic, let us place it in the hands of Jefferson, who will pursue ‘a temporizing policy,’ rather than in the hands of Burr, who is ‘an American Catiline.’”

The differences with his party which began in 1800 continued to the end. The Federalists apostatized from national doctrines; he remained true. They censured and he approved the purchase of Louisiana. The projects of disunion which certain Federalist leaders favored, he steadfastly opposed. In 1804 he entered the lists a second time in order to prevent a coalition between his party and Burr; and this effort, although successful, cost Hamilton his life.

This brings to a close the chronological survey of Hamilton’s work. What of that work as a whole? The thirty years between his first public appearance, in 1774, and his final

¹ *Works*, VIII, 549.

struggle with Burr, in 1804, belong to a great period in the history of the world. In the United States three revolutions were accomplished; the first separated the colonies from Great Britain; the second gave us the Constitution and the Federal administrations; the third placed the national government in the hands of Jefferson. Hamilton's services were rendered in connection with the first and second of these revolutions — chiefly the second. The triumph of the third restricted the sphere of his public activity and usefulness to very narrow limits. That he assisted materially in securing the independence of the colonies is not questioned. Still, his relation to that movement was very unlike that of his fellow-colonists. Only in a superficial sense was the Revolution due to the quarrel over the question of taxation. Rightly viewed, this quarrel determined the time and method of a separation; but the real cause of separation was incompatibility of character and interests between the American and British peoples. In the course of the century and a half — some five generations — from the first period of rapid settlement to the outbreak of the Revolution, the English colonists became Americans; and a new civilization grew up which, in important particulars, was unlike the old. The taxation grievance by itself could never have converted a law-abiding people, such as the colonists were, into revolutionists. What did most to bring this about was the recognition, on their part, that in character and spirit there had come to exist between them and their British kindred wide and growing differences; and that out of these differences must arise a perpetual conflict of interests and policy. In this new civilization the two most characteristic features were hostility to privilege and attachment to local self-government, — in other words, democracy and what, owing to the peculiar form of its later most prominent manifestations, we call State rights. Hamilton did not feel in any marked degree the motives which spring from these two characteristic elements of American civilization. He had not inherited an American character. His ancestry had had no part in the distinctive life of the colonies of the mainland. He came to

this country, as he himself tells us, when "about sixteen." Judging from the pamphlets which he published only two years later, he must have been, when he left his West Indian home, as mature as the average American of twenty-two or perhaps of twenty-five. To him America was neither a birthplace nor a nursery; and only in a qualified sense can it be called a school. It was rather a field into which he entered after his character was formed and his equipment for work was nearly completed. Hence he took part in resisting the mother country, not because he wished democratic institutions, nor because he wished the colony of New York to enjoy the right of self-taxation, but, to use his own words, because the mother country "attempted to wrest from us those rights without which we must have descended from the ranks of freemen." And these rights, as he understood them, were those enjoyed by Englishmen in England. Nevertheless when, owing to the existence in others of motives which he did not feel, resistance developed into revolution, he too became a revolutionist and a very effective one. Even before independence was achieved, Hamilton in common with other patriots was called upon to answer two questions: first, Shall the United States be a confederacy or a nation; second, What shall be their institutions and their type of civilization? It is the way in which he answered these questions that has made Hamilton one of the greatest characters in American and in modern history. His reply to the first was that the United States must be a nation, and to this end must have a national government clothed with ample powers to provide for every national want; that the administration must pursue an energetic and centralizing policy in order that the character of the people and the traditions of government might become thoroughly national. This was Hamilton's theory. At the close of the War of Independence its realization seemed impossible. He saw in the thirteen States not a nation, but an aggregation of turbulent, semi-socialistic democracies, in which the national idea and the highest national interests were being sacrificed to local and class interests and to the idea of the unqualified sovereignty of the

individual State. Against these tendencies his struggle, although heroic, was in vain. The riot of democracy and particularism had to go on until those who owned property and those who cared for law and order became thoroughly alarmed. With the rebellion of Shays began in earnest that movement which was both an aristocratic reaction against democracy, and a nationalist reaction against State rights, — the movement which gave us the Constitution of 1787 and twelve years of Federalist supremacy. This reaction was Hamilton's opportunity. He was its master spirit. How wisely he used it in promoting the nationalization of the American people and their institutions we already know.

Not less distinct and scarcely less important was Hamilton's answer to the question what should be the type of civilization in the United States. He wished to create here, as far as the situation would permit, an American England. In all that he did, the models and working ideas were of English origin. He praised the English constitution in the Convention of 1787; the features of our Constitution which gave it most resemblance to that of England he defended convincingly in *The Federalist*. In his career as Secretary of the Treasury he probably came nearer than any other American cabinet officer to wielding an influence over Congress comparable with that of a British prime minister over Parliament. The principles that underlie his financial policy are in the main those which have been tested and approved by the experience of England. His tolerant attitude towards the Tories was the natural expression of his English sympathies as well as of his sense of justice and humanity and of wise public policy. But in his use of English ideas he was not a mere copyist. The originality and wisdom with which he modified are as striking as the boldness with which he appropriated. Jefferson and, later, John Adams called Hamilton "British." The word was applicable only in so far as it implied a purpose to establish here those features of the English system which were adapted to the American character and situation. In so far as it suggested a willingness to sacrifice American to British interests, it was grossly unjust.

The value of the service which Hamilton rendered in aiding to re-establish the process which connected the development of the United States with that of England, is greater than we can easily realize. Although England has made it harder for us to acknowledge the debt, the words of Jay are true:

"It certainly is chiefly owing to institutions, laws and principles of policy and government originally delivered to us as British colonists, that, with the favor of Heaven, the people of this country are what they are."¹

It is also true that a people, as little as an individual, can afford to throw away what is inherited. But, owing to the animosities which the war kindled, to the obstinate unfriendliness of England, and to the seductive policy of France, we were then under strong temptation to develop our national system on a basis too exclusively American and French. From this folly Hamilton helped to deliver us.

Any just estimate of Hamilton's work must take into the account what he did for the education of the public. His usual method of seeking support was through appeals to the reason of thoughtful and patriotic citizens. In this his success was phenomenal. Friends and foes testified that in the qualities which enable a writer to convince, Hamilton was without a rival. In what he wrote there was rarely a trace of the partisan, never of the demagogue. Much of his work was done while questions relating to the Constitution engaged the attention of the public. For the treatment of such themes he had a singular aptitude. The extent of his writings is as remarkable as their solidarity. He wrote, often at considerable length, on every important public question which arose during the Federalist period. The result was a collection of writings which embody the best political thought of the time. Indeed, considering both range and quality, it is scarcely venturesome to say that Hamilton's works exceed in value those of any other American statesman.

What were the defects of Hamilton's statesmanship? First,

¹ John Jay, *Life and Writings*, II, 262.

he failed as a party leader. This was in part because he would not accept the conditions of successful leadership. The party leader who succeeds simply goes ahead in the direction which the party is inclined to take. The apparent leader is in reality the follower. But Hamilton marked out his own course and would not deviate from it. In the second place, his attitude towards democracy was mistaken. Democracy was not, as he wrote Sedgwick a few hours before his death, "our real disease." That he thought it was, is not surprising; for in him the love of order was instinctive, and the predilection for conservative methods of progress was strongly marked. In his day, moreover, democracy, both here and in France, showed itself at its worst. But, as we can now see, democracy is essential to progress; it is both the means and the fruit of the diffusion of civilization.

Equally mistaken was Hamilton in wishing to destroy the States. They hindered, it is true, the work of consolidating the Union; but at the same time they stood for the invaluable principle of local self-government. The evil which they did was of minor consequence when compared with that which their destruction would have caused.

These defects, considerable as they are, did not, during the period of his greatest usefulness, seriously affect the work of Hamilton; but during his closing years, they proved fatal to his influence and, it is mournful to add, to his peace of mind. In 1801 the American people came under the sway of Jefferson and refused to listen any longer to the conservative statesman who hated and warred upon their most cherished political beliefs. Hamilton recognized his isolation and not without bitterness wrote:

"Mine is an odd destiny. Perhaps no man in the United States has sacrificed or done more for the present Constitution than myself; and contrary to all my anticipations of its fate, as you know from the very beginning, I am still laboring to prop the frail and worthless fabric. Yet I have the murmurs of its friends no less than the curses of its foes for my reward. What can I do better than withdraw from the scene? Every

day proves to me more and more that this American world was not made for me.”¹

But he had not failed. Although in hands that he distrusted, the republic was safe; and no one had done more than he to make it so.

¹ *Works*, VIII, 591.

VI

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE PARTY REVOLUTION OF 1800¹

IF WE knew the full and exact truth respecting our first party revolution, we could reason more wisely in regard to later ones and act more prudently in regard to those which are to come. The materials on which to base a judgment of this revolution are abundant and excellent. There is little or no dispute respecting important matters of fact. Of particular value are the opinions which we find in the private correspondence of party leaders and of other interested and sagacious men of that day. Instructive, too, are the histories of the Federalist period, some of which compare favorably with the best works on other periods. And yet, despite the abundance and quality of the material and the skill of those by whom it has been worked, I am compelled to think that in one respect the results are not satisfying; it seems to me that as a rule the factor of party has not been appreciated at its true worth. The views to which I beg your attention are the results of a study prompted by the conviction that since the establishment of party government the key to political history is to be found in a study of the nature and history of party.

It is agreed that among the factors which had weight in the struggle of the year 1800, the following deserve special mention:

(1) Peace with France, since this took from the Federalists the popularity which they had enjoyed as the war party of

¹ *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1894*, pp. 531-539; Government Printing Office, 1896.

1797 and 1798 and left upon them the odium of having pushed unduly far burdensome war preparations which the event had proved unnecessary.

(2) The quarrels of Adams and Hamilton, which on the eve of the election developed factions within the party that were little less hostile to one another than to the common enemy.

(3) The blunders in party strategy committed by the Federalists in passing the Alien and Sedition Acts, in raising the term of naturalization from five to fourteen years, in claiming for the federal courts a common law jurisdiction, and in pushing prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts in the doubtful Middle States.

(4) The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.

Concerning the influence of the peace with France and of the Federalist dissensions and war measures there is and can be no question — they were each and all greatly hurtful to the party in power. Concerning the influence of the fourth factor, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, there is a wide difference of view. Quite too generally these famous utterances have been condemned on the ground of their supposed relationship to later sectional movements; — that in New England between 1807 and 1814, in South Carolina in 1832, and in the Southern division of the Union in 1861. It is quite true that they were quoted as authority by the sectionalists of the North as well as those of the South; on the other hand, it should be remembered, first, that the true source of sectionalism is to be found in what Calhoun called the contrariety of the interests of the sections, rather than in the theories of the Constitution, and second, that the motive which gave birth to the resolutions had in it absolutely nothing of a sectional nature. Their aim was to protect those rights of the individual citizen which had been violated by the Alien and Sedition Acts; — rights which were as much an object of concern to Matthew Lyon of Vermont, as to any citizen of Virginia or South Carolina. It is true that the authors of the resolutions found no way of escape from unconstitutional and tyrannous legislation on the part of the national government save in a theory of the rights

of the States which history has proven untenable, and public opinion now decisively rejects; but it should be kept in mind that the theory of the Union which now prevails had not been accepted in 1798 by the mass of the American people. How little the views of Madison and Jefferson jarred upon the comparatively immature and feeble national sense of a hundred years ago may be inferred from two circumstances — first, the extent, in that period immediately subsequent, of the defection of the Federalists themselves from the national idea, and second, the formal acceptance of the doctrine of State sovereignty by a great and successful party at a later period when the spirit of nationality had reached a stage of development considerably more advanced. Indeed, it is probable that at the date of their issue a considerable majority of American citizens accepted the theory of the Union on which the resolutions were based. But our present concern is not so much the relationship of the resolutions to sectionalism as their immediate effect upon the fortunes of the Republican party. In the principles of that party the rights of the individual and the rights of the States then held the first place. Every true Republican believed that the Federalist legislation of 1798 was unconstitutional, and therefore, to quote the words of Jefferson, “as null and void as if Congress had commanded the people to bow down and worship a graven image”; and many Republicans, among them Jefferson himself, believed that this legislation was part of a conspiracy to transform our Government into a monarchy. Protection through the federal judiciary they did not consider a possibility. That body was regarded as thoroughly partisan; and one of its members at least, Judge Chase, had given good ground for that opinion. What Jefferson wrote John Dickinson at the close of 1801 tells fairly the prevalent view:

“They, the Federalists, have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold. There the remains of Federalism are to be preserved and fed from the Treasury, and from that battery all the works of Republicanism are to be beaten down.”¹

¹ *Jefferson, Works*, IV, 424.

In fact, during the years under consideration, the distrust of the early Republicans toward the federal judiciary was not less general than that of the later Republicans during the first five years which followed the publication of the Dred Scott decision. It seemed, therefore, an imperative necessity that a protest as solemn, as earnest, and as influential as possible should be uttered, and this was what the resolutions accomplished. Silence under such circumstances would have appeared cowardly, and must have proved demoralizing.

The fact that the legislatures of most of the other States rejected both the theory and the propositions embodied in the resolutions signifies little in regard to the attitude of the people, for those legislatures had been chosen under the influence of the war fever. Perhaps the greatest party advantage which the resolutions secured was this: they drew the attention of the Republicans to domestic affairs and to their own political principles, and in this way weakened and broke the spell of France which had done more than all things else to hurt their usefulness as citizens and to bring them into discredit as a party. Taken as a whole I think it reasonable to conclude that peace with France, the errors of the Federalists, and the issue of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were the immediate causes of the Republican victory. They seem to me to explain satisfactorily why this occurred in 1800 rather than four years later.

But to know immediate causes is not enough, if it can be shown that a more important cause lies behind and brings these into operation. Why, in the year 1798, were the Federalists stricken with judicial blindness? Why, in 1801, could John Adams truly write:

"No party that ever existed knew itself so little or so vainly overrated its own influence or popularity as ours. None ever understood so ill the causes of its own power or so wantonly destroyed them."¹

I think the answer is this: the useful work for the sake of which this party came into existence was done, and the time

¹ *Works*, IX, 582.

had come when, in consequence of the completion of their task, the Federalists were bound to commit errors — if not in one way, then in another — when it was well for the country that they should err so often and so grievously that the people would take from them the control of the government. Underneath the quarrels of the leaders and the blind and foolish legislation of 1798; underneath the growing regard for power as compared with devotion to public service, illustrated in the attempt of the party to give the Presidency, against the will of the people and contrary to public interest, to Aaron Burr rather than to Jefferson; underneath the moral degeneracy which made it possible for Hamilton, in May of 1800, to write that letter on which Governor Jay penned the words: "Proposing a measure for party purposes which it would not become me to adopt"— underneath these and all other acts of folly and signs of decay I believe we shall find a sufficient cause in the fact, that the services which the country needed from the Federalists had already been rendered fully and excellently; for, in the case of a political party, as truly as in that of an individual man, wisdom, power, and moral health depend upon having useful work to do; and, in the one case, as surely as in the other, when this is fully done dissolution must begin.

This brings us to the question: What is the principle that should regulate a party's term of office? That this should not be prolonged indefinitely is obvious, for that would bring party government to an end; it would give to one element in the state an undisputed and permanent ascendancy; the remaining elements it would first oppress and afterwards destroy; and the political stagnation that would follow, would soon transform such progressive countries as the United States, England, and France into so many western Chinas.

Moreover, these results of a permanent tenure would follow all the more surely and swiftly if the party in power could justify the partisan claim that, even at its worst, it was better than the best of its rivals. Such a party would enjoy a moral superiority in the presence of which other parties would seem to have no right to exist — would appear, in fact, more like

outlaws than legitimate members of the political system. It is on this very plea of an inherent and durable superiority put forward by that element which has actual possession of the government, that most of the despotisms of history have been built. Whatever may have been true in the lower stages of political progress, it never can be true in that more advanced stage where government by party becomes possible and useful that any one party can possess a lasting monopoly of the capacity for public service; for this must lead first to a one-sided development of the state, and then to the permanent arrest of its development.

The term of power for every party must therefore be limited; and the rule which should determine its beginning and end is, I think, the following: office should be given to a particular party whenever the most urgent public needs are such that this party can satisfy them better than any other party; the party thus raised to power should remain in office as long as these conditions hold; it should be deprived of office when changes in the state or in parties make it clear that some other party can provide better for the most urgent wants of the people. The state is the master; parties are its servants; and, just as an ordinary master employs at any particular time the man who has the greatest aptitude for the piece of work in hand, so the public master, the state, should call at each period into its employ that public servant who can best perform the tasks which belong to this period. Let us apply this principle to the Federalist party and period. I take the date 1786 as approximately correct for the beginnings of the Federalist movement. In that year the conviction that the existing system could not continue, became widespread, and the coöperation of many influential citizens through correspondence and public action to establish a better system was fairly begun. To that year belong both Shays' Rebellion and the Annapolis Convention. What at this date were the most urgent needs of the United States? The salient features of the situation were these: virtual repudiation by the general government; various forms and degrees of repudiation by many of the state govern-

ments; the collapse of credit, public and private; general financial unsoundness; general industrial depression; widespread discontent; the beginnings of civil war in Massachusetts; a condition of things in other States likely to lead to civil war; growing discord between the States; the federal government powerless and despised at home, and abroad, an object of contempt; in a word, the Union far advanced toward dissolution and the States a prey to anarchy. Is it not evident that a cure for these evils was the urgent, the overshadowing public need of the year 1786? But in order to be efficacious such a cure must be applied to the sources of the evils, and by those who best understood them and had the greatest interest and skill in combating them. In the Philadelphia Convention Gerry, himself a Democrat, said: "The evils we experience flow from an excess of democracy."¹ This was the truth. A more rapid progress toward democracy than, with due regard to the public welfare, was possible in the Old World, was the distinctive feature of American political history during the colonial period. The common view that the cause of the Revolution was the determination of Parliament to withhold from Americans rights which belonged to Englishmen — in particular the right to be taxed only by their representatives — gives but a part, and that the less important part, of the explanation.

The fact is that before the passage of the Stamp Act the extent to which the average citizen in the colonies participated in government was far greater than that of his kinsmen in Great Britain; and he resolved to throw off the yoke of England, not in order that he might possess the rights of Englishmen, but in order to exercise without hindrance far greater rights. But independence brought evil as well as good. It gave to democracy an impulse stronger than it could bear; the restraints which England had exercised, though irksome, had been wholesome; their sudden removal, and the failure of the government of the Confederation, which tried to do for the States what England had done for the colonies, left the United

¹ Elliot's *Debates*, V, 136.

States an aggregation, rather than a union, of discordant democracies with marked socialistic tendencies. Then it was seen that in order to restore their broken relationship to the outer world and to one another, and to arrest the dissolution of the social order, the most promising means were organization on a national basis — the creation of a powerful general government, and the withdrawal from the States of the powers they had abused. Only in these ways could the “excess of democracy” be restrained and the United States find and hold its proper place in the civilized world. To do these things, to create this organization, to establish this government, to take from the States those functions whose exercise was destroying both the Union and themselves — these were the tasks, the mission of the Federalist party. For this mission that party had a special aptitude. It drew to its support the wealth, the intelligence, and the conservatism of the endangered Union. The political history of the years from 1786 to 1800 is, in the main, the record of the way in which this mission was fulfilled. I think it fair to claim for the Federalist party most of what is distinctly new and useful in public policy within this period. The Constitution of 1787, its first and most important undertaking, was fortunately not wholly Federalist; had it been so, it would have been untrue to American political character, and it could not have provided for any long period for American political wants. Nevertheless, most, if not all, of the provisions which make the Constitution of 1787 unlike and superior to the Articles of Confederation are of Federalist origin. The ratification of the Constitution, the second undertaking of the Federalists, was also accomplished, though not without a desperate and what at times seemed an almost hopeless struggle. Success likewise attended the third and final undertaking, namely, to inaugurate the new government in such a way as to secure for it respect, obedience, and goodwill, and to employ the greatly increased federal powers so as to remedy effectively existing public evils.

The measure of success in this last feature of the Federalist programme is shown by the fact that in the year 1800 every

one of the conditions which imperiled the public welfare fourteen years earlier had disappeared. The aims set forth in the preamble of the Constitution had been realized; a more perfect union had been formed; justice had been established; domestic tranquillity insured; the common defense provided for; the general welfare promoted, and the blessings of liberty secured. Moreover, the work of the Federalists had been done so wisely as to make permanent every useful modification of public policy which they had introduced. Hence, judged from the standpoint of the public interests, there was no need that the Federalists should remain in office, either for the sake of new services or to defend good work already accomplished. The only possible ground on which a prolongation of their term could be demanded was that their ability and experience had made them, in the details of lawmaking and administration, more capable than their rivals. That their capacity in these respects was superior may be conceded; but, as we have already seen, the claim based upon this superiority is incompatible with the very idea of party government; for, carried out, it involves a permanent tenure of office for one party, and consequently the destruction of government by party.

Thus much in regard to the causes; what of the consequences of the party revolution of 1800? Not infrequently defeat is good for a party; it operates as a disciplinary experience whose fruits are reorganization on a sounder basis, the supremacy of wiser leaders and counsels, and a renewal of moral health. But it was not so with the Federalists; they went on from one act of folly and dishonor to another until the verdict of their contemporaries, that they were fatuous in counsel, futile in action, wanting in patriotism, seems likely to become the verdict of history. Why was it that this party, so wise, so patriotic, so surpassingly useful in the early days, became, after its first reverse, so rapidly degenerate? The answer is, because, when its first work was done, its rival took care that it should find no new work to do. In no portion of his varied career did Jefferson show greater political wisdom than in his course toward the defeated Federalists. He re-

refused to persecute; he did everything to conciliate; and in the inaugural of 1801 he appropriated and took under his protection and that of his party the useful work that they had done. This policy made a revival of Federalism impossible. Had the Republicans attacked the Constitution or sought to weaken the national government, the Federalists, in defending their own creations, would have had a future. But Jefferson's policy deprived them of the most honorable and useful activity which is open to a party in opposition, and left to them little more than a choice of ways to die. A second result of Jefferson's policy was that it helped to Federalize the Republicans. Desertion from the defeated to the victorious party soon grew into a stampede, and the new element in the Republican camp became quickly and greatly influential. Looked at from the standpoint of party, the destruction of the Federalists and the Federalization of the Republicans are the most striking consequences of the revolution of 1800. From the higher standpoint of the state the most important consequences are these: first, the resumption of that progress toward democracy which had been the marked characteristic of the colonial and revolutionary periods, but had been checked during the conservative aristocratic reaction of the years 1786 to 1800; — a progress on whose resumption and healthful unfolding was to depend what is most distinctive and beneficent in the contribution of America to the civilization of the world; and second, a powerful impulse to the forces which were slowly establishing in our people a national and American character. The trouble in 1786 had been that through breaking our relationship to Great Britain we had come to occupy the position of a nation without possessing either a national organization or a national character. In 1800 the national organization, thanks to the Federalists, had been supplied, but we still lacked a national American character. This, then, was the urgent, the overshadowing want of the new period. The attitude of the mass of the people toward the beneficial changes made by the Federalists had been either reluctant acquiescence or passionate opposition; only in a slight degree had they unlearned the pro-

vincialism and the unbalanced democracy that had produced the calamities of 1786; only in a slight degree had they concerned themselves hitherto for national interests or national honor; but now, through their elevation to power, the welfare and the good name of the nation were placed in their keeping, and the new responsibility tended to develop within them those larger political conceptions which, when added to those traits which had distinguished them from the beginning, namely, love of freedom and devotion to self-government, were to make the character of our people national and American; — and these were the greatest and best of the consequences of the party revolution of 1800.

VII

THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON¹

ON THE fourth of March, 1837, Andrew Jackson was able to review his completed official career with a degree of complacency rare, if not unique, in the annals of magistracies. It was an almost unbroken succession of victories that he looked back upon. He had signally triumphed over his political rivals, Clay and Calhoun. He had destroyed the Bank, and broken the rule of the classes and the party which supported it. He had subjected Congress to his will, and extorted from the Senate the "expunging resolution." His course toward nullification had been courageous and consistent, and had increased his power and fame. His conduct of foreign relations had been successful. He had reorganized and disciplined the Democratic party. He had named his successor. Moreover — and it was this that gratified him most — he believed that in all his warfare he had fought and won, not for himself, but for the people; and he knew from full and grateful testimony that this was their view, and that they honored him as their faithful and invincible champion. His farewell address testifies, it is true, to a feeling of disquietude on account of the growth of sectionalism. But for this he could not justly hold himself responsible; and his firm trust in the people, now through his agency masters of the state, reassured him.

The estimate of his own work, by one so little capable of impartial judgment as was Jackson, is, of course, not authori-

¹ *The Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, June, 1886.

tative. Equally fallible are contemporary views of a man, respecting whom all ranged themselves as ardent friends or foes. It is now, however, a half century since Jackson set out from the White House on his return to the Hermitage — a period long enough to reveal, with considerable distinctness, the real scope and nature of his work, and to lessen, if not remove, early prepossessions.

Of the lives of Jackson, Parton's, written during the period just preceding the Civil War, and Professor Sumner's, published in 1882, are the best. We possess also, in Professor von Holst's *Constitutional History of the United States*, a very able discussion of Jackson's character and political work.

On the extent to which personal feeling became a factor in Jackson's policy and the mischief resulting therefrom; on the usurpations by which a nominally republican administration was transformed into the really despotic "reign" of one man; on Jackson's spirit and methods in the Bank controversy, Sumner and von Holst are in substantial accord. They condemn without reserve. Parton, although lenient in particulars, reaches a similar verdict. Jackson's course toward nullification receives praise. Sumner, however, qualifies his approval as follows:

"Nullification involved directly the power and prestige of the federal government, and he would certainly be a most exceptional person who, being President of the United States, would allow the government of which he was the head to be defied and insulted."¹ And later, commenting on the proclamation to the people of South Carolina:

"He lives in popular memory and tradition chiefly as the man who put down this treason, but the historian must remember that, if Jackson had done his duty to Georgia and the Indians, nullification would never have attained any strength."² Parton holds the widely prevalent opinion that Jackson is responsible for the "spoils system" in national politics.³ Sumner dissents. "It is a crude and incorrect notion," he

¹ Sumner, *Jackson*, 219.

² Sumner, *Jackson*, 283.

³ Parton, *Jackson*, III, 692.

says, "that Andrew Jackson corrupted the civil service. His administration is only the date at which a corrupt use of the spoils of the public service as a cement for party organization under the democratic-republican self-government, having been perfected into a highly finished system in New York and Pennsylvania, was first employed in the federal arena."¹ Von Holst's views are similar. He thinks that Jackson, by vigorous resistance, could have put off the evil day.

"But, by this means, only a short delay would have been gained. To prevent the evil, it was necessary to avert its causes, and to do this there was need of something more than a powerful will; a single person could assuredly not do it."²

We have been looking at single features and measures. What of the administration as a whole? Parton's view is as follows:

"I must avow explicitly the belief that, notwithstanding the good done by General Jackson during his Presidency, his elevation to power was a mistake on the part of the people of the United States. The good which he effected has not continued, while the evil which he began remains."³ Sumner, in commenting on "Jackson's modes of action in his second term," says:

"We must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance without really appreciating it; leaving behind him disturbed and discordant elements of good and ill just fit to produce turmoil and disaster in the future."⁴ Later he adds:

"Representative institutions are degraded on the Jacksonian theory just as they are on the divine-right theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. There is not a worse perversion of the American system of government conceivable than to regard the President as the tribune of the people."⁵ The view of von Holst may be inferred from the following passages:

¹ Sumner, *Jackson*, 147.

³ Parton, *Jackson*, 694.

² Von Holst, II, 14.

⁴ Sumner, *Jackson*, 325.

⁵ Sumner, *Jackson*, 325.

"In spite of the frightful influence, in the real sense of the expression, which he exercised during the eight years of his presidency, he neither pointed out nor opened new ways to his people by the superiority of his mind, but only dragged them more rapidly onward on the road they had long been travelling by the demoniacal power of his will."¹ The meaning of the Bank struggle is thus defined. "Its significance lay in the elements which made Jackson able actually and successfully to assert his claims, in conflict both with the Constitution and with the idea of republicanism, to a position between Congress and the people as patriarchal ruler of the republic."²

Elsewhere he tells us that the "curse of Jackson's administration" is that it weakened respect for law; that "the first clear symptom" of "the decline of a healthy political spirit" was the election and re-election of Jackson to the Presidency; that his administration paved a "broad path for the demoralizing transformation of the American democracy": and that "his 'reign' receives the stamp which characterizes it, precisely from the fact that the politicians knew how to make his character, with its texture of brass, the battering-ram with which to break down the last ramparts which opposed their will."³

According to Parton, Sumner, and von Holst, as I understand them, the net result of Jackson's influence upon the American people was to hasten their progress toward political ruin. I think this conclusion erroneous. The gravest accusation against Jackson is, that his influence undermined respect for law. It is plausibly argued that, since he himself was impatient of authority, his example must have stimulated lawlessness in his followers. It may be urged, in reply, that the history of the country does not support the charge. The worst exhibitions of general lawlessness which have disgraced the United States were the anti-Abolitionist mobs of Jackson's

¹ Von Holst, II, 30, 31.

² *Ibid.*, II, 67, 68.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 149.

own day — for which he was not responsible. Since then the American people, in spite of the demoralizations of the war and reconstruction periods, have steadily grown in obedience to law. The turbulence of un-Americanized immigrants, although it may hurt American reputation, is not an expression of American character. That we are essentially a law-abiding people, the contested Presidential election of 1876 strongly testifies. Devotion to the state and obedience to formal law come, at times, into conflict. In such cases, obedience to law, if persisted in, would give us the civilization of Asia. Disregard of formal law, in order to serve the state more efficiently, is a distinctive feature of European and American civilization. In this sense, Caesar, Luther, Hampden, and Washington were law-breakers. Between these, and those who break the law for the sake of power or passion, or self-love in any form, the difference is world-wide. The acts of the former are recognitions of political duty; the acts of the latter are denials. In the Indian wars and the War of 1812-14, strict deference to the inefficient management at Washington would have made success impossible. Jackson took matters into his own hands, and, in times when failure and chagrin were the order of the day, was brilliantly successful. If the people took note of the insubordination, they also took note of the patriotic motive which prompted it. The lessons of the camp he carried into civil life. He regarded himself as the highest representative of the entire people, commissioned by them to secure their welfare. The undoubted usurpations which followed were never recognized as such by Jackson. On the contrary, he believed himself the staunchest upholder of the Constitution. And the people agreed with him. Unconscious violations of law may entail suffering, but they do not demoralize; they do not weaken respect for law.

Another charge is, that Jackson ruled his party through personal methods, and that he drew to his aid irresponsible counsellors. It is true: through the "kitchen cabinet" and the "Globe" he maintained a personal relationship with his followers not unlike that of a Highland chieftain with his clans-

men two centuries ago. This relationship was unfavorable to the free exercise of individual judgment, and perhaps to self-respect. What went far, however, towards justifying it, was the undeveloped political character of many of Jackson's partisans. Personal politics were a necessity to them. Their choice lay between the stern drill of Jackson and the blandishments of the demagogue. The methods best adapted to the Whigs were out of the question. It is fair, in judging Jackson's course as a party leader, to remember that he worked with and for the lower strata of political society.

It is a curious circumstance that the relation of Jackson to sectionalism has received very little attention; and yet the growth of sectionalism, i. e., the tendency to divide the Union into two portions, politically separate and independent, is the fact which, from the Missouri Compromise of 1820 to the ordinance of secession in 1860, gives our political history its distinctive character. The one important question concerning Jackson, as indeed concerning every public man during the forty years which precede the Civil War, is: What did he do towards saving the Union from sectionalism?

The first step towards an answer is to discriminate between State rights and sectionalism. State rights seek the widest extension of local self-government within state lines: sectionalism seeks political independence for a group of States. State sovereignty, so-called, is a perverted form of State rights. State sovereignty has, as a matter of fact, never existed. No State has ever presented the conditions which make real sovereignty practicable and desirable. We doubt whether any State has ever for a moment soberly wished to assume and maintain real sovereignty. A fancied State sovereignty has, from time to time, been invoked in order to extort concessions from the national government, as was done by South Carolina in 1832; or in order to effect a peaceful and apparently legal escape from the sovereignty of the United States to a new sovereignty in the process of creation, as was done by the Southern States in 1860 and 1861. But in neither case was the assumption and maintenance of real State sovereignty contemplated. It

is true that States call themselves sovereign; but the word does not create the fact — sovereignty must first exist in the nature of things. State rights, apart from sectionalism, have never been a serious hindrance to the progress of national unity. The possibility of their becoming so lessens every day, because the interests which unite the States and the preponderance, physical and moral, of the Union as a whole over any one State, increase daily. Sectionalism, on the other hand, is, by its very nature, incipient disunion. The first strongly marked appearance of sectionalism was in New England, just before and during the War of 1812-14. At the close of the war, with the removal of grievances, it came suddenly to an end. The second appearance of sectionalism was due to divergence of interests and views between North and South, caused by the institution of slavery. In both cases sectionalism wore the mask of State rights because in that way it could gain an appearance of legality while pursuing a course essentially revolutionary.

It is demonstrable, however, that sectionalism, particularly when based on slavery, is incompatible with State rights. Sectionalism, fully developed, means disunion; in the place of one united people it would create two or more hostile peoples with conflicting interests, and without natural boundaries. Wars and colossal armaments would follow, and in their train centralization, the destroyer of State rights and of local self-government in every form. Although our Civil War lasted but four years, it almost transformed the charter of the government. The entire previous period since the administration of Washington had not effected so great a centralization. It is also demonstrable that Southern sectionalism, before reaching the point of attempted disunion, became hostile to State rights. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, and the Dred Scott decision were affronts to the strongest sentiments which sustain State rights. The course of the South during the Kansas struggle was destructive of State rights. There could not be a more distinct violation of their essential principle than the attempt to establish slavery in a Territory against the will of its inhabitants. Indeed, it was the treason of Southern sectionalism to

State rights as well as to the Union that divided the Democratic party in 1860. The resort to secession has a similar meaning. The election of Lincoln did not imperil State rights; but it did deprive slavery of the sympathizing, docile support of the general government — a support to which it had long been accustomed — and threw it back upon its unimpaired constitutional guaranties and the rights of the States. But these were not enough. Slavery could prosper only through the fostering care of a national government, and it was to secure this that the South seceded.

Jackson came before the country as a disciple of Jefferson, and therefore as a believer in State rights. There was, it is true, much in his temper and situation which favored centralization; nevertheless, he was an honest, though moderate and somewhat inconsistent Jeffersonian, and he won and retained the confidence of the State rights elements in the Democratic party. Moreover, he identified himself with the newly enfranchised and poorer citizens just rising to political self-consciousness. In these ways, his following came to include a large majority of his fellow-citizens, and, what was of the utmost importance, by far the larger proportion of those whose political character and opinions were as yet plastic. Jackson's great contemporaries, Clay and Webster, could not reach these. Both were identified, through their party relations, with the higher classes, and both were disqualified through peculiar elements of character for popular leadership. In his tastes and intellectual sympathies, Clay was far removed from the "sons of toil." His skill in contriving compromises, although exerted for patriotic ends, did not impress the imagination of the people. Straightforward, blunt methods are their preference. There was something, too, in Clay's course as candidate for the Presidency that seemed to hint at over-calculation, irresolution, and even timidity — qualities which, once suspected, are a fatal bar to the confidence of the populace. Webster never touched the popular heart. His almost matchless eloquence appealed most strongly to statesmen, jurists, and those classes whose culture and imagination

enabled them to forecast the future and made them susceptible to grand ideas. The masses had a confused sense of Webster's greatness; but it did not win them. It served rather to emphasize the difference between him and themselves. Webster's devotion to national unity seemed, in great measure, to arise from a contemplation of the country's destined place in the world's history. It was the greatness yet to come that he beheld, and by which he was inspired. Jackson's interest in national unity, on the contrary, seemed to grow out of his regard for the people then living, his contemporaries. It was their will that he consulted, and their plaudits that he cared for. To the people, Webster's claims seemed based on his superiority to themselves; Jackson's, on his devotion to themselves. Their decision could not be doubtful. The result was that Jackson became, to a degree never realized by any other man in our history, the trusted leader and teacher of the masses. Of this relationship Sumner says: "Jackson came into power as the standard-bearer of a new upheaval of democracy and under a profession of new and fuller realization of the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican principles."¹

Also: "One can easily discern in Jackson's popularity an element of instinct and personal recognition by the mass of the people. They felt: 'He is one of us.' 'He stands by us.'"²

Very explicit on this point is von Holst: "Jackson was the man of the masses, because of his origin and his whole course of development, both inner and outer, he belonged to them."³

Most felicitous is the statement of Jackson's political relation to the people:

"The supporters of his policy were the instincts of the masses; the sum and substance of it, the satisfaction of these instincts."⁴ This intimate relation to the people, and this unparalleled power over the people, Jackson used to impress upon them his own love of the Union and his own hatred of sectionalism. The victory at New Orleans and the proclamation to the people of South Carolina in 1832

¹ Sumner, *Jackson*, 136.

³ Von Holst, II, 3.

² Sumner, *Jackson*, 138.

⁴ Von Holst, II, 31.

are the two facts which did most to reveal Jackson's personality, and they are altogether national facts. The one portrays him as the defender of the nation against foreign enemies; the other, against sectionalism. His character was altogether national. It is easy to think of Calhoun as a Southerner and a South Carolinian; but it would not be easy to think of Jackson as belonging to Tennessee or to the border States. The distribution of his support in the election of 1832 is instructive. New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania, as well as Tennessee, Georgia and Missouri, were Jackson's States. He was not looked upon as the representative of any particular section. His policy as President showed no trace of sectionalism. Its aim was the welfare of the masses irrespective of section. To him state lines had little meaning; sectional lines, absolutely none.

There is another way in which he rendered great though unconscious service to the cause of national unity: he made the government, hitherto an unmeaning abstraction, intelligible and attractive to the people. Bagehot says:

"The best reason why monarchy is a strong government is that it is an intelligible government. The mass of mankind understand it, and they hardly anywhere in the world understand any other."¹

The chief value, then, of Jackson's political career, was its educational effect. His strong conviction of the national character of the Union, his brave words and acts in behalf of the rights of the Union, sank deep into the hearts of followers and opponents. The fact of national unity grew more real and attractive through his definition and defence. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that it was Jackson who made "peaceable" secession impossible. The spirit of Jackson's administration as a whole, the acts through which he influenced most deeply and permanently the political character of the people, are in accord with his resistance to nullification. Their tendency was to nationalize.

The greatness of his service was hidden for a time. Section-

¹ *English Constitution*, 101.

alism, under the influence of slavery and the agitation against slavery, developed rapidly in the North as well as in the South; but when the doubtful struggle began, it was in obedience to the teachings of Jackson that the Northern Democrats put aside their scruples against "coercion," and resolutely engaged in the war for the Union. Had it not been for him, the issue of the conflict between 1861 and 1863 might well have been other than it was.

VIII

THE WHIG PARTY¹

WHIG PARTY, in America, a political party prominent from about 1824 to 1854.²

THE FIRST national party system of the United States came to an end during the second war with Great Britain. The destruction of the Federalist party through a series of suicidal acts which began with the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798, and closed with the Hartford Convention of 1814-1815, left the Jeffersonian Republican (Democratic) party in undisputed control. When, after Waterloo, Napoleon ceased to disturb the relations of the New World with the Old, the American people, freed for the first time from all trace of political dependence on Europe, were at liberty to shape their public policy in their own way. During the period of rapid internal development which followed after 1815, the all-inclusive Republican party began gradually to disintegrate and a new party system was evolved each member of which was the representative of such groups of ideas and interests, class and local, as required the support of a separate party. This work of disintegration and rebuilding proceeded so slowly that for more than a decade after the Peace of Ghent each new party, disguised during the early stages of organization as the personal following of a particular leader or group of leaders, kept on calling itself Republican. It was not until late in the

¹ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, eleventh edition, Vol. XXVIII, p. 589, 1910-1911.

² Immediately before the War of Independence and during the war those who favored the colonial cause and independence were called "Whigs."

administration of John Quincy Adams, 1825 to 1829, that the supporters of the President and Henry Clay, the Secretary of State, were first recognized as a distinct party and began to be called by the accurately descriptive term National Republicans. But after the party had become consolidated, in the passionate campaign of 1828, and later in opposing the measures of President Jackson, it adopted in 1834 the name Whig, which, through memorable associations both British and American, served as a protest against executive encroachments, and thus facilitated union with other parties and factions, such as the anti-Masonic party, that had been alienated by the high-handed measures of President Jackson. The new name announced not the birth but the maturity of the party, and the definite establishment of its principles and general lines of policy. The ends for which the Whigs labored were: first, to maintain the integrity of the Union; second, to make the Union thoroughly national; third, to maintain the republican character of the Union; fourth, while utilizing to the full the inheritance from and through Europe, to develop a distinctly American type of civilization; fifth, to propagate abroad by peaceful means American ideas and institutions. Among the policies or means which the Whigs used in order to realize their principles were the broad construction of those provisions of the federal Constitution which confer powers on the national government; protective tariffs; comprehensive schemes of internal improvements under the direction and at the cost of the national government; support of the Bank of the United States; resistance to many acts of President Jackson as encroachment by the executive on the legislative branch of the government and therefore hostile to republicanism; coalition with other parties in order to promote national as opposed to partisan ends; resort to compromise in order to allay sectional irritation and compose sectional differences; and cordial and yet prudent expression of sympathy with the liberal movement in other lands.

The activity of the Whig party, reckoned from the election of 1824, when its organization began, to the repeal of the

Missouri Compromise in 1854, covers thirty years. In two respects, namely, the rise of the new radical democracy under Andrew Jackson, and the growth of sectionalism over the slavery issue, this period was highly critical. In view of these events the most difficult task of the Whigs, clearly discerned and heartily accepted by them, under the patriotic and conservative leadership of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, was to moderate and enlighten, rather than antagonize, the new democracy; and — what proved to be beyond their powers — to overcome the disrupting influence of the slavery issue.

The inaugural address and the messages to Congress of President J. Q. Adams set forth clearly the nationalizing, broad-construction programme of the new party. But his supporters in Congress, imperfectly organized and facing a powerful opposition, accomplished very little in the way of legislation. The election of 1828 gave to Andrew Jackson the Presidency, and to the people, in a higher degree than ever before, the control of the government. The president's attack upon the Bank, the introduction of the modern "spoils system" into the federal civil service, the unprecedented use of the veto power, Jackson's assumption of powers which his opponents deemed unconstitutional, and his personal hostility towards Clay, who had succeeded Adams in the leadership of the party, brought about, under Whig leadership, a coalition of opposition parties which influenced deeply and permanently the character, policy and fortunes of the Whig party. It became the champion of the Bank, of the rights of Congress, and of the older and purer form of the civil service. Moreover, as a means of strengthening the bond with their new allies the Whigs learned to practise a tolerance towards the opinions and even the principles of their associates which is exceptional in the history of American political parties. In strict accord with their own principles, however, the Whigs supported the president during the nullification controversy. The renown of Webster as the foremost expositor of the national theory of the Union rests largely on his speeches during this controversy, in particular on his celebrated reply to Senator R. Y. Hayne

of South Carolina. Nevertheless, after vindicating the rights of the Union, most of the Whigs supported Clay in arranging the compromise tariff of 1832 which enabled the nullifiers to retreat without acknowledging discomfiture. The majority of the Northern Whigs, with the entire Southern membership of the party, disapproved the propaganda of the Abolitionists on the ground of its tendency to endanger the Union, and many from a like motive voted for the "gag rules" of 1835-1844, which in spirit if not in letter, violated the constitutional right of petition. In the election of 1832 Clay was the nominee of the party for the Presidency, but in 1836 and 1840, purely on grounds of expediency, the Whig conventions nominated General W. H. Harrison. During the administration of Martin Van Buren the Whigs tried with success to make party capital out of the panic of 1837, which they ascribed to Jackson, and out of the long depression that followed, for which they held Van Buren responsible. The election of General Harrison in the "log cabin and hard cider" campaign of 1840 proved a fruitless victory; the early death of the President and the anti-Whig politics of his successor, John Tyler, whom the Whigs had imprudently chosen as Vice-President, shattered their legislative programme.

In 1844 Clay was again the Whig candidate, and the annexation of Texas, involving the risk of a war with Mexico, was the leading issue. The Whigs opposed annexation, and the prospect of success seemed bright, until Clay, in the effort to remove Southern misapprehensions, wrote that he "would be glad" at some future time to see Texas annexed if it could be done "without dishonor, without war, with the common consent of the Union, and upon just and fair terms." It is widely held that this letter turned against Clay the anti-slavery element and lost him the Presidency. The triumph of Polk in 1844 was followed by the annexation of Texas and by war with Mexico. The Whigs opposed the war, but on patriotic grounds voted supplies for its prosecution. The acquisition of Texas, and the assured prospect of a great territorial enlargement, at the cost of Mexico, brought to the front the ques-

tion of slavery in the new domain. The agitation that followed continued through the presidential election of 1848, in which the Whigs elected General Zachary Taylor, and did not subside until the passage of the compromise measures of 1850. To its authors this compromise seemed essential to the preservation of the Union; but it led directly to the destruction of the Whig party. In the North, where the inhumane Fugitive Slave Law grew daily more odious, the adherence to the compromise, on which Clay and Webster insisted, weakened the party fatally. The alternative, namely, a committal of the party to the repeal of the obnoxious law, would have driven the Southern Whigs into the camp of the Democrats, leaving the Northern Whigs a sectional party powerless to resist the disruption of the Union. The only weapons that the Whigs knew how to use in defence of the Fugitive Slave Law were appeals to patriotism and sectional bargaining, and these could be employed only so long as the party remained intact.

The National Whig Convention of 1852, the last that represented the party in its entirety, gave to the Northern Whigs the naming of the candidate — General Winfield Scott — who was defeated in the ensuing election, and to the Southern the framing of the platform with its “finality” plank, which, as revised by Webster, read as follows:

“That the series of acts of the Thirty-second Congress, the act known as the Fugitive Slave Law included, are received and acquiesced in by the Whig party of the United States as a settlement in principle and substance of the dangerous and exciting questions which they embrace . . . and we will maintain this system as essential to the nationality of the Whig party and the integrity of the Union.”

Two years later the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the Kansas-Nebraska Act demonstrated that “this system” could not be maintained, and that in committing the Whig party to the policy of its maintenance the Convention of 1852 had signed the death-warrant of the party.

Among the services of the Whigs the first in importance are these: During the thirty critical years in which under the lead-

ership of Clay and Webster they maintained the national view of the nature of the Union, the Whigs contributed more than all their rivals to impress this view upon the hearts and minds of the people. During this same extended period as peacemakers between the sections they kept North and South together until the North had become strong enough to uphold by force the integrity of the Union. And lastly they bequeathed to the Republican party the principles on which, and the leader, Abraham Lincoln, through whom the endangered Union was finally saved.

IX

THE CAUSE OF SECESSION¹

WE HAVE been trying ever since the close of the Civil War to obliterate the old sectional lines. Our success although considerable, is far from perfect; the lines are still traceable; the terms North and South retain too much of their earlier meaning. This vitality of the sectional spirit, so long after the main cause which produced it has disappeared, testifies to the completeness of the sectionalization and to the conservatism of the American character; but these facts do not constitute a sufficient explanation. The public spirit and the practical instincts of the American people favor the fullest and speediest reconciliation. Why is it so slow in coming? I believe that an important but generally overlooked reason is the erroneous character of prevalent theories respecting the origin and nature of the secession movement. In the North those who seceded are assigned an unjust degree of responsibility for secession and its consequences. In the South, on the contrary, the defenders of the Union are regarded as aggressors, and therefore as responsible for all that was suffered by the South.

What exactly is the Northern theory? Previous to the passage of the ordinance by which South Carolina undertook to make herself independent of the United States, the North had never really believed that a serious attempt to destroy the Union would be made. Threats of disunion had been heard often, and at times these had borne the marks of settled purpose, as for example in 1849. But hitherto they had yielded

¹ *The Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. II, September, 1887.

to concessions; and the North had come to believe that in any possible emergency the Union could as a last resort be saved as it had been before, by compromise. That slavery was a disturbing influence was clearly recognized; that the Union could not go on indefinitely upon the old basis which united a free with a slave-labor section was also seen. But the basis was to be changed and the Union saved. This was the position generally taken by the leaders of the Republican party. Its best expression is found in the frequently quoted opening paragraph of Mr. Lincoln's speech before the Republican State Convention of Illinois:

"We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object, and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not close until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself can not stand.' I believe this government can not endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South."¹

That slavery, through restriction and the operation of moral and economic influences, would gradually disappear was the belief of the party which was already dominant in the North and was soon to become responsible for the restoration of a divided Union. That the South would resort to revolutionary means for the preservation of slavery was not seriously apprehended. This, as we know, was a mistake. Before the close of 1860 the North and the Republican party were confronted by the fact of secession. At first, relying upon earlier tactics,

¹ *Lincoln-Douglas Debates*, 1.

the attempt was made to win back the seceded states by concessions. These extended to the surrender of the right to interfere with slavery in the States by future amendment to the Constitution. It was in vain; the South, having resolved on disunion, insisted on conditions which the North could not make without suffering a moral injury infinitely worse than the worst possible results of secession and civil war. Up to the time when the efforts for peace were seen to be hopeless, slavery was generally recognized as the source of the trouble. The attack upon Sumter turned the public attention in another direction. The North which could not be united against slavery could be united against disunion. In order to secure Northern unity in the fullest degree, the relation of slavery to secession was, for the time being, purposely ignored. On July 22, 1861, Mr. Crittenden offered, and the Senate, by an overwhelming majority, adopted, a resolution of which the following is the significant portion:

"That this war is not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights of those States; but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several states unimpaired; that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."¹

In substance the resolution affirms that the war is waged for the purpose of restoring the Union exactly as it was before secession took place—in other words, that the rights of the States and the interests of slavery shall not suffer through the war. Soon, however, it became evident that the most effective way to save the Union was through destroying slavery. In the following December the Senate refused to commit itself again to the principles of the Crittenden resolution. In the two following years the emancipation proclamations were issued. In 1864 the Republican National Convention, in the third resolution of its platform, declared:

"That as slavery was the cause, and now constitutes the

¹ McPherson, *History of the Rebellion*. 286.

strength of this rebellion, and as it must be, always and everywhere, hostile to the principles of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the republic; and that while we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the government, in its own defence has aimed a death blow at this gigantic evil, we are in favor, furthermore, of such amendment to the Constitution, to be made by the people in conformity with its provisions, as shall terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or jurisdiction of the United States.”¹

In affirming that “slavery was the cause” of the rebellion, that it is “hostile to the principles of republican government” and that “the national safety” demands its extirpation, the resolution states in terse, vigorous terms a definite theory of the origin and nature of the secession movement. The theory was not new; but at this convention it received for the first time the formal sanction of the Republican party, and, in the ensuing election, that of all the free States save one. In accord with it, the war was prosecuted to its successful close and the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were added to the Constitution. Closely examined, the resolution vindicated the Abolitionists,—not indeed necessarily their methods, but in the most emphatic way, their prescience and motives. Moreover, by making slavery the scapegoat for the sins of the people, it opened the way for reconciliation. It was a noble utterance; through it the convention, while remaining in the best sense true to party and country, rose above both and became the representative of civilization itself.

Another theory which both at the opening of the Civil War and since its close has crowded into the background the one embodied in the above resolution, is given by Mr. Blaine in his work entitled *Twenty Years of Congress*. After showing that the advocates of secession had failed to make a satisfactory exhibit of grievances, although the fitting opportunities for doing so were numerous and the propriety obvious, Mr.

¹ Stanwood, *Presidential Elections*, 240.

Blaine criticizes the effort of Jefferson Davis to supply the defect by recounting in a message to the Confederate Congress the measures of the federal government which he deemed hostile to the South. In this criticism, Mr. Blaine, after affirming that "not a single measure adverse to the interests of slavery had been passed by the Congress of the United States from the foundation of the government," gives an impressive enumeration of measures which tended to strengthen slavery, and thus proceeds:

"Against all these guarantees and concessions for the support of slavery, Mr. Davis could quote, not anti-slavery aggressions which had been made, but only those which might be made in the future. This position disclosed the real though not the avowed cause of the secession movement. Its authors were not afraid of an immediate invasion of the rights of the slave holder in the States, but they were conscious that the growth of the country, the progress of civilization, and the expansion of our population, were all hostile to their continued supremacy as the governing element in the republic. The South was the only section in which there was distinctively a governing class. The slave-holders ruled their States more positively than ever the aristocratic classes ruled England. Besides the distinction of free and slave, or black and white, there was another line of demarcation between white men that was as absolute as the division between patrician and plebeian. The nobles of Poland who dictated the policy of the kingdom were as numerous in proportion to the whole population as the rich class of slave-holders whose decrees governed the policy of their States. It was in short an oligarchy which by its combined power ruled the republic. No President of any party had ever been elected who was opposed to its supremacy. The political revolution of 1860 had given to the republic an anti-slavery President, and the Southern men refused to accept the result. They had been too long accustomed to power to surrender it to an adverse majority, however lawful or constitutional that majority might be. They had been trained to lead and not to follow. They were not disciplined to sub-

mission. They had been so long in command that they had become incapable of obedience. Unwillingness to submit to constitutional authority was the controlling consideration which drove the Southern States to the desperate design of a revolution, peaceful they hoped it would be, but to a revolution even if it should be one of blood.”¹

Mr. Blaine's theory of the cause of the secession movement appears to be in conflict with that of the previously quoted resolution. The resolution attacks an institution; Mr. Blaine, the men whom it had victimized. According to Mr. Blaine, secession was not necessary; it was the wanton act of disappointed, ambitious men. The resolution declares war against slavery; Mr. Blaine, against the slave-holder—not on account of his devotion to slavery, but because he sought to destroy the Union in order to gratify personal ambition. An appropriate consequence of the resolution is the legal destruction of slavery through amendments to the Constitution. Mr. Blaine's view justifies the harshest measures of reconstruction, and the spirit of distrust towards the South which, whether justifiable or not, has influenced the policy of the Republican party during much of the period since Abraham Lincoln ceased to be its leader.

The best statement of the Southern theory is given by Mr. A. H. Stephens in the work entitled *The War between the States*:

“Slavery, so-called, or that legal subordination of the black race to the white which existed in all but one of the States when the Union was formed, and in fifteen of them when the war began, was unquestionably the occasion of the war, the main exciting proximate cause on both sides, on the one as well as the other, but it was not the real cause, the *causa causans* of it. That was the assumption, on the part of the federal authorities, that the people of the several States were, as you say, citizens of the United States, and owed allegiance to the federal government as the absolute sovereign power over the whole country, consolidated into one nation. The war

¹ Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, I, 256, 257.

sprang from the very idea you have expressed, and from the doctrine embraced in the question propounded to me. It grew out of different and directly opposite views as to the nature of the government of the United States, and where, under our system, ultimate sovereign power or paramount authority properly resides.

“Considerations connected with the legal status of the black race in the Southern States, and the position of several of the Northern States towards it, together with the known sentiments and principles of those just elected to the two highest offices of the federal government (Messrs. Lincoln and Hamlin) as to the powers of that government over this subject and others, which threatened, as was supposed, all their vital interests, prompted the Southern States to withdraw from the Union, for the very reason that had induced them at first to enter into it; that is, for their own better protection and security. Those who had control of the administration of the federal government denied this right to withdraw or secede. The war was inaugurated and waged by those at the head of the federal government, against these States or the people of these States, to prevent their withdrawal from the Union. On the part of these States, which had allied themselves in a common cause, it was maintained and carried on purely in defence of this great right, claimed by them, of State sovereignty and self-government, which they with their associates had achieved in their common struggle with Great Britain, under the Declaration of 1776, and which in their judgment lay at the foundation of the whole structure of American free institutions.”¹

Again:

“The real object of those who resorted to secession as well as those who sustained it, was not to overthrow the government of the United States but to perpetuate the principles upon which it was founded. The object in quitting the Union was not to destroy, but to save the principles of the Constitution.”² Further, in discussing the right of a State to secede:

¹ Stephens, *The War Between the States*, I, 28. ² *Ibid.*, I, 31.

"In answer to your question whether she (the State of Georgia) could do this without a breach of her solemn obligations under the compact, I give this full and direct answer: She had a perfect right so to do, subject to no authority but the great moral law which governs the intercourse between independent sovereign powers, peoples, or nations. Her action was subject to the authority of that law and none other. It is the inherent right of nations, subject to this law alone, to disregard the obligations of compacts of all sorts, by declaring themselves no longer bound in any way by them. This, by universal consent, may be rightfully done when there has been a breach of the compact by the other party or parties. It was on this principle that the United States abrogated their treaty with France in 1798. The justifiableness of the act depends in every instance upon the circumstances of the case. The general rule is, if all the other States — the parties to the confederation — faithfully comply with their obligations under the compact of the Union, no State would be normally justified in withdrawing from a Union so formed, unless it were necessary for her own preservation. Self-preservation is the first law of nature with states or nations, as it is with individuals." ¹ And in comparing the two motives for seceding:

"But even the two thousand million dollars invested in the relation thus established between private capital and the labor of this class of population under the system, was but as the dust in the balance compared with the vital attributes of the rights of independence and sovereignty on the part of the several States." ¹

These views are in substantial accord with the two vindictory pleas which South Carolina sent forth with her ordinance of secession, and with the speeches and writings of Mr. Jefferson Davis. They state fairly the Southern theory of the origin and nature of the secession movement. Mr. Stephens concedes that disagreement between North and South in respect to slavery was the immediate cause of the war, but affirms that

¹ Stephens, I, 496.

² *Ibid.*, I, 539, 540.

the underlying cause was the difference of view in respect to the nature of the Union; the North holding that it was national and, therefore, that secession was unlawful; the South, that it was, in the literal sense, federal, i. e. composed of independent sovereign States, which for the sake of the better attainment of common interests had, in the Constitution, made certain strictly limited delegations of sovereign powers to the general government, which delegations, however, were revocable at will. The States, while remaining in the Union, retained their original sovereignty unimpaired and had, therefore, the same right to withdraw from the Union which European states have to withdraw from any league which proves injurious to their welfare. The last point is the claim that the interest of the South in slavery was but as "the dust in the balance," in comparison with her interest in "the rights of independence and sovereignty" of the several States.

The difference between the Southern view and that set forth by Mr. Blaine is radical. What Mr. Stephens makes of primary importance, namely, the doctrine of unqualified State sovereignty, the Northern theory altogether ignores. In the one case the motives to secession are represented as among the best, in the other, as among the worst which can actuate human nature. If the controversy concerned history alone we could wait with patience for the verdict of later times; but it concerns also the politics of the present and the immediate future. Obviously the best method of reconciling sectional differences must be based on the true theory of the origin and nature of those differences; and in order to attain this, it is necessary to study the movement which culminated in secession from a standpoint which is neither Northern nor Southern, and in a spirit which cares more for the establishment of the truth than of preconceived political theories.

Looking at the situation in 1860, it is clear that the South believed in the unqualified sovereignty of the States, and cared more for the maintenance of this doctrine and the institution of slavery, together considered, than for political union with the North; that the North believed in the national character

of the Union, disliked slavery, and was resolved to confine it to the bounds within which it was then established; that the outcome of thirty years of embittered strife was the rupture of the moral bonds which had united the two sections, and the creation of an enmity which every attempt to assuage augmented and intensified. This was the situation. How did it come about? Roughly stated, the unlikeness in character and the hostility of interest between North and South, which we describe by the word sectionalism, were products to which slavery was the chief but not the only contributor. Even in the early colonial period, sectionalizing tendencies appear. During the time while capital was inconsiderable and industry little diversified, climate and soil tended to make the conditions of life decidedly easier in the South than in the North. Later, as the Northern colonists accumulated those resources which lessen dependence upon nature, this difference became less conspicuous, but it had lasted long enough to effect a marked and permanent dissimilarity between Northern and Southern industrial character. A second difference lay in the fact that the social strata were farther apart in the South than in the leading Northern colonies. A third difference was ecclesiastical: in the North, Calvinism, which powerfully stimulates and elevates the democratic tendencies of human nature, prevailed both in doctrine and discipline; in the South, the Episcopal form of church government and anti-Calvinistic dogmas. It should be remembered that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this difference was far more significant than it would be today. It is perhaps a consequence of the facts already named that the forms of local self-government assumed in the North a more popular character than in the South. The general conclusion to which the comparison just outlined leads, is that, even during the colonial period, the North came to be considerably more democratic than the South. The divergence thus caused had, at the outbreak of the Revolution, been increased by the system of African slavery. In the Southern colonies it was strongly entrenched; in the Northern, it had always been subordinate and was declining. The spirit of the

period which covers the American and French revolutions was sharply opposed to every form of human bondage. During this, the last quarter of the eighteenth century, emancipation made rapid progress in the North; while in the South, in spite of a widely spread disapprobation on moral grounds, and the active opposition of Jefferson and indeed many of the leading Southern statesmen of that day, the number of slaves kept increasing. The census of 1790 gave the six Northern states 40,370 slaves — more than half being held in the single state of New York — and the six Southern, 657,527. These figures show that at the beginning of the national period the slave-labor system was dominant in the South, and the free-labor system in the North. The economic disadvantages of slavery had been an important, perhaps the principal, cause of its decline in the North. It was hoped that the same consideration would affect it similarly in the South. But Whitney's invention of the cotton-gin in 1792, by increasing the profitability of slave labor and therefore of slave rearing, disappointed this hope. At the close of the eighteenth century the economic interests of the South were fully enlisted in the support of slavery.

How did slavery conduce to the growth of sectionalism? It gave to the South an economic character and development wholly unlike those of the North.¹ Under the system of free labor every individual is stimulated to exert himself to the utmost. Under the system of slave labor the reverse is true. The free population soon learns to regard manual toil as servile. It becomes first unfashionable and then dishonorable. The productive capacities of the masses are paralyzed. Poverty and wretchedness ensue. Slavery is responsible too, for the restriction of the South to agriculture. Neither in commerce nor manufactures could it compete with the free labor of the North. In agriculture it enjoyed a limited and ever decreasing prosperity solely because of its exemption from unrestricted competition with free labor. This was notably

¹ See the excellent discussion of the economic contrast between the free and slave States by von Holst, *Constitutional History*, I., ix.

the case with the staples — cotton, rice and sugar. Moreover the cost of transportation gave a species of protection to the bulkier articles of its food supply. It is conceded also that the want of home markets, the costliness of labor and the cheapness of land, led to a system of agriculture which depleted the soil with alarming rapidity. In short, with respect to economic prosperity and the forms of progress most dependent upon economic prosperity, slavery placed the South at a great disadvantage as compared with the free North.

The differences already pointed out led to others. The North, in which labor was honored, attracted multitudes of immigrants; the South repelled them. The immigrants kept the North in close sympathy with the Old World and with the democratic movement in progress there. Foreign commerce, which was in the hands of the North, had a similar influence. The increasing hostility towards slavery of the most important states of Europe, particularly England and France, at last made this isolation of the South almost perfect. Isolation led to antagonism. The attitude of the South towards Cuba and the republics of Central and South America; towards the Panama Congress; towards England, in the negotiations respecting compensation for slaves that had been freed in British ports; towards Texas and Mexico; towards Spain and the naval powers of Europe, in the Ostend Manifesto, — proved that the South through subjection to slavery had become involved in a conflict with the world.

While this isolation was revealing itself, a social reconstruction was in rapid progress. A tendency to a relatively aristocratic constitution was visible even in pre-revolutionary days. To this tendency the revolutionary period was unfavorable; and we find that in Virginia, for example, under the lead of Jefferson, the legal foundations of the earlier semi-feudal aristocracy were swept away; entail and primogeniture were abolished, and the church disestablished. This democratic triumph was however of short continuance. It is a truism that social as well as political power gravitates to the hands best fitted to wield it. In large part as a consequence of its economic in-

fluence, slavery checked the progress of the South towards democracy and re-established the old aristocracy on a new and safer basis. This it accomplished in a very simple way, namely, by depressing the masses. As, through the malign influence of the peculiar institution, the untilled or half-tilled fields of the numerous poor landholders changed into patches of wilderness, the will and the capacity of their owners to discern and secure their true interests and to make themselves felt in social and political affairs steadily lessened. There were no legal infringements on their status as freemen; but they counted for nothing in the social scale, and their political subordination was complete. The most conclusive proof of their degradation lay in the fact that they could not recognize its cause. In this depression of the poorer non-slaveholding land owners, the landless free shared. What these classes lost fell naturally to the slave holders. They, a small minority of the free population, became the ruling class, and held their power by the securest of all tenures, namely, a marked and ever increasing relative superiority to the other classes.

To the above, one qualification should be added. On the borders the supplanting of the democratic social and political constitution took place slowly and never completely; for there the influence of free labor continued to make itself felt. Hence the heart of the Southern system was by no means at or near its geographical center but in precisely those regions which were furthest removed from contact with free labor.

It is not possible to fix an exact date for the completion of the revolution above described. Indeed, looking at the South as a whole, it never was completed. But the change in question — by which the new aristocracy based on slave labor secured for itself the political control which the masses had wrested from the old semi-feudal aristocracy — was practically achieved during the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth century. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, not only the economic but the social and political forces of the South had been drawn into the support of slavery. One proof of the change in the political and

social constitution of the South is found in the fact that, while the South had been full of sympathy toward the first French revolution and had, in common with the North, at times almost forgotten American interests in her zeal for those of the French, she was comparatively little influenced by the second European democratic wave, which first became visible in 1830 and culminated in the general upheaval of 1848. Indeed, the history of the United States presents few contrasts more striking than that between Jefferson and Calhoun in respect to their relationship to the outside world. From the death of Jefferson, in 1826, to 1850 Calhoun was as distinctly the first statesman of the South as Jefferson had been for the previous half century. Jefferson carried his sympathy for the French Revolution so far as actually to participate in its work. Calhoun, on the contrary, maintained during the intense excitement of the second revolutionary epoch an attitude of cold, almost unfriendly reserve. On March 30, 1848, in the course of remarks opposing certain resolutions which congratulated the "French nation on the success of the revolutionary struggle," he used the following characteristic words:

"They have decreed a republic. If the French people shall succeed in that — if they shall prove themselves to be as wise in constructing a proper constitution as they have proved themselves to be skilful in demolishing the old form of government, — if they shall really form a constitution which shall on the one hand guard against violence and anarchy and on the other against oppression of the people — they will have achieved indeed a great work. They will then be entitled to the congratulations not only of this country but of the whole civilized world."¹

Each was true to himself and to the South of his day. Jefferson was a democrat, and during more than half of his active life the South made sensible progress towards democracy. Calhoun, politically and socially, was an aristocrat, and in 1848 the South had become altogether aristocratic.

During the administration of Jackson the basis of sectional-

¹ Calhoun, *Works*, IV, 451.

ism was completed. The South added to her creed two doctrines: one that the States are unqualifiedly sovereign; the other that slavery is a "good." The early colonists had inherited a love of local self-government and a capacity for its exercise. They came to the New World at a time when a powerful reaction was taking place in England against the despotism of the Stuarts and of Oliver Cromwell. It was owing to their sympathy with this reaction that many, perhaps a majority, of those who shaped the character of the new commonwealth were led to emigrate. The New World fostered these traits and tendencies. The colonists prospered in proportion as they were let alone. Indeed their political activity, and, in a certain sense, their political education centered in resistance to the aggressions of the British government upon their rights of self-government. Their relations with one another previous to the Revolution showed in general devotion to particular rather than common interests. The French and Indian wars and finally the oppression of the mother country first taught them the necessity of coöperation. The protracted struggle through which their independence was established enforced this lesson. Separation from Great Britain necessitated national union. As isolated sovereign States, they could not discharge the obligations which independence imposed; they could accomplish nothing for themselves or the world. United in one political organization, they could prosper and do something in promotion of human progress. But conceding that successful revolution involved national union, does it follow that our forefathers perceived and accepted this consequence? If so, how can we account for the particularistic character of the Articles of Confederation — the instrument in which is set forth their idea of the relation of the States? The Articles not only explicitly declare that the individual States are sovereign but provide ample defences against any possible violation of their sovereignty. The government created by the Articles had no power over its presumable subjects. It could not compel a State or the citizens of a State to heed its resolves. A further ground for the conclusion that the framers of the first union

did not believe in its national character, is found in the circumstance that the Articles were proposed and, after long discussion, adopted before the issue of the war was determined, — a situation the most favorable possible to the development of nationalizing tendencies. The Articles however failed; and the reason for their failure was that they were based on the theory of the unqualified sovereignty of the States. The people recognized the failure, but not its cause. By a peaceful revolution, the Constitution framed in 1787 took the place of the discredited Articles. We cannot here enter into the controversy over the question whether the Constitution is national or, in the strictly literal sense, federal. The truth probably is, that the majority of the framers were converts to the doctrine of national as opposed to State sovereignty. This is the testimony of Luther Martin and other State rights dissidents, and, as I think, that of the imperfect records of the convention. The majority of the people on the contrary, as the history of the ratification makes clear, remained faithful to the older doctrine. Deference to the authority of the framers; the understanding that amendments would be added; the great ability, persuasiveness and untiring industry of Hamilton and Madison; and, above all, the conviction that something must be done; — these and other circumstances secured the ratification of a constitution which, to the minds of probably a considerable majority, had created a dangerously strong central government. For a period of about forty years after the first inauguration of Washington, the doctrine of national sovereignty gained ground rapidly. Washington imparted the strength of his own dignity and wisdom to the new government. Hamilton made it vigorous and facile. As the difficulties of the really critical situation were, one after another, met and removed; as the public credit revived and the name American came to be respected and honored, the central government, the recognized source of those blessings, became the real center of the political interests of the country. Other circumstances favored the change; in particular, the foreign complications which covered the first twenty-five years, and the

general prosperity which characterized most of the period. But perhaps no one thing contributed more to the nationalization of public sentiment than the accession to power, in 1801, of the Democratic party. Its predilection for the freedom of the individual had made it jealous of the powerful central government and disposed to champion State rights. Its leader, Jefferson, was the author of the Kentucky resolutions, which together with the contemporaneous Virginia resolutions written by Madison, have, to very recent times, formed the charter of the opponents of national sovereignty. Had the party continued in opposition, its anti-national spirit would have increased; as it was, owing to the responsibility of office and the assumption by its opponents, the Federalists, of the task of maintaining State rights, the Democratic party made rapid progress towards nationalization. Proofs of this we find in the purchase of Louisiana, the embargo policy, the declaration of war, important acts of war legislation, the creation of a national bank in 1816, the votes on internal improvements, and the tariffs of 1816, 1824 and 1828. The doctrine of State rights was at its lowest ebb in 1815, when it had to share in the disgrace of its latest expositor, the Hartford Convention. In 1820 the contest over the admission of Missouri brought it temporarily to the front. Then it subsided again until, in the administration of John Quincy Adams, the State of Georgia found it useful in securing possession of the territory within her borders held, under the guaranty of the United States, by the Creeks and Cherokees. While this contest was in progress, South Carolina, under the leadership of Calhoun, brought forward the doctrine anew as the basis of nullification. The appeal to State rights in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions had in no respect a sectional character. The aim was to use the States to protect the rights of the individual against unconstitutional laws of the general government. The aim of the appeal in the case of New England was to protect local interests against the injurious policy of the general government. In this case, however, the grounds of complaint were temporary. In the case of Georgia, the same was true. It is certain

that the use of the doctrine, both in the case of New England and Georgia, served to bring it into discredit. In the former case it was associated with alleged disloyalty; in the latter, with lawless rapacity. The invocation of State rights by Calhoun in behalf of South Carolina bore an entirely different and far more dangerous character. Two features were especially disquieting. In the first place, South Carolina did not stand alone. Her grievance was shared by a group of States, and its source was the diversity of economic interests between them and the Northern States. Its character was thus stated by Calhoun:

"This diversity of interest has already, in this early stage of its political existence, brought us into direct and dangerous conflict on the great questions of trade, of taxation, of disbursements and appropriation, and finally on the still more vitally important question, the nature, character and powers of the general government. Who of any party with the least pretension to candor can deny that on all these points,—so deeply important,—no two distinct nations can be more opposed than this and the other section."¹

The other and more alarming feature was the fact that the sectionalism recognized by Calhoun was due to slavery and was, therefore, so far as men could then see, permanent. It is important to observe that, independently of the abolition movement, sectional economic interests, which slavery had made unlike those of the North, led the most typical statesman and State of the South to commit themselves to the doctrine of unqualified State sovereignty. Was it not also possible that State sovereignty might become necessary for the protection of slavery itself? For the present there was no danger, but Calhoun saw that it was coming:

"As widely as this incendiary spirit has spread, it has not yet infected this body, or the great mass of the intelligent and business portion of the North; but unless it be speedily stopped, it will spread and work upwards till it brings the two great sections of the Union into deadly conflict. This is not

¹ *Works*, VII, 134.

a new impression with me. Several years since, in a discussion with one of the senators of Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), before this fell spirit (that of abolition) had showed itself, I then predicted that the doctrine of the proclamation (Jackson's to South Carolina) and the Force Bill — that this government had a right, in the last resort, to determine the extent of its own powers, and enforce its decision at the point of the bayonet — which was so warmly maintained by that senator, would at no distant day arouse the dormant spirit of abolitionism. I told him that the doctrine was tantamount to the assumption of unlimited power on the part of the government, and that such would be the impression on the public mind in a large portion of the Union. The consequence would be inevitable. A large portion of the Northern States believed slavery to be a sin and would consider it as an obligation of conscience to abolish it if they should feel themselves in any degree responsible for its continuance; and this doctrine would necessarily lead to the belief in such a responsibility.”¹

The South could easily accept the new form of the doctrine of State rights, because she had held to that doctrine in its milder forms from the beginning. It would perhaps be just to say, that the South, owing to the relative slowness of her development, had remained much closer to that early condition which was favorable to State rights. Further, the course of the North and West in regard to the tariff and internal improvements had strengthened the conservatism of the South. Strictly speaking, therefore, the conversion was not from national to State rights doctrines, but from one form of the latter to a more advanced one. Moreover, the theory of the nature of the Union, propounded by Mr. Calhoun and widely accepted in the South, implied and asserted the right of secession, but did not make this prominent. It is true that Mr. Davis and others have denied the right to nullify while affirming the right to secede. But this is a difference of detail rather than of principle. The point worth noting is that, almost a generation before the Civil War, the South accepted a theory

¹ *Works*, II, 628.

of State rights which, freely interpreted, made it lawful for any State at any time to withdraw from the Union.

The final act in completing the basis of sectionalism was the acceptance of slavery as a "good." The alleged grounds for this course are given by Calhoun. He thus states the general question:

"It would be well for those interested to reflect whether there now exists, or ever has existed, a wealthy and civilized community in which one portion did not live on the labor of another; and whether the form in which slavery exists in the South is not but one modification of the universal condition; and finally, whether any other, under all circumstances of the case, is more defensible, or stands on stronger ground of necessity."¹

After affirming that to destroy slavery "would be to destroy us as a people," he thus proceeds:

"But let me not be understood as admitting, even by implication, that the existing relations between the two races in the slaveholding States is an evil, — for otherwise, I hold it to be a good, as it has thus far proved itself to be to both, and will continue to prove so if not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition. I appeal to facts. Never before has the black race of Central Africa, from the dawn of history to the present day, attained a condition so civilized and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually. It came among us in a low, degraded, and savage condition, and in the course of a few generations it has grown up under the fostering care of our institutions, reviled as they have been, to its present comparatively civilized condition."

He adds:

"In the meantime, the white or European race has not degenerated. It has kept pace with its brethren in other sections of the Union where slavery does not exist."

But he concedes:

"In one thing only are we inferior — the arts of gain. We acknowledge that we are less wealthy than the Northern sec-

¹ *Works*, V, 207.

tion of the Union; but I trace this mainly to the fiscal action of the government, which has extracted much from, and spent little among us."

He then defends the institution on more general grounds in the following unmistakable terms:

"But I take higher ground. I hold that in the present state of civilization, where two races of different origin and distinguished by color and other physical differences, as well as intellectual, are brought together, the relation now existing in the slaveholding States, is, instead of an evil, a good — a positive good."

Then, after dwelling on the superior humanity of slavery, he turns to its political influence:

"And here I fearlessly assert that the existing relation between the two races in the South, against which these blind fanatics are waging war, forms the most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free and stable political institutions."¹

This was not the earlier view. The most distinguished of Southern statesmen, beginning with Henry and Jefferson, had confessed that slavery was an evil and hoped for its extinction. Now it was proclaimed as a "good," and the proclamation signified not the beginning but the end of a revolution in the opinions of the South. How had it been effected? The increasing hold of slavery had all along tended to this result. For some time the subjection of the South had been so complete as to forbid the hope that she could ever unaided free herself. History records no instance of an aristocracy which has instituted and supported a movement to overthrow the basis of its own power. But this is exactly what must have happened in the South had she made a voluntary surrender of slavery in 1830 or later. Indeed the only conceivable ways for accomplishing this, — voluntary surrender on the part of the ruling class or revolution from below, — were equally impossible. Interest forbade the former; incapacity the latter. The fact is that the South had fully accepted slavery, and it

¹ *Works*, II, 630-632.

was inevitable that she should make the best of it; for the tendency of human nature to bring moral standards into harmony with conduct that has been irrevocably resolved upon, is invincible. The Abolitionists too, representing as they did the growing antagonism to slavery of the North and the civilized world, had without doubt hastened the process of conversion. It was natural that attacks from without should lead to greater devotion. It is however an error to suppose that the Abolitionists caused the South to accept slavery as a "good." That this should take place was, wholly irrespective of the course of the enemies of slavery, inevitable. Moreover no theory dishonors a people more than the one which assumes that in the weightiest matters their views are decided by their resentments.

The acceptance by the South of slavery, not as an evil to be deprecated, but as a "good, a positive good" and "the most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free and stable institutions," marks a turning point in the history of the United States. Hitherto the standing ground of the advocates of slavery had been interest; now they advanced to a higher position. If slavery was a blessing instead of a curse, why not defend and diffuse it? This was the logical outcome of the new position, and the South did not hesitate to accept it. The attitude of the South in the defence of slavery underwent a marked change. In the debates over the admission of Missouri, Southern men freely confessed that slavery was a misfortune and urged its extension to new territory on the ground of "diluting the evil." When in Jackson's second administration the debates on slavery were resumed, the old deprecatory, half-apologetic tone ceased. Here again it is important to note the fact that for nearly a generation the participants in secession had been taught that slavery was a blessing, and, consequently, that it was their duty as well as their privilege to defend and extend this blessing.

This brings us to the end of the inquiry as to the origin of the secession movement. Its development, even in outline, is not within the limits of this article. Assuming that the con-

clusions just reached are correct, let us recall the theories first quoted. That of Mr. Stephens is erroneous because he makes devotion to State sovereignty the primary cause; whereas the truth is that slavery was, for the most part, the cause of this devotion. Peoples care very little for a political or constitutional principle except as it serves their interests; they are not willing to die for a pure abstraction. The only reason why the people of the South adopted, or rather retained and developed, the doctrine of State sovereignty was the security it afforded to Southern interests. But how did they come to have interests which the national theory of the Union endangered? Only through slavery. In proof of the correctness of this view we need but look at the present condition of the South. Since the destruction of slavery and the interests founded upon it, devotion to national sovereignty is displacing almost too rapidly the old devotion to State sovereignty. The South was altogether mistaken in her claims respecting State sovereignty. In 1860 State sovereignty did not exist in either section. The South believed otherwise, but her experience during the Civil War made the mistake evident. The Confederate government could not have maintained itself at all except through acts which were emphatic denials of this doctrine. Consequently the South had no warrant for the charge that the North was the aggressor and that President Lincoln inaugurated the war. Mr. Blaine's view is mistaken in that it exaggerates the influence of personal agency. He treats as if altogether voluntary, actions which in great measure were compelled. He lays the entire blame upon those who actually initiated and participated in secession; whereas disunion was inevitable from the moment when the South accepted slavery as a "good"; or perhaps from that earlier time when the South, having ceased to be democratic, came under the rule of the slaveholder. Interested motives doubtless had their share in the inception of the secession movement; but there was patriotism also. The event foretold by Calhoun had come to pass; the moral bonds between the sections were broken; we had become "two peoples."

It is difficult to realize the character of the years which just preceded the Civil War — how very evil they were! It was the time of the gospel of hate. In the place of the old Union stood the two highly individualized, sharply antagonistic sections. No man could serve the North without incurring the enmity of the South, or the South without incurring that of the North. Nor could a man serve the moribund Union without forfeiting the good will of his own section. This was the real offence of Webster in his 7th of March speech. In that speech he had virtually said: "I care more for the Union than for either section"; and the reply was repudiation by the North and distrust by the South. Henceforth, in what related to the dominant movement of that day, he was an "isolated man." The tragic close of Webster's life is historic because his sufferings grew out of a contradiction, not in himself, but in the situation of the country, — a contradiction which in some measure involved and darkened the lives of every devotee of the old Union. Perhaps in no way was the increasingly unwholesome influence of the times more clearly shown than by its effect on the finest natures. It transformed John Brown, in whom were united the better qualities of the patriarch, the crusader and the philanthropist, into a deliberate organizer of servile insurrection; it made "Stonewall" Jackson, in whom religious enthusiasm and patriotic zeal were as strongly marked as his phenomenal genius for war, eager to unfurl the black flag.¹ The situation became intolerable. Terrible as were the consequences of secession, they were far less terrible than the sure and steady demoralization of character which it brought to an end.

The true cause of secession is that set forth by the Republican Convention of 1864. It was slavery that paralyzed the productive energies of the South; that confined her to agriculture, and that impoverished both land and people. It was slavery that checked the democratic movement, and delivered the South, bound hand and foot, to the rule of the slaveholding aristocracy. It was slavery that isolated the South, that

¹ Pollard, *Secret History of the Confederacy*, 281-282.

brought her into hostile relations with the progressive outside world, and so obscured her notions of right and wrong, that she could praise as "a good, a positive good," the institution which she had previously condemned, and through which she was being undone. It was slavery that induced her to develop and maintain, on an ultra-democratic basis, the antiquated doctrine of State sovereignty, and at the same time to attempt to overthrow those foundation principles of democracy, the rights of free speech and of petition. It was slavery that induced her to force upon the general government a policy of aggression, which resulted in a prolonged and desperate struggle for the possession of the newly acquired territory; and in the course of this struggle, it was slavery that led to those acts which embittered and inflamed the already alienated sections, — the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, the Personal Liberty Laws, the overthrow of the Missouri Compromise, the bloodshed and terrorism in Kansas, the interference there against free labor on the part of Pierce and Buchanan, the Ostend Manifesto, the Dred Scott decision, the attack upon Sumner, the insurrection at Harper's Ferry, and the fatal demand respecting slavery in the Territories made at the Charleston Convention in 1860. Finally, it was slavery that forced the South, in the interest of self-preservation, to withdraw from the Union. Indeed, after the South was fully committed to slavery, the course which she actually pursued became compulsory. She could not have remained true to herself, had she undertaken to abandon it. But this course led directly and inevitably to disunion; for, between the principle of slavery, which is the right of the strong to the uncompensated services of the weak, and the principle of modern progress, which is the duty of the strong to help the weak to become strong, there is an "irrepressible conflict." The events of 1860 made evident what Lincoln and Seward had foretold, that within the Union slavery was doomed to extinction. But the destruction of slavery involved the destruction of the entire Southern system — a revolution greater than the North would need to undergo in being made over into a copy of the Austrian empire.

Effacement no self-respecting people can accept. To escape this, the South was forced to secede. The South is responsible for secession only in so far as she is responsible for slavery. The participants in secession were the victims of those who converted the South to the belief that slavery was "a good."

X

OUR TWO GREAT PARTIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND TASKS¹

I. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

NOTHING is more false than the cynicism, uttered often of late, that the end for which parties exist is the power and patronage of office. It is true that this is the end of the "party boss" and the "party machine," but it is not the end of parties themselves. Every legitimate party — and one may add that every great and durable party is legitimate — comes into being in order to do a particular work in the service of the state. Parties are born of public wants. It is with the state as with other organisms; its development waits on the satisfaction of its new wants. In the course of this development whenever a want appears for which the policy of the government and the policies of existing parties do not provide, then, in order to procure for it the satisfaction which cannot be found elsewhere, those citizens to whom this want appeals most strongly organize as a political party. To provide satisfaction for the particular public want which calls it into existence is the proper work of every party — the task assigned it by its master, the state. The success of a party depends on the clearness with which it perceives and on the fidelity with which it executes its allotted task. A just idea of this task is essential to every one who would be a good citizen. With this idea before him, he knows what the policy of his party should be, and he is able to do his share in securing its

¹ *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. VI, December, 1891; Vol. VII, September, 1892.

adoption and observance; without this idea, he is at the mercy of associates whose aim is to use party for the advancement of their own personal fortunes. Scarcely less important is a true conception of the tasks of parties other than one's own; for it enables each one to judge with fairness the conduct of all and to occupy a standpoint sufficiently elevated to command the entire political field. In order to ascertain with precision what are the tasks, both general and specific, of any given party, we need to study the circumstances of its origin; a commission is most legible when first made out.

1. *Origin of the Democratic Party*

This, the older of the two great parties of the present, was organized on a national basis within the first five years after the inauguration of Washington. The situation at that time was as follows: The state parties which had led the way hitherto in the treatment of public questions could do so no longer. With the establishment of the new Constitution the centre of political interest had shifted; national concerns were now uppermost and were destined to remain so. But national parties had not as yet come into existence. The struggle over ratification which began in 1787 had taken the form of a series of state campaigns, in which each commonwealth decided for itself the matter at issue. Nevertheless there were certain features of the contest which prepared the way for the approaching consolidation of local into national parties. The questions debated were everywhere the same. From New Hampshire to Georgia, identical or very similar arguments were urged for and against the new plan. The leaders, and in particular those who were friendly to the proposed change, did not confine their efforts to their own States. In all of the commonwealths the influence of Washington was felt; in many of them the same was true of Madison and Hamilton, and, on the other side, of Henry and Lee. This hearty coöperation of political leaders belonging to the different States was a long step towards the union of their followers in national party

organizations. But the event which finally effected this union and made it durable was the adoption of a definite and strongly national policy by the new federal government.

This policy, devised in the main by Hamilton, but receiving the cordial and earnest support of Washington, ran in important respects counter to the predilections of the majority of the American people. In the first place, its manifest and indeed avowed tendency to nationalize the Union offended those who still believed in the sovereignty of the individual States. In the second place, the energetic use which the government made of powers like that of imposing excises, which, although denied to its predecessor, were explicitly conferred by the new Constitution, alarmed those who were averse to strong government and in particular to a strong central government. The bold appropriation of other highly important powers, such as that of creating a bank, on the ground that they were conferred by implication — a principle which seemed of indefinite extensibility — had a like and even greater effect. Again, the financial policy of Hamilton, although it restored public credit and gave a healthful stimulus to general industry, was obnoxious to many because it established an alliance between the government and the owners and managers of capital, and thus threatened to bring into politics the corrupting influence of the "money power." To others this policy was objectionable because they thought that it sacrificed the interests of the South, where "the debt was owed," to those of the North, where "it was owned." In the fourth place, when the government at the beginning of the struggle in Europe declared for strict neutrality and made earnest endeavors to compose the old irritating differences with England, its course was altogether unpopular. France the people loved and wished to help; England they hated and wished to humble. Finally, the moderately but distinctly aristocratic tone of the administration brought it into collision with the social movement of the time which was increasingly democratic, and, what was of greater immediate importance, gave color to the charge, made repeatedly by Jefferson and his friends, that those in control of the

government were at heart traitors to republicanism, and were secretly plotting its overthrow and the reintroduction of monarchy. We have, it is true, convincing proof that the accusation was false; but it was honestly made, was widely believed and had very great influence. One noteworthy result was that it led the opposition to pose as defenders-in-chief of the Constitution against those who had taken the leading part in framing it and in securing its adoption. Despite its untruth and injustice, the delusion in respect to the anti-republican spirit and purposes of the Federalists was useful in repressing revolutionary tendencies, and in developing loyalty to the new system among those who at first regarded it with suspicion if not enmity.

It was during the five years beginning with 1789 that the government, in a series of remarkable measures, defined its policy in reference to the matters named above, and that the different classes of citizens whom it offended began, with little regard to state or sectional lines, to draw together and to act with a common purpose. At first the opposition was prompted more by instinct than by calculation, and was both irregular and ineffective; but before the end of 1793, under the leadership of Jefferson and the discipline of repeated contests over definite issues, it became organized as a durable and formidable party.¹ But organization does not provide the material of

¹ In a letter written to Washington, dated May 23, 1792, Jefferson summarizes his objections to the policy of the government. In the arrangement of the funding scheme and associated measures he asserts, under the form of reporting the views of others: "That all the capital employed in paper speculation is barren and useless, producing, like that on a gaming table, no accession to itself, and is withdrawn from commerce and agriculture where it would have produced addition to the common mass: that it nourishes in our citizens habits of vice and idleness, instead of industry and morality; that it has furnished effectual means of corrupting such a portion of the legislature as turns the balance between the honest voters whichever way it is directed: that this corrupt squadron, deciding the voice of the legislature, have manifested their dispositions to get rid of the limitations imposed by the Constitution on the general legislature, limitations on the faith of which the States acceded to that instrument: that the ultimate object of all this is to prepare the way for a change from the present republican form of government to that of a monarchy, of which the English constitution is to be the model." — *Jefferson, Works*, III, 359.

which a new party is composed; it can only bring together material already in existence. Hence the real beginnings of a party must be sought for, not in the few months or years during which its organization is effected, but in a greatly extended earlier period. They are to be found only in the slow growth of ideas and convictions which are the foundation of political character, and as such determine the attitude of citizens toward public questions. There must have been Democrats before there could be a Democratic party; and the beginnings of the party are to be traced in the processes which developed in citizens the spirit and purposes of democracy.

We have seen that antagonism to the centralizing and conservative policy of the early Federal administrations was the immediate motive that led to the formation of the first Republican, or as we now term it, Democratic party. But this antagonism itself was the fruit of the progress of many centuries. Indeed it is not too much to say that to its growth every influence ministered which worked for the establishment of two ideas: first, that citizens should have equal civil and political rights; second, that government should be under the control and in the service, not of privileged classes, nor of favored individuals, but of the people. Looking simply at the field of American history, it would be just to enumerate among the causes of the origin of the Democratic party all influences which from the beginning of the colonial period carried forward at a really marvelous rate the democratization of American character. Of these it will suffice to mention three: first, that sifting process by which the persecutors of the Old World sent to the leading colonies of the new those of their subjects who were most democratically inclined, — the men who, although not yet ready to concede freedom to others, were most resolute in asserting it for themselves; second, the protracted and severe but altogether wholesome discipline, economic, social, military and political, through which in the course of somewhat more than a century and a half the colonists grew into fitness for self-government; and lastly, the Revolution itself, which was a social as well as a political up-

rising. We habitually think of this movement as one whose primary if not sole aim was to throw off British authority in order to establish American home rule. But it was also a modern and highly important phase of the ancient struggle between aristocracy and democracy. In fact the deepest cause and the most complete justification of the Revolution are to be found in the circumstance that in the progress towards democracy which both were making, the American people had far outstripped their British kinsfolk. In 1765 the former had become democratic, while the latter were, comparatively speaking, still aristocratic. The public policy therefore which most truly expressed the political character of the English and was best adapted to serve their interests, did not truly express American political character and could not satisfactorily serve American interests. This view goes far to explain the unity which at the beginning of the struggle was so quickly and completely established between the hitherto unfriendly thirteen commonwealths.¹ It goes far to explain, in the second place, why the northernmost British dominions could not be induced to take part in the movement. They had scarcely entered on the pathway of democratic progress. The grievances which their southern neighbors felt because the British policy was anti-democratic, were to them unintelligible. It explains, too, while it does not justify, the extent, the rigor and at times the inhumanity of the crusade against the Tories. They were hated not simply as Loyalists, but as aristocrats, whose policy was the restoration of the aristocratic system of England. It explains, lastly, that swift advance of the democratic spirit between 1765 and 1786, which is perhaps the most noteworthy feature of legislation and social history. But the achievement of independence and the suppression of the Tories gave to

¹ It is the custom of those who look at the matter from the standpoint of the present situation to wonder that the States during and immediately after the Revolution should have been so loosely and imperfectly united; but looking at the matter from the historical standpoint and keeping in mind with what reluctance every political unity submits to incorporation with others in a larger unity, we ought rather to wonder at the quickness with which the Union was formed, and at the elements of strength and durability which it possessed. It was the leaven of democracy in them all which made this possible.

American democracy a stronger stimulus than it could bear. In most of the States shameful excesses marked the years just after the war. Democracy fell into general discredit.¹ In the reaction which followed, the conservative elements made good use of their opportunity. The Constitution of 1787 — the excellent and abiding fruit of this reaction — was framed, its adoption after a doubtful struggle was secured, and the new federal government was successfully inaugurated. But the body of the people remained democratic. And soon, as has been shown above, alarm at the undemocratic character which the federal policy assumed, and sympathy with the revolution in France led to the revival of American democracy and to the formation of the National Democratic party.

2. *The Tasks of the Democratic Party*

The circumstances of its origin show that the Democratic party began its career as the party of the masses. "The cherishment of the people," to use the quaint phrase of Jefferson, "was its principle." To advance their welfare — so far as this can be done by political means — was and is its proper work. Stated in its most general form, the task of the new party was to renew and carry forward on a national scale that democratic movement which, until the conservative reaction of 1787, had been the dominant feature of American political development. But what in its nature and aims is the democratic movement? Upon the answer much depends. The ideas

¹ In the Convention of 1787, Gerry, afterwards one of the foremost of Democratic leaders, said: "The evils which we experience flow from the excess of democracy." Elliot's *Debates*, V, 136. At the close of the convention, in giving reasons for not signing the Constitution, Gerry, having in mind the recent experiences of Massachusetts, spoke of democracy as the "worst of political evils." V. 557. Randolph, afterwards the ally of Jefferson in Washington's cabinet, said: "In tracing these evils, (those under which the United States labored), to their source, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy." V. 138. And even Mason, the staunchest of Democrats, who thought that the new government must end either in monarchy or a tyrannical aristocracy, conceded "the injustice and oppression experienced among us from democracy." V. 154.

respecting democracy — using that term in its broad sense — which are held by those to whom the management of its interests is committed, determine both the quality of their leadership and, temporarily at least, the character of its fortunes. Historically the progress of a people begins with one or a few of its representatives. For a time, rightly and necessarily, the enjoyment of the “higher goods” of life which embody this progress is confined to the few. But where public conditions are healthful and progress is normal, participation in these “higher goods” soon begins to widen, and this process goes on until at last the humblest citizen becomes to the full measure of his capacity a sharer in them. This diffusion of the “higher” and the “highest goods” of civilization, first within national limits and then universally, is the aim of the democratic movement. In its employ are many agencies. Among the most useful of these are religious and philanthropic organizations; but the one to which the political direction of the movement falls is the Democratic party. The importance of this trust becomes clear when we reflect that the policy of the state towards the movement is the factor which decides the question of success or failure. This policy can be made to take a form which will bring it to an end long before the people have obtained any considerable portion of the “higher goods” which it undertakes to carry to them. How numerous and impressive are the illustrations of the premature arrest of the democratic movement which the history of Asia furnishes! On the other hand the policy of the state can be shaped in such a way as to promote the full, healthful and beneficent development of the movement. To cause it to take and maintain this favorable form is the proper aim of the Democratic party. Its efforts to this end, namely that of securing through political means the participation of the masses in the “higher goods” of civilization, may be roughly grouped in three divisions: first, those which seek to extend and equalize political and civil rights; second, those which seek to protect in the possession and enjoyment of rights; third, those which seek to develop and maintain in the masses that quality of citizenship which

makes the wide diffusion of political privileges an advantage both to the citizen and to the state. In the policy of the party, so far as that policy has been truly democratic, these points have always been cardinal; and such they must continue until each is accomplished.

At the beginning of the party's career the duty to educate the citizen was less clearly perceived than its correlatives — the duty to extend his privileges, and the duty to protect him in the possession and enjoyment of these. For this there is a sufficient explanation. Without the aid of party the people had already attained to a degree of political capacity which justified a larger participation in government. Hence the earliest work of democratic organizations, both in colonial days and at the beginning of the national period, was not to produce capacity — influences outside of their control were doing that — but to secure room for the exercise of capacity already produced. When the national party was formed a century ago, the movement to make political privilege commensurate with political capacity was under full headway. The state democracies had already achieved notable progress in the disestablishment of privileged classes and institutions, and in the extension of the franchise. In this work the national party could not take a direct share; for the Constitution of the United States had left the direct control of the franchise and the general regulation of property rights to the States. It cannot be doubted, however, that the influence of the national party, and especially of its stronger leaders, hastened the democratization of the constitutions and laws of the States. Despite certain reactionary influences the process went on until, before the middle of the nineteenth century was reached, equality of civil and political rights had become, with inconsiderable exceptions, the rule throughout the free-labor portion of the Union. This task is now accomplished. A political equality more comprehensive than the party first contemplated is to-day the fundamental law both of the States and of the nation.¹ But the

¹ The Democratic party has not done this alone. The most extraordinary extension of the suffrage was the enfranchisement of the freedmen by the Republican party.

task of extending political rights involved more than the granting of the franchise. In the early stages of the democratic movement the laws and the traditions of government were unfavorable to the masses. Both had come into existence and both had received the sanction of ancient usage long before the common people had become a distinct and powerful factor in politics. It was necessary therefore to change law and tradition so as to give to each a thoroughly democratic character. This, a slow and difficult work, is now also substantially accomplished. To-day, in spirit and in form our laws, our government, our institutions are as a rule democratic.

The second of the greater tasks of the Democratic party, namely, the protection of the citizen in the possession and enjoyment of his lawful rights, is one which from its very nature can never be fully accomplished. In the main the opposition to the Constitution at the time of its ratification and the demand that, if accepted, it should be amended so as to incorporate a bill of rights, were democratic efforts in defence of the rights of the individual. The same is true of the antagonism to the centralizing policy of the Federalist administrations. In this, as has been shown above, the Democrats believed that the seeds of a new tyranny were germinating. In the Alien and Sedition Laws they saw the rapidly advancing realization of all their worst fears. These laws they regarded as harshly oppressive, and the Sedition Law as clearly unconstitutional. Years afterwards, Jefferson, when seeking to repair his broken friendship with the Adams family, wrote Mrs. John Adams in explanation of the pardon of Callender — who, because of disrespectful utterances towards her husband, had been sentenced under the Sedition Law to a term in prison — that he considered that law as unconstitutional, and a nullity as “absolute and palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a graven image.” But in the presence of these laws, what were the Democrats to do? The government was against them in every branch. The situation seemed desperate. What they did was to formulate the celebrated Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799. The part

which these resolutions afterwards played in the service of sectionalism both North and South has done much to obscure their real character. They were not in any sense a product of the sectional spirit. They were promulgated, not in the interest of any division of the Union, but in the interest of the liberties of the people everywhere—in the interest of Matthew Lyon of Vermont quite as much as in that of any citizen of South Carolina. The theory of the Union which they propounded, whatever may be urged in its defence on grounds purely historical, was incompatible with the safety and welfare of the United States and the development of the American people. Moreover it would have argued ill for the future of the Democratic party and of the American people, if the acts arraigned by the resolutions had been suffered to pass without earnest protest. At any rate the resolutions rested on democratic principles. Nevertheless at that time this theory of unqualified State sovereignty, of the federal government as the creature of the States, of the right and duty of each State to nullify acts which in its judgment exceeded the measure of the powers delegated to the federal government, seemed to its framers rational and the most effective weapon by which to maintain cherished rights.

Resistance to those early measures of the federal government which were deemed oppressive developed into a settled policy of resistance to centralization. It was held that a powerful central government which rested on popular favor and possessed a full treasury must become corrupt and tyrannical. The individual citizen would not be able to control it and would not feel responsible for it; but he could share in its favors and would learn to lean upon it. Hence it became early a well-established principle of Democratic party policy to keep the federal government weak and poor. But this was not solely for the sake of the individual. It was believed that the federal government could be used by one class or section to oppress other classes or sections, and that its capacity for evil in these directions would be proportioned to its powers and to the wealth which it controlled. To a considerable de-

gree Democratic opposition to protective tariffs has been based on this principle. One unmistakable result of such tariffs is to increase the dependence of the citizen upon government, and to enlarge the resources of government for controlling the citizen through means which appeal to self-interest. Moreover the strongest arguments of its friends have never been able to convince Democrats that the burdens and benefits of protection can be shared by different sections and classes in equal measure; but that they ought to be shared in this way, is fundamental in the Democratic code.

In earlier days the national government was looked upon as the only considerable source of danger to the rights which the Democratic party undertook to protect. The States on the other hand were considered their strongest and most trustworthy guardians. It was this belief which led the Democratic party to accept the doctrine of State rights in the extreme form set forth in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. The early attitude of the party toward the government was due to the fact that the government had been in hands other than its own. This attitude seemed to change when the government became Democratic. It is a question whether the Democratic party has not lost to a too great degree its distrust of strong government.

Of late and indeed for a considerable period the States have been recreant to the trust imposed in them. The legislatures have undergone a marked deterioration.¹ In many a majority of the members possess few or none of the qualifications which fit men for that perhaps highest and most difficult public function, namely, the making of good laws. In such the State governments oppress and plunder the people instead of protecting them in their rights, and there is little prospect of any change for the better. This growing badness of the state governments explains why the people everywhere are seeking both by restrictive provisions and by direct popular legislation to place their legislatures under greater constitutional restraints.² Into

¹ Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, ch. 40.

² The decay of State government, and of the State (commonwealth) itself

the causes of the unhappy change we do not now inquire; it is enough to note that if the Democratic party would protect the people in their rights, it must turn its attention to the governments of the States quite as much as to that of the Union. But the case is at its worst in municipal government. Here the democratic theory as held by extremists — with whom fortunately the greater leaders of American democracy are never to be classed — would lead us to expect a political paradise. What we have, especially in the largest cities, is as the world knows, something quite different. Nowhere else in civilized lands are the most sacred rights of the citizen trampled under foot in so swinish a manner. Here therefore the Democratic party, the party of the masses, has an urgent duty to perform. Another of the newer sources of oppression is party. To break, in the interests of free and responsible citizenship, the despotism which party, or rather the party machine, has established, is a task which belongs indeed to all parties, but especially to that one which proclaims that resistance to oppression is the highest of political duties. But of this more below.

In performing the first of its greater tasks, namely, that of securing to the masses the right to share in political functions, the Democratic party was engaged for a long time in work which in good part was destructive. Before it could properly lay the foundations of the new system, it had to break down and clear away the supports of the earlier antagonistic system. For a considerable period, therefore, its attitude towards existing law was that of hostility. This was necessary and highly useful; but it had at least one evil result: it weakened in the people that wholesome sentiment of respect for law which is one of the strongest supports of public order and of individual morality. In performing the second task, namely that of protecting the people in the possession and enjoyment of their newly acquired rights, it needs to cultivate again the

as a factor in the American political system, has been conclusively established by Professor J. W. Burgess. See *Political Science Quarterly*, I, 9 (March, 1886).

law-abiding spirit; otherwise its work cannot endure. The laws, the institutions and the general system which the Democracy has been laboriously building up will have need of defence. Already they are being attacked from two sides, the reactionary aristocratic and the socialistic. But in order that the party may defend law it must respect law; and before it can respect law it must produce law that is worthy of respect.

The third task, that of political education, is the one to which the party has given least attention. One reason for this is the unfortunate prevalence of what may be called the theory of natural political equality. This began to find favor about the middle of the eighteenth century and was widely accepted at the time of the American and the French revolutions. It affirms that there is, in justice, no such thing as political privilege, that full and equal participation in government is the natural right of every citizen. If this theory is true, the sole aim of a party devoted to the masses should be to secure for them what nature intended but men had denied. There were some, however, who insisted long ago that education was essential to the success of democratic institutions. Among these was Jefferson. Aside from his strenuous warfare upon privilege, there is perhaps no feature of his conduct so noteworthy as his zeal and efforts in the cause of education. "If a nation," he wrote in 1816, "expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."¹

It must be evident to every one who studies carefully the different forms of government, national, state and municipal, in the United States, that one prolific source of their imperfections is the possession of the ballot by multitudes, both North and South, who are not yet qualified to use it rightly. In the cities and to a considerable extent in the States at large, the cause of good government has been sacrificed to the too early realization of the democratic ideal of general and equal suffrage. But the American people, in whom the sense of the practical is strongly developed, will not always submit to bad government for the sake of a political ideal. In order to guard

¹ *Works*, VI, 517.

against a reaction even more strongly anti-democratic than that of 1787, the Democratic party should see to it that the quality of the citizenship of the masses is raised. Its own welfare as well as that of the country demands this. But how shall the result be accomplished? In the first place it should cherish, maintain and perfect the two most important sources of political education, namely the schools and local self-government. In its school policy it should give a prominent place to those studies which are calculated to promote good citizenship. It should not be content with primary schools, nor with a system that unites primary and secondary schools, but by founding institutions and by establishing generous scholarships and fellowships it should aim to place the higher and the highest education within the reach of the most capable and aspiring sons and daughters of the poor.¹

Of not less importance than the schools in the political education of the people is local self-government. The growth of the capacity of the citizen for the service of the state depends on the degree of his interest in public questions, and on the extent of his responsibility for their right treatment. Local self-government in its various forms — state, county, township, parish, ward, district — brings the citizen face to face with public questions concerning which he is well-informed, which visibly affect his own interests and the interests of his neighbors, and in the settlement of which his voice and influence may count for much. Indeed so important a factor in the training of the citizen is local self-government, that we may well question whether any people destitute of it can ever be practically self-governing. Jefferson's estimate of its value, given in old age, is impressive:

"It is by dividing and subdividing these republics, from the great national one down through all its subordinations until

¹ Jefferson's plan for the educational system of Virginia provided for secondary schools and a university as well as primary schools. He was the father of the University of Virginia, an institution which holds an enviable place among the best of those which are devoted to higher learning in America. See Professor H. B. Adams' excellent monograph, *Thomas Jefferson and the University of Virginia*.

it ends in the administration of every man's farm by himself — by placing under every one what his own eye may superintend, that all will be done for the best. What has destroyed liberty and the rights of man in every government which has ever existed under the sun? The generalizing and concentrating all cares and powers into one body, no matter whether of the autocrats of Russia or France, or of the aristocrats of a Venetian senate. And I do believe that if the Almighty has not decreed that man shall never be free (and it is a blasphemy to believe it) that [*sic*] the secret will be found to be in the making himself the depositary of the powers respecting himself, so far as he is competent to them, and delegating only what is beyond his competence, by a synthetical process, to higher and higher orders of functionaries, so as to trust fewer and fewer powers in proportion as the trustees become more and more oligarchical. The elementary republics of the wards, the county republics, the State republics and the republic of the Union would form a gradation of authorities, standing each on the basis of law, holding every one its delegated share of powers, and constituting truly a system of fundamental balances and checks for the government. Where every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic or of some of the higher ones, and feels that he is a participator in the government of affairs, not merely at an election one day in the year, but every day; when there shall not be a man in the State who will not be a member of some one of its councils, great or small; he will let the heart be torn out of his body sooner than his power be wrested from him by a Cæsar or a Bonaparte. How powerfully did we feel the energy of this organization in the case of embargo? I felt the foundation of the government shaken under my feet by the New England townships.”¹

The institutions of local self-government were planted long before the national Democratic party came into being, but it was to do good service in maintaining them, especially in the state form. It is true that for a considerable period entangle-

¹ *Works*, VI, 543.

ment with slavery influenced its conduct in this respect; but long before slavery became a prominent issue, the Democratic party was the champion of the States, and it should be, but is not in the proper degree, their champion still.

The newspaper press is at the present day a useful and powerful means of popular education. Its influence over the masses is particularly strong; but they need from it a higher quality of service than what they now receive. They need a press not less enterprising, nor less studious to please healthful tastes, than that of the present, but they need one which shall give less space to the brutish doings of mankind, and more to the activities which make for progress.

But the ways in which party exerts the most direct if not the most powerful, influence upon the quality of citizenship are two: first, through the spirit and methods of party management; second, through the way in which it fills and administers public office. It can hardly be doubted that the great body of the people receives a very large and possibly the larger share of political education at the hands of party. For the citizen who is merely a voter, parties name the candidates and decide upon the measures that the citizen supports; for the man who desires political preferment, party is the only road to office; for the patriot who would render public service, party furnishes the readiest and in most instances the only effective means. Hence, since the people do their political work under the direction of party, party becomes a potent factor in shaping political character. In fact parties and party leaders do for adults very much what schools and teachers do for youth. The standard of public service, the spirit and the methods which prevail in a party, tend to reproduce themselves in all its followers. Any party, therefore, which entrusts the management of its interests, state or national, to men who are bad citizens, and countenances these in the employment of methods which are dishonorable and demoralizing, is sapping the foundations of citizenship. In this way it can do more to destroy the qualities that make good citizens, than local self-government, the public school system, and the newspaper press can do to build them up. Of what use, for example, is

local self-government — which is of value mainly because it trains the individual to independent thought and intelligent serviceable conduct in respect to public affairs — if rings and bosses usurp within the local sphere the functions which belong to the citizen? Apparently the greatest failure of the American party system in its present stage of development is that the methods and management of the stronger parties are calculated to depress rather than to raise the quality of citizenship of their followers. We must concede in this point the present superiority of the English system.

The second way in which party influences citizenship, namely, the manner in which it fills and administers public office, is likewise of prime importance. The motive of government should be to advance as much as possible public welfare; its personnel should include the best citizens, and none but good ones; its methods should be the most effective within the range of its choice, and at the same time they should conform to the highest standards of morals and decorum. In so far as governments meet these requirements they set before the citizen, in a way which is both attractive and impressive, a model of what he should strive to be and to do. Their influence, exerted constantly and powerfully, tends to develop the best elements of civic character. In so far, on the other hand, as governments depart from these requirements, their influence is for harm. Instead of confirming they weaken what is good; instead of rebuking they encourage what is evil. But under the existing system, governments, national, state and municipal, are in the service and under the control of party. If, therefore, the Democratic party would succeed in what has been described as the greatest and most difficult of its present tasks, namely, to develop and maintain a high quality of citizenship in those who in a special sense are under its charge, it needs to become everywhere, in city and state as well as at Washington, the strenuous and consistent champion of good government.

What is the bearing of these general tasks upon the policy of the party towards the leading public issues of the present

day? Here there is room for disagreement; but in the judgment of the writer it may be stated briefly as follows:

The party policy should continue to be anti-sectional. From the beginning one of the most difficult and costly, but at the same time one of the most useful of its services, was to assist in holding together the discordant sections until the northern — by far the more democratic of the two — should become strong enough to maintain the Union by force. Of the different bonds which united North and South, the Democratic party was the strongest, and was the last to break. In performing this service it sacrificed consistency, and for a time was untrue to fundamental principles. But it did this, we must in all fairness concede, not so much in the service of slavery as in that of the Union. To-day its duty towards the sections is of a less compromising nature. The present task, that of reconciliation, while involving no betrayal of principle, does tend to broader sympathies and a more healthful political character.

In the early days it was difficult to adjust rightly the relations of American to French democracy. The two were widely different; in the American there was little of the socialistic and centralizing tendencies which strongly characterized the French. It was however, important that sympathy and friendship should subsist between the two systems; but more important that the democracy of the United States should not become subservient to that of France. Today this danger has passed away. American democracy is too large a body to be swerved from its course by outside influence. But a new embarrassment has now arisen. How shall the Democratic party deal with the socialistic and centralizing tendencies of its own adherents? It is dangerous to ignore these tendencies, for they are strongly established, and there may be in them an element of reasonableness. On the other hand it is clear that socialism is incompatible with the distinctive principle of American democracy. Socialists and democrats have at heart the same interest, namely the welfare of the masses; but their methods are diametrically opposed. The socialist depends upon the community or the state, the democrat upon himself.

Neither can accept the principle of the other without surrendering his own. Viewed from the democratic standpoint, the introduction of the socialistic régime would mean the destruction of the most valuable elements of political character.

As the champion of the masses, the Democratic party gave early a welcome to the immigrant and advocated a short term for naturalization. Without question some evils resulted; nevertheless this policy is now accepted by the rival party. The advantage of the policy is that speedy admission to the rights of citizenship hastens the process of Americanization. In the Federalist period the immigrant would have fared ill if the Democratic party had not received him and begun his political training. To-day the welcome which both parties extend to him does something to keep the immigrant from swelling the ranks of the dangerous classes. One of the things which a modern civilized country cannot afford is a multitude of inhabitants who are not citizens. There is, however, ground for thinking that the Democratic party should now modify its traditional policy with respect to immigration. It is having more than enough to do in discharging its duties towards its American constituency; to enlarge and at the same time to debase this constituency by encouraging the influx of intractable foreigners, is to say the least imprudent. Adherents who cannot be easily Americanized are a source of weakness rather than of strength to the party.

The tariff policy of the Democratic party is calculated to foster good citizenship. Whatever may be thought of the claim that a lower tariff will conduce not only to a more rapid increase of national wealth but also to its more equal and just distribution, it will be conceded that freer trade with other peoples must in certain ways exert a favorable influence upon character. It excludes that traffic between party and government on the one side, and protected interests on the other, which is a marked and injurious feature of high protection. It excludes also that ignoble form of extreme nationalism which is not ashamed to claim as a recommendation of the protective policy that it enables us, the richest and most prosperous

people of the world, to compel our "poor relations" in Europe to pay a very considerable percentage of our taxes. In seeking to free every class and section from paying tribute to any other class or section, it defers to and fosters a sentiment of justice. In seeking to wean the American producer from an enervating dependence on government, it helps to build up that element of character which is the secret of American success, namely, self-reliance.

The favor which a large section of the party extends to the scheme for the free coinage of silver is inconsistent with democratic principles as well as with the best democratic traditions. In so far as the motive for free coinage is to enhance the price of silver, it appeals only to those who hold the anti-democratic doctrine that for certain classes of producers government ought to provide profitable markets at the cost of the general public. In so far as the object is, through cheapening the money unit, to discharge debts by the payment of less value than was understood at the time when the debts were incurred, the result must be to injure the character of those who seek to profit by repudiation, and of the party which consents to become their advocate. It was acts based upon motives such as this which, soon after the Revolution, brought the State democracies into lasting discredit, and gave to the party of Hamilton rather than that of Jefferson the control of the government during the Federalist period.

Lastly, because its membership includes tens of thousands over whom employers can exert undue influence, and other tens of thousands to whom the vote-buyer has an access all too easy, the Democratic party is vitally interested in the establishment of the secret ballot. Rightly estimated, measures which save the citizen from casting a truckling or venal ballot do him and the country a greater service than measures which raise his wages or lessen for him the cost of living.

In general it may be said of each feature of Democratic policy that it is right and profitable in so far — and only in so far — as it helps the party to accomplish its tasks as the protector and educator of the masses.

II. THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

Whenever a large body of citizens is convinced that the most urgent need of the state cannot be provided for through any existing party, the time has come for the organization of a new party. This was the case in 1854. There were at that date hundreds of thousands of thoughtful and patriotic Northern citizens who held that the greatest need of the United States was the restriction of slavery to territory where it was already established. The desire to restrict slavery was not new. It had existed from the founding of the republic, and in two instances, namely, the Ordinance of 1787 and the Compromise of 1820, had shown itself a decisive force in shaping public policy. What was new in 1854 was the discovery that the barriers against the extension of slavery on which full reliance had been placed hitherto had become untrustworthy. The event that did most to bring about this discovery was the repeal of the compromise which in 1820 had prohibited slavery in all the vast unsettled region north of the line of $36^{\circ} 30'$. Even more alarming than the opening of Kansas and Nebraska to slavery which this repeal effected, was the doctrine advanced by its supporters that the national government had no right to prohibit slavery in any Territory. But what could be done? The first impulse was to restore the abrogated compromise. This, however, could be accomplished only through the championship of a powerful party; and from no one of the parties then existing could this championship be secured.

The Democratic party could not give it; for its Southern wing was altogether pro-slavery, while the masses of its Northern supporters had no aversion to slavery. Neither could the already moribund Whig party give the required championship; for it also had a Southern pro-slavery wing; and although a majority of its Northern members were, largely on political grounds, opposed to slavery, they were at the same time thoroughly imbued with the doctrine that the preservation of the Union was the highest of political duties, and that com-

pliance with the demands of the South was the only way by which the Union could be preserved. By habit and tradition the party was altogether unfitted for the heavy task under consideration. Its great achievements had been in the line of compromise. The fame of its most popular leader, Henry Clay, was based in the main on his services as architect and promoter of the compromises of 1820, 1833 and 1850. Moreover, through its support of the "gag-laws" and of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the party had alienated beyond recovery the good will and confidence of that influential body of Northern citizens whose antagonism to slavery on moral grounds made them comparatively indifferent to political considerations. Equally unfavorable was the outlook when the supporters of slavery-restriction turned to the newer parties of that day. The Know-Nothings were at best an ephemeral party, whose chief political service was to aid in the transition from the old party system, based on maintaining the Union by compromise, to the new system, based on the sectional struggle for supremacy. They were chiefly intent upon substituting nativism, an altogether minor issue, for the real issue, which was slavery. The Free-soil party was composed in the main of political Abolitionists and disaffected Democrats. Its official utterances were strongly antagonistic to slavery. In its general doctrines, however, it was quite too democratic to become the party of the North. In some of its conventions it even went so far in this direction as to sanction the views of State sovereignty set forth in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.

Under such circumstances it was necessary to form a new party; for in no other way could the supporters of slavery restriction be true to their sense of public duty. The organization of the Republican party was begun during the agitation over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill,¹ and was substantially completed in time for the national campaign of 1856. Its members were drawn from all parties. Of necessity it was confined to the North — it was the party of the North. The fact

¹ See Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, Vol. I, pp. 409-413; Julian, 143-144; von Holst, V. 130.

that resistance to the extension of slavery was the main feature of early Republican policy, accounts for the widely prevalent view that in the beginning the new party was mainly if not purely an anti-slavery organization. If this were true, it would be difficult to explain any considerable portion of its career, and altogether impossible to trace to a common underlying principle the varying lines of policy which it has pursued at different periods, or to account for the prosperous existence of the party long after the definite settlement of the question of slavery. The truth is that only in a secondary sense was the Republican party then or later an anti-slavery organization.

Under the influence of different labor systems there had grown up in the North and the South two distinct types of civilization. In the North labor was free. The social as well as the political structure was truly democratic. Of the spirit of caste there was scarcely a trace. The section possessed a highly developed and widely extended educational system. Its inhabitants were noted for industrial energy. Its manufacturing and commercial interests were extensive. Its population was largely urban. It had great wealth. It was in close and sympathetic relations with civilized Europe. Its merit was that it placed the highest prizes within reach of the humblest; its defect, that it made too much of the material goods of life. In the South, labor was enslaved. The social structure was aristocratic. The planters and the professional classes formed a true and in some respects a highly meritorious aristocracy, whose superiority in intellect and character gave them the undisputed social and political leadership of their section. The masses of the whites were poor and lacking in thrift and enterprise. The educational system was inadequate. There was little immigration. Agriculture, pursued by methods which steadily and rapidly impoverished the soil, was the one great industry. In respect to the social and political movements of the progressive outside world, the position of the South was that of growing isolation and antagonism. The merit of this system lay in the fine and strong traits which it produced in the men and women of its higher classes; its defect, its vice,

was the malign influence which it exerted on the character and fortunes of the masses of the Southern whites.

As these two types of civilization developed, the differences between them became more pronounced and difficult of adjustment. Before the middle of the century the discussion of national questions had made it clear that in the most essential points the interests and opinions of the North were in direct conflict with those of the South. The public policy which best suited the needs of the one was believed by the other to be hurtful. At the beginning of the second half of the century the divergence had already become so wide as to make a durable reconciliation impossible. The greatness of the difference between the sections is best measured by the differences between the ideals which they cherished. Each section had its own peculiar type of gentleman. Neither fully understood the ideas of the other in respect to honor, justice and obligation.¹ But as the possession of common ideals is the most solid basis of unity between citizen and citizen as well as between man and man, so the possession of unlike and conflicting ideals is the certain breeder of chronic discord. The conflict — about to become war — between these two types of civilization was the fact which dominated the political situation at the birth of the Republican party. In the presence of this greater struggle the strife between class and class ceased. The party system of the country was reorganized on a sectional basis. In the South the Democratic party gradually absorbed the Whigs and Know-Nothings and made itself the party of that section — the champion of its civilization. The Republican party drew to itself from each of the old parties the elements which were most distinctly Northern and thus became the party of its section — the party of the North. Its first great task is best described in the words of Lincoln:

“‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’ I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not

¹ See the comments of von Holst on the discussions in Congress which followed the attack on Sumner, V, 327.

expect the house to fall; but I do expect that it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other.”¹ The work immediately before the new party was to save the Union by making it all free.

Whether judged from the standpoint of national welfare or from the higher standpoint of world-progress, the record of the Republican party while engaged in this task is singularly creditable. It is true that in the later stages of the work it followed unwise counsels and perpetrated serious mischief. But as a whole, the history of the Federalists from 1787 to 1797 is probably the only chapter in the history of parties which, in respect to brilliancy and usefulness, can be compared with the record of the Republican party between 1861 and 1872. During the fourteen years in which the Republican party had full control of the government, it not only restored the broken Union, but — what is perhaps a severer test of political capacity — organized it anew, and on a durable basis.

The first work of the new party was to propagate the doctrine of slavery restriction. While engaged in this its conduct was marked by discretion and good sense as well as by courage and moral earnestness. It was aided by the course of its enemies. The Ostend Manifesto, the efforts of Pierce and Buchanan in coöperation with the “border ruffians” to establish slavery in Kansas against the will of its inhabitants, the attack on Sumner, the Dred Scott decision, the enforcement — sometimes brutal and always hateful — of the Fugitive Slave Act, helped much to make it clear to the North that the conflict between itself and the South was not only “irrepressible” but mortal. The event, however, to which the party owed most was the introduction of the doctrine of squatter sovereignty; and its greatest benefactor outside its own ranks was Stephen A. Douglas. The course of this leader in connection with that doctrine gave in 1854 the decisive impulse to the party’s organization. The discussion of that doctrine with Douglas in 1858 revealed Abraham Lincoln, and at the critical moment gave to him — immeasurably the fittest of all its can-

¹ *American Orations*, III, 3, 4.

didates — the leadership of the party. Finally, when its uselessness to slavery became apparent, it was the rejection of squatter sovereignty by the South and the quarrel of Southern leaders with Douglas that in 1860 divided the Democratic party, made Lincoln President, precipitated secession and placed the Republicans in control of Congress.¹

When, early in 1861, the Republicans found themselves in power, the problem which they had first to solve was not how to deal with slavery, but how to save the Union. The situation was difficult in the extreme: on the one side was a united, resolute, desperate South; on the other, a divided irresolute and yet optimistic North. There was only one course which gave hope of preventing a permanent separation. The South claimed, and the Democratic half of the North believed, that the immediate cause of secession was Republican hostility to slavery. Hence, in order to secure a sufficient degree of unity in the North and to win the border States to the support of the national cause, it seemed expedient to drop the question of slavery. This was done. The majority of Republican representatives voted for an amendment to the Constitution which would have made it impossible for the national government ever to interfere with slavery in the States. The Territories of Colorado, Dakota and Nevada were organized without prohibiting slavery.² The Union commanders who under the guise of military measures aimed the first blows at slavery were promptly rebuked. The Crittenden resolution, which assured the South that the war was waged to restore the Union just as it was previous to secession, that is, without any purpose of interference with slavery, received in July of 1861 the support of a large majority of Republican congressmen. The true attitude of the party at the outbreak of the war was clearly defined in the famous letter dated August 22, 1862, of President Lincoln to Horace Greeley:

“As to the policy I ‘seem to be pursuing,’ as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union.

¹ Of course I speak here of the immediate, not the remote, cause.

² Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, I, 270, 271; II, 677, 678.

I would save it in the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the Union as it was. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them; if there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery. . . . What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe it hurts the cause; and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause. . . . I have here stated my purpose according to my views of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.”¹

As the war progressed the North grew more united, while public opinion advanced steadily to the position that slavery was the true cause and chief support of secession. When this became clear, the Republican party, leading rather than following its prudent chief, resumed its warfare against slavery. In the Convention of 1864 the party declared:

“That as slavery was the cause and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion and as it must be, always and everywhere, hostile to the principles of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the republic; and that while we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the government, in its own defence, has aimed a death-blow at this gigantic evil, we are in favor, furthermore, of such amendment to the Constitution, to be made by the people in conformity with its provisions, as shall terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or jurisdiction of the United States.”²

¹ Greeley, *The American Conflict*, II, 250.

² Stanwood, *Presidential Elections*, 240.

To this programme the party held without deviation until, late in 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution.

Then came a task in some respects more delicate and difficult than that of saving the Union — the task of its reconstruction. The disposition to employ force which war always fosters, the self-confidence which victory begets, the loss through the assassin's act of Lincoln's wise and powerful leadership, the rashness and self-will of his successor, the impolitic course of the South towards the freedmen, — all these circumstances conspired to lead the party to the adoption of measures which were inconsiderate and which have proved the source of lasting evils. The formal disruption of the Union in 1860 and 1861 was made possible and in a sense inevitable by the earlier disruption of the moral bonds which for a century had held North and South together.¹ The cessation of hostilities could not of itself bring about a true restoration of the Union; that could be effected in one way only, and that was, through the knitting together of these same broken moral ties.

The condition of the South at the close of the war was one of peculiar difficulty and peril. The section was exhausted, impoverished, discouraged; its labor system was destroyed; its industry was paralyzed. In this situation the South needed — as no prosperous community ever can need — the best services of its most capable citizens. The work of restoration could be well done only by those who belonged to the suffering community and were its natural leaders. Outsiders, however well disposed, could not fill their place. But under the influence of the untoward circumstances above mentioned these considerations were overlooked. In most of the Southern States the classes which possessed the highest political capacity — the only classes which had had any effective political training — were excluded from all share in the work of reorganization. This task, delicate and difficult beyond all others, was committed to the freedmen, who had no training as citizens, to the loyal

¹ It seems to me that we may justly date the clear beginning of the American Union from the Peace of Paris in 1763.

whites, in most States a class comparatively small and without experience in politics, and to a few immigrants from the North, some of whom were unscrupulous adventurers. The natural results followed. Those States which came most fully under the "carpet-bag" régime were soon reduced to a pitiable condition. Their legislative history for the period under consideration is little else than a record of plunder. Then came the terrible reaction through which the white people of the South regained control of their local affairs. The means they employed were cruel and demoralizing; but the responsibility for the use of such means rests at least in some measure on the party that forced upon them an intolerable situation. If, in a Northern State, the native-born, the educated and the reputable citizens should be deprived of political functions, and the control of government should be put into the hands of the pauper, the illiterate and the vagabond elements, the situation would not be worse than that of a considerable portion of the South during the most trying years of the period of reconstruction. In some respects it would be better; for there is no oppression which galls like that exercised by those who have been slaves over those who were once their masters, and there are no circumstances under which maltreatment is so exasperating as when an outside power — in this case, the national government at the instigation of the Republican party — prevents the victim from defending himself against a weak assailant; moreover, there is no considerable class in the North so incapable, in a political sense, as were the freedmen of the South in the first years after emancipation. No people worthy of respect can permit itself to be ruled by its least capable classes; and yet that is precisely what the Republican party demanded of the South when it undertook to place the freedmen in control of the Southern state governments. The gravest evils which resulted from this policy were not the misdeeds of the "carpet-bag" governments nor the desperate methods by which these governments were overturned, but the antagonism between the two races which it kindled, the unnecessary and greatly injurious increase of sectional bitterness, and lastly, by

the production of a "solid South," the maintenance there long beyond the natural period of a hurtful one party system.

Before the end of General Grant's second term the work of formal reconstruction was completed, and with it closed the first great period in the life of the Republican party. It had fulfilled its mission as the party of the North; it had made the free-labor system of the North the system of the entire Union. Incidentally it had accomplished another task; it had raised the power and prestige of the federal government to a point which settled forever the old controversy between state and national sovereignty; and the settlement reached was the one for which Hamilton, Clay, Jackson and Webster had labored.

The question which the party had next to solve was whether there would be a place for it in the new party system which was about to be formed. Just as the earlier change from class to sectional interest as the basis of party had given birth to the Republican party and assigned to it its first great task, so now, after the completion of that task and the consequent destruction of the sectional basis, it became necessary to reorganize the party system on the more natural and durable basis of class interest. The gradual disintegration of the sectional basis and the gradual acceptance of the class basis is, I think, the most noteworthy feature in the history of party during the last twenty years. This process began earlier and has proceeded farther in the North than in the South, but in the North it is still incomplete. It reveals itself in the decreasing prominence of sectional issues and in the increasing prominence of issues that rest upon conflicts, real or supposed, between the interests of the different classes. On the whole, the Democratic party is committing itself more definitely to the championship of the farmer and the laborer; the Republican party, to that of the manufacturer and the large capitalist. In the new system there is need of a party to champion the interests of the conservative classes of the whole Union. The Democratic party cannot satisfy this need. In the North it is already the party of the masses; in the South it is destined soon to become so. The predecessors of the Republicans, namely the Federalists and

Whigs, were the conservatives of the early period. To take up their work and to prosecute it in accordance with the actual conditions of the present, is a task which some party must accept and for which the Republican party has marked qualifications. This task of conservation is but another form of the earlier task. Then the party had to protect the civilization of the North by making the Northern labor system national. It had to fight against slavery and secession. Now it is called upon to protect the same civilization against other foes, — against the alien, the monopolist, the inflationist, the repudiator, the anarchist and many another who would overturn and destroy. If the party can be led to accept its present work as heartily as it did the earlier, there will be no change in its principles and less danger of a change in its fortunes.

It is impossible to trace here the course of the party in its efforts to find and fill the new position. It is sufficient to remark that its advance in this direction has been slow and halting, and that from time to time it has taken backward steps. It has not even at the present day fully emancipated itself from the sectional idea. Very recently it gave general support to the Federal Elections Bill, and its national platform of the present year promises measures of a like nature. The hope which during the reconstruction period influenced its policy far too greatly — that it could secure not only lodgment but control in the South through the colored vote — has been the source of serious blunders. There has never been a time when the party could afford to pay the price which it was necessary to pay in order to obtain this vote.

Looked at from the standpoint of party welfare, the question of greatest present moment is: How can the confidence and support of the naturally conservative classes in the South as well as in the North be won and kept? This is a matter indeed which concerns deeply all good citizens, irrespective of their relations to party. The political health of the country, the outlook for good government and for progress, are dependent in no small measure on the existence of a well-balanced party system. In order that there may be such a system there is

need of a strong conservative party. The best things in our civilization, however strongly entrenched they may be in laws and institutions and even in popular regard, are exposed to constant and dangerous attacks, and need therefore a watchful and powerful protector. To affirm the need of a conservative party is not to claim that all the features of the existing order are right and should be permanent. Doubtless some of these which were once highly useful need now to be replaced by other features more in accord with existing and coming conditions. But the public has a deep interest in the methods by which such changes are to be effected. The evils of a bad method of introducing a reform may outweigh the benefits which the reform itself is calculated to bring. Right here we see how a conservative party can render important services: it secures the choice of the most gradual, the least destructive and therefore the best methods of introducing reforms; it resists and prevents pseudo-reforms. Were it not for this unconscious and even unfriendly coöperation of the conservative, the best work of the progressive radical would be accomplished prematurely, at great cost and with but little benefit.

Is the present policy of the Republican party such as to win the confidence and support of those classes, both North and South, which are naturally conservative? So far as its course in respect to public credit and finance is concerned, one may answer in the affirmative. Most of its measures in relation to these important subjects reveal a sense of honorable obligation as well as a clear perception of what is expedient. They satisfy the instinct of the conservative for stability. The position which the party has taken in regard to foreign trade seems to me less satisfactory. It has abandoned the earlier view that protection is useful only during the industrial infancy of a people, for the modern view that a tariff high enough to offset the lower wages of competing foreign producers, and general enough to include all industries which are exposed to foreign competition, should be the permanent policy of the country. In putting this forward as the leading feature of its policy, there is danger that the Republican party will make itself the party of the protected

classes and sections rather than the conservative party of the whole country. The hold which it used to have on its supporters came through the fact that it gave expression to their moral convictions and their love of the Union. The hold which it is now seeking to gain as the dispenser of tariff favors rests largely upon the service which it renders to the pocket. This is a degradation.¹ It is certain moreover that the hold itself is less secure. It is impossible to make a tariff which will satisfy the conflicting interests of different protected classes. It is equally impossible to bestow the benefits of protection upon all of the more important classes.

During the first period of its history the party gained the support of a large proportion of the farmers of the North through its antagonism to slavery and its support of the Union. Neither of these ties is as strong as it used to be. The loyalty of the Democratic party to the national idea is no longer in question. The future relationship of the Northern farmer to the Republican party will be determined in a higher degree than before by the way in which the tariff affects his economic interests. There are signs that the influence of the "home market" idea is losing its hold upon him. A large number of farmers both east and west are coming to believe that their share in the cost of protection is larger than their share in its benefits. They do not understand why they should be taxed in order to swell the profits of industries which, without protection, would pay better than farming can be made to pay. When told that this is done in the interest of the laborer, their reply is that the better way to help the laborer is to tax him less; that the wages which farmers have to pay are already unreasonably high; that when just allowance is made for the care and self-denial which a farmer, especially when dependent on borrowed capital, must exercise, as well as for the thought, devotion and number of hours that he gives to his work, his

¹ Compare, in respect to the motives appealed to, the address of Governor McKinley—one of the best of American citizens—at the recent national convention, with any typical utterance of the great leaders of the early period of the party.

return is actually smaller than that of the laborer he employs; that if the farmer produces more, it is because he works longer, harder and more intelligently; that if he saves more, it is because he spends less.

Without question the party should modify its policy towards the South. Southern ill-will on account of its agency in the overthrow of secession and slavery would have subsided long ago but for the attempt during the reconstruction period to make the negro the ruler of the South, and later, through such measures as the Federal Elections Bill, to give him the ascendancy in those States and districts where he outnumbers the whites. The race problem is indeed a difficult one. Its settlement, I venture to think, can come in one way only, and that is through the establishment of confidence and good-will between the colored people and their white neighbors. A careful study of an average Northern community will show that its moral health and prosperity rest to a great degree upon the influence of its higher over its lower class — of its wisest and strongest members over its weakest. This influence can operate only when the two classes are in friendly relationship. If this relationship is broken by bringing the two classes into conflict, the influence of the higher class for good is destroyed, or rather, it changes to an influence for evil. The lower class, instead of receiving inspiration and encouragement, become envious and embittered. The statement that the negro is not allowed to vote is true; but the answer to this is that he is not yet ready to exercise that right to his own profit or to that of the community in which he lives. His attitude toward the liquor and lottery questions confirms this view. Moreover the attempt to enforce this right by means of the national government can only serve to postpone the day when the negro will be fit for the ballot, and when the Republican party, by winning the confidence of the conservative classes of the South, can become in the fullest sense a national party.

XI

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN AMERICAN POLITICS ¹

THE NATIONAL Democratic party came into being during the first administration of Washington, and is, therefore, more than a century old. What were the circumstances of its birth? The answer carries us back to the long period between the first settlements in British America and the Revolution. In each colony there showed itself very early a tendency on the part of the common people to demand for themselves a share in the government; and this demand grew larger as time went on. The result was that in most of the colonies the basis of government, both civil and ecclesiastical, was broadened by the inclusion of a large popular element. In the course of this movement, each colony developed a democratic party, organized, it is true, less perfectly than the parties of to-day, but still sufficiently to accomplish its proper ends. John Adams, who knew the facts and understood the meaning of earlier American history better than any other statesman of his time, wrote in 1812: "You say our divisions began with federalism and anti-federalism? Alas! they began with human nature; they have existed in America from its first plantation. In every colony, divisions always prevailed. In New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and all the rest, a court and country party has always contended." ²

The significance of these local democratic parties in colonial politics is that they aided in the political development of the

¹ *The International Monthly*, Vol. II, October, 1900.

² *Life and Works*, X, 23.

people by impressing upon them democratic ideas, and by giving them an invaluable training in practical politics, — an education which more than anything else explains their success in the greater struggles that were to follow. Taking the record as a whole, it is surprising that there was so little error in political theory and so little political misconduct on the part of the masses during the five or more generations which cover the colonial period. In explanation, it should be said that, owing to the strong and in general wisely exercised influence of the colonial aristocracy, and to the prudence of the English government these young democracies were entrusted with public responsibilities quite gradually, and never completely. The popular leadership, as a rule, was wise and strong. The early development of democracy in the colonies was affected but little by philosophical speculations, home or foreign; the persecutions of the Stuart period, political and ecclesiastical, sifted out those Englishmen who were most democratically inclined, and sent them to the New World, where they came under influences which stimulated in every man the impulse to make the most of himself; this impulse thus strengthened acting upon the colonial masses is the source of American democracy. Looked at from another standpoint, the significance of the colonial democratic parties is that, owing to their work, the political ideas and character of Americans had become at the close of the Seven Years' War very unlike those of their kindred in the mother country, — so unlike in fact that the aristocratic and monarchical system of England was no longer adapted to their wants and was soon to be regarded as intolerable.

The Revolution made a deep and lasting impression upon American democracy and American democratic parties. The revolutionary period is generally supposed to terminate with the close of the war, but a broader view would extend it to the adoption of the Constitution, that is, to 1789; for the full significance of the Revolution is not seen if we regard it merely or mainly as a military struggle; it was a movement which abolished or modified every part of the system under which

Americans were living at the time of the Stamp Act, and created every part of the new system which was to take its place. In this creative work the most difficult and, in some respects, the most admirable portion was that government of the Union which more than replaced the rejected British government; but this was not devised until 1787, and was not established until 1789. The Revolution should, therefore, be considered as extending from the Stamp Act to the inauguration of Washington, a period that covers nearly a quarter of a century.

How and to what extent did the Revolution affect American democracy and democratic parties? In the first place, the Revolution was a democratic movement; its controlling motive was attachment to democratic ideas; the centre of resistance in each colony was not in governor, council, or senate, — they, as a rule, were for submission, but in the democratic assemblies. All of the typical revolutionary utterances, the gravest and weightiest, as well as the most passionate and vapid, breathe throughout the spirit of democracy. With this, the declarations and resolves of the different revolutionary bodies, from the Continental to those of the New England towns, are filled to overflowing; it is the essential and living element in the Declaration of Independence, in Paine's *Common Sense*, in popular song and caricature. Moreover, in the early stages of the Revolution the work of governing fell into the hands of the people and was performed by them until the new constitutions established state governments in place of the colonial. During much of the period the New England town-meeting assumed the higher functions of a politically sovereign body. Not elsewhere, unless we except Athens and Switzerland, has the ordinary citizen ever exercised an influence so decisive on the determination of great matters. The undemocratic elements, namely the official classes, and that large section of the colonial aristocracy which was unfriendly to the Revolution, speedily lost their influence and became the object of a fierce persecution, every act of which gave impetus to the democratic movement. This embittered struggle with the Loyalists or Tories during the war and their expulsion at its close deepened meas-

urably the democratic impress upon American society and politics, for the Tories were the strongest upholders of conservatism, and of that regard for birth and culture which distinguishes the colonial from the post-revolutionary aristocracy. Further evidence of advance of democracy during and in consequence of the Revolution can be found in the character of the new state constitutions, in the working of the Articles of Confederation, in the legislation of the several States, and, it must be added, in the general decline of good government. In fact, the Revolution through weakening the force that hitherto had exercised a wholesomely restraining influence, gave to democracy a stronger impetus than it could bear. In large measure the misgovernment of the closing years of the period was due, as democrats like Gerry conceded in the Philadelphia Convention, to an "excess of democracy."

In brief the lesson of the American Revolution, like that of the greater revolution which followed soon in France, is that at the close of the eighteenth century the democracy, without the aid and coöperation of the conservative classes, was not yet fit to be entrusted with the full control of government.

The first truly national or federalist period began in 1787 with the framing of the Constitution and extended to the party revolution of 1800. Its political characteristic was conservative reaction; the democratic masses had few representatives in the Convention of 1787, and the Constitution itself, particularly in its first unamended form, in some of its most distinctive features, is undemocratic. This was recognized in the debates of the convention and was the ground on which some of the members refused their signatures. It was the chief ground also of the strong and nearly successful opposition to ratification. This opposition which, had it been well organized, would have defeated the Constitution, must be recorded as an error, grave indeed, but more significant of political immaturity than of incapacity. Hitherto the democratic masses had concerned themselves with public interests either narrowly local or at most provincial; they had not yet learned to "think continentally."

At the beginning of Washington's first administration the conservative and wealthy classes were again in control; Hamilton was the chief motive power of the new government, Washington its balance wheel. Democratic dissatisfaction with the Constitution was in part appeased by the incorporation of the first amendments, — a substantial bill of rights, — and by successful opposition to the undemocratic official etiquette which the high Federalists wished to introduce.

It was early in this period that the reaction against the policy of the new government began, which, through consolidating the democratic parties already existing in the several States, led to the formation of the National Democratic party of the Union. One cause of this reaction was the series of famous measures by which Hamilton undertook to restore public credit and, at the same time, to strengthen the moral foundation of the new general government while weakening that of the States. A second cause was the administration's policy of peace with England, — a policy that involved large concessions to a hated enemy, — and a strict neutrality towards France, our generous ally in the War of Independence, now laboring in the throes of a revolution which gave her the ardent sympathy of every American democrat. Of the two, the scheme of Hamilton for the restoration of public credit had the greater influence; most of the measures which it embraced were well calculated to arouse democratic opposition; they tended to strengthen the federal government over which the people had comparatively little influence, and to weaken correspondingly that of the States where they had full control; moreover, their manifest tendency was to foster the growth of a moneyed aristocracy and to make it the permanent ally of the government; and lastly, one feature of the scheme, namely, that of a national bank, prepared the way for that doctrine of "implied powers" which threatened to destroy those limitations upon the general government that democrats regarded as the crowning merit of the Constitution.

The leader of this reaction and the founder of the National Democratic party was Thomas Jefferson.

How were those two statesmen, Hamilton and Jefferson, related? Hamilton, whose unequalled talents and splendid services should not blind us to the grave defects of his statesmanship, wished to destroy the States and to build up a highly centralized national government in which the aristocratic division of the people was to have forever not merely the leading, but the controlling voice. His model was the British system. His distinction as a statesman rests in part on what he did as the restorer of order in times when the Union was perishing through disorder, and in part on what he did, — more doubtless than any contemporary or successor, — “to reëstablish the processes that connected the development of the United States with that of England.” The value of this, his second great service, becomes apparent when we reflect that owing to hatred towards England, kindled by the Revolution and fanned by the galling nature of her subsequent policy, and to gratitude towards democratic France whose aid had made it possible to throw off the British yoke, we were under strong temptation to disregard our English inheritance and to develop American civilization on a basis too largely French. But Hamilton, by birth and early training a British West Indian, “did not inherit an American character . . . to him America, — the America of the British mainland, — was neither a birthplace nor a nursery; and only in a qualified sense can it be called a school. It was rather a field into which he entered after his character was formed and his equipment for work nearly complete.”¹

In the character of the American people there were two fundamental traits which Hamilton persistently antagonized; these were hostility to privilege, and attachment to local self-government. This is why he seemed and was the arch-enemy of American democracy. Hamilton’s character and policy go far to explain the enduring qualities of Jefferson’s work in organizing the Democratic party. What Hamilton struck at were the principles of democracy; and it was these that Jefferson defended. In reading to-day the writings of these pro-

¹ *Supra*, Chapter V.

found thinkers, one notes in each and everywhere proofs of solicitude as to the deeper results of public policy; each concerns himself with the question, how will the measure under consideration influence civic character and institutions? In such inquiries, however, Hamilton emphasizes most what makes for national strength and reputation, while Jefferson cares first for the welfare of the individual; Hamilton would make the Union great and glorious; Jefferson would make every citizen strong and free.

Hamilton had little of that tact whose source is considerateness towards others, and none of that which springs from dislike of struggle; he was opinionated, overbearing in manner, and pugnacious. Jefferson, on the contrary, was tactful in a high degree towards the feelings and rights of his associates; he was delicately considerate; his letters to Madison are, — if we overlook the passages relating to enemies, — a fine revelation of a gentle, manly party chieftain; his dislike of war was constitutional; he always chose the means that promised with least friction the ends he had in view; he was not always magnanimous and sometimes imagined evil when none existed. In dealing with others Jefferson was adroit, Hamilton masterful; Jefferson used strategy, where Hamilton gave resounding blows.

These differences helped to explain the failure of Hamilton as a party leader and Jefferson's unexampled success. Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson was by birth and training wholly American. He felt the Virginian's pride in his own State. In him the taste and culture of the best representatives of American aristocracy were united with trust in and respect for the people. Unlike Hamilton, to whom strong government seemed the chief support of the public welfare, Jefferson felt a profound distrust of government, and would narrow its functions as much as possible while broadening correspondingly the sphere of the individual's initiative and rights. Jefferson, despite his attachment as a Virginian to State rights, was as little provincial as Hamilton; but his emancipation had come in a different way, namely, through the working on his mind and character

of the ideas which are the foundation of universal democracy. He was a lover of nature, agriculture and science, of music, literature, and philosophy. In fact, he surpassed Hamilton in range of liberalizing interests and pursuits, almost as much as in human sympathy. He appropriated in short a large share of the good things of life, and he would have the less favored possess and enjoy as much as he, and is not this, namely, to secure to all full participation in the good things of life, the real aim and justification of the democratic movement?

Under the wise guidance of its founder and its able lieutenants, Madison and Gallatin, the newly organized party sustained creditably the rôle of opposition. At first it was beaten in nearly every contest; each measure of Hamilton's financial scheme became law; the disputes with England were settled in a way which the Democrats condemned; our relations with France grew colder as that country grew more democratic; but this experience of failure did not in the least dishearten; in each struggle the new party gained a clearer consciousness of its tasks, a fuller confidence in its leaders, and a better discipline. But while its numerical strength grew constantly, the political revolution that placed the Democratic party for the first time in control of the national government did not take place until the year 1800. In the history of party the events which led to that revolution are of deep significance. The misconduct of France under the ignoble government of the Directory, culminating in the shameful ill-treatment of our envoys in the years 1797 and 1798, caused the Democratic party, which had always been friendly towards the French, a temporary loss of popular favor. The Federalists under the influence of the war fever very imprudently passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, to which Jefferson and Madison made reply in the famous Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. In the earliest discussions which these resolutions have called forth, undue emphasis has been placed on their relationship to later sectionalism. What most concerns us here is their relationship to the Democratic party. "In the principles of that party the rights of the individual and the rights of the States then held

the first place. Every true Republican believed that the Federalist legislation of 1798 was unconstitutional, and therefore, to quote the words of Jefferson, 'as null and void as if Congress had commanded the people to bow down and worship a graven image'; and many Republicans, among them Jefferson himself, believed that this legislation was part of a conspiracy to transform our government into a monarchy. Protection through the federal judiciary they did not consider a possibility. That body was regarded as thoroughly partisan; and one of its members at least, Judge Chase, had given good ground for that opinion. . . .

"In fact, during the years under consideration, the distrust of the early Republicans (Democrats) towards the federal judiciary was not less strong than that of the later Republicans during the first five years which followed the publication of the Dred Scott decision. It seemed, therefore, an imperative necessity that a protest as solemn, as earnest, and as influential as possible should be uttered, and this was what the resolutions accomplished. Silence under such circumstances would have appeared cowardly, and must have proved demoralizing. . . . Perhaps the greatest party advantage which the resolutions secured was this: They drew the attention of the Republicans to domestic affairs and to their own political principles, and in this way weakened and broke that spell of France which had done more than all things else to hurt their usefulness as citizens and to bring them into discredit as a party."¹

In the year 1800 came the political revolution which placed the control of the national government for the first time in the hands of the Democratic party, and opened a new chapter in its history and that of the country. What at that date had the party accomplished? Although the record looked at in detail is marred by serious errors in policy, it had done much for the education of the people; it had helped to emancipate them from the political provincialism of the earlier periods, and to develop in them an interest in the questions that concerned the Union as a whole; in fact it had brought the masses

¹ *Supra*, pp. 100, 101.

again into full participation in the political life of the country; moreover, — and this was the highest service, — it had restored to their proper influence over the minds of the people those democratic principles that had fallen into discredit at the close of the Revolution.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRATIC PERIOD, 1800-1825

The propriety of giving this title to the first quarter of the nineteenth century can scarcely be questioned. During his administration of eight years the rule of Jefferson over his party was more complete than any other American party leader has ever enjoyed, and this ascendancy over party carried with it an influence over Congress greater than that exercised by Washington or Jackson or Lincoln. Madison and Monroe, the succeeding Presidents, were disciples of Jefferson, and the same may be said of the foremost party leaders of the period. Throughout these twenty-five years Jefferson was either the all-powerful active leader of the party or the revered guide and counselor of those who undertook to fill his place. The inaugural of Jefferson, in 1801, is often quoted as the most adequate statement of democratic principles and policy to be found in the entire range of political literature, a distinction which it richly deserves. The man whom Hamilton had denounced as "an atheist in religion and a fanatic in politics," and whom not a few New England divines regarded as a modern anti-Christ, gave in this address sincere utterance to sentiments and views which advancing civilization can never leave behind, for they express its inner unchanging spirit.

In no portion of his varied career did Jefferson show greater political wisdom than in his course towards the defeated Federalists. He refused to persecute; he did everything to conciliate; and in the inaugural of 1801 he appropriated and took under his protection and that of his party the useful work that they had done. This policy made a revival of Federalism impossible. Had the Democrats attacked the Constitution or sought to weaken the national government, the Federalists, in

defending their own creations, would have had a future. But Jefferson's policy deprived them of the most honorable and useful activity which is open to a party in opposition, and left to them little more than a choice of ways to die. A second result of Jefferson's policy was that it helped to Federalize the Democrats. Desertion from the defeated to the victorious party soon grew into a stampede, and the new element in the Democratic camp became quickly and greatly influential. Looked at from the standpoint of party, the destruction of the Federalists and the Federalization of the Democrats are the most striking consequence of the revolution of 1800. From the higher standpoint of national progress the most important consequences are these: first, the resumption of that progress towards democracy which had been the marked characteristic of the colonial and revolutionary periods, but had been checked during the conservative aristocratic reaction of the years 1786 to 1800—a progress on whose resumption and healthful unfolding was to depend what is most distinctive and beneficent in the contribution of America to the civilization of the world; and second, a powerful impulse to the forces which were slowly establishing in our people a national and American character. The explanation of our troubles in the "critical period" from 1781-1789 is that through breaking our relationship to Great Britain we had come to occupy the position of a nation before possessing either a national organization or a national character. In 1800 the national organization, thanks to the Federalists, had been supplied, but we still lacked a national character. This, then, was the urgent, the overshadowing want of the new period. The attitude of the mass of the people toward the beneficial changes made by the Federalists had been either reluctant acquiescence or passionate opposition; only in a slight degree had they unlearned the provincialism and the unbalanced democracy that had produced the calamities of 1786; only in a slight degree had they concerned themselves hitherto for national interests or national honor; but now, through their elevation to power, the welfare and the good name of the nation were placed in their keeping and the

new responsibility tended to develop within them those larger political conceptions which, when added to the traits that had distinguished them from the beginning, namely, love of freedom and devotion to self-government, were to make the character of our people national and American.

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRATIC PERIOD, 1825-1840

The third period in the history of the Democratic party extending from 1825 to 1840, is rightly called the Jacksonian; for with the one exception of Jefferson, Jackson has impressed himself upon the party more deeply and durably than any other of its leaders. How does this period differ from the preceding? Chiefly in this: Jefferson, as has been noted, tried to make all classes democratic, and his success was such that at the close of the second war with England the Democratic party included the conservative classes, and supported a conservative policy. Jackson on the contrary made himself the champion of the masses, and in this way became the leader of a movement more radically democratic than that which Jefferson had led. Instead of seeking to reconcile the two divisions of society as Jefferson had done, he stood forth as the champion of the poor, and made war in their behalf against the rich. This is the significance of the crusade against the bank and the looting of the civil service. The great development of executive power under Jackson, signified a notable retreat from the earlier position of the party, namely, that of distrust towards the President and confidence in the House of Representatives. Jackson was a strong executive, because behind him was the strength of the people. His course towards the nullifiers of South Carolina signifies an advance of the Democratic party in national sentiment. As a rule those who have given most study to this period censure Jackson. Professor Sumner says: "We must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance without really appreciating it; leaving behind him disturbed and discordant elements of good and ill just fit to pro-

duce turmoil and disaster in the future." Later he adds, "Representative institutions are degraded on the Jacksonian theory just as they are on the divine-right theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. There is not a worse perversion of the American system of government conceivable than to regard the President as the tribune of the people." The view of von Holst may be inferred from the following passage: "In spite of the frightful influence, in the real sense of the expression, which he exercised during the eight years of his Presidency, he neither pointed out nor opened new ways to his people by the superiority of his mind, but only dragged them more rapidly onward on the road they had long been travelling, by the demoniacal power of his will." The meaning of the Bank struggle is thus defined: "Its significance lay in the elements which made Jackson able actually and successfully to assert his claims, in conflict with the Constitution and with the idea of republicanism, to a position between Congress and the people as patriarchal ruler of the republic." Elsewhere he tells us that the "curse of Jackson's administration" is that it weakened respect for law; that "the first clear symptom" of "the decline of a healthy political spirit" was the election and re-election of Jackson to the Presidency; that his administration paved a "broad path for the demoralizing transformation of the American democracy."

In reply to this arraignment it may be observed that Jackson worked for and with that portion of the people whose political development was least advanced; that the personal methods he employed were suited to their needs; that the net results of his influence was to lift them to a higher political plane than they had occupied before; that since they regarded him (as he regarded himself) not as the violator of the Constitution but as its staunchest supporter, his example tended to build up rather than to break down respect for law; that no President of the United States has been more distinctly national in his spirit or has done more to awaken that spirit in his supporters. On the other hand, it is fair to concede that under Jackson politics were vulgarized and American society

was deprived of its rightful influence over government; still in a fair summary of the period it seems safe to say that it lifted the lower political strata more than it depressed the higher.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CONFLICT
WITH SECTIONALISM, 1840-1860

The twenty years from the defeat of Van Buren in 1840 to the defeat of Douglas in 1860 brought disaster to the old parties. The characteristic of this period was the rapid growth of sectionalism, the North with its institutions based on free labor, and the South resting on slave labor, had each become conscious that the public policy best adapted to the interests of the other threatened its own welfare. Favored by a rapid increase of population and by legislation that had excluded slavery from the region north of the Ohio, and from most of the territory west of the Mississippi, the North in 1840 had made itself master of the House of Representatives and seemed destined to win in the near future control of the Senate and the Presidency. The South in alarm resolved upon a policy of territorial expansion in order to increase the number of slave States and thus preserve the sectional balance in the Senate. The first step was to annex Texas; the second, to wrest a vast territory from Mexico. Earlier the great parties had tried, not without success, to keep slavery out of politics. In 1844 the acceptance by the Democratic party of the policy of territorial "expansion" made slavery the leading political issue, and such it remained to the end of the period. During these years so memorable for territorial acquisitions, for the struggle over the Wilmot Proviso, for the Compromise of 1850, for the growing agitation over the new Fugitive Slave Law, for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, ostensibly to make room for squatter sovereignty, for the long agony in Kansas, for the sensational Dred Scott decision, for the reconstruction of the party system on the sectional basis, — during all these eventful years the Democratic party was the accomplice of the

Western slave holder in the effort to extend slave labor at the expense of free labor. The sacrifice of principles necessitated by this expediency led to rapid moral decay; in the way of beneficial legislation little or nothing was accomplished. The party ceased to produce great leaders; among the names now held in honor by the Democratic party not one belongs to this period. Men of conscience and courage like Thomas H. Benton were driven out of the party; of the new leaders none were better than third rate; the real democrats of those times are to be looked for in other parties, the greatest of them all, Abraham Lincoln. — whose seat to Jefferson the Democrats of our day quite offend, — was first a Whig and then a Republican. The leader who had most influence over the party was Stephen A. Douglas, a man of boundless audacity and not destitute of courage, but blind to the moral aspect of public questions. In declaring, at a time when the disposition of slavery was the highest concern of the country, that he did not care whether slavery "was voted up or voted down" Douglas forfeited all right to the name of statesman; nevertheless it was he who in 1860 led the party out of its bondage to the South. The significance of this period in the history of the Democratic party is the illustration it gives of the disastrous results of a betrayal of principles in the morals, honor, and usefulness of a party.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Even if it had remained in power, the greatly demoralized Democratic party could not have met the emergency created by secession. During the interval between the election of 1860 and the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln it made no preparation moral or material for the impending struggle; the reluctant support which it gave to the war for the Union was inconstant, and at times ceased altogether. Its opposition to the policy of destroying slavery was bitter, and continued to the end. If it is true that the Union was saved by the aid of Democrats, it is also true that it was saved in spite of, rather than by the aid of, the Democratic party; and there were times

in the course of the doubtful struggle when President Lincoln and his supporters felt that the "fire in the rear" was not less deadly than the "fire in the front." Nevertheless the record is not wholly of mischief. Under stress of public danger the Republicans often disregarded the limitations of the Constitution. In resisting such illegal acts the Democratic party vindicated democratic principles, and at the same time met an urgent public need. But this service, considerable as it was, did not atone for the lukewarmness of the party in support of the war, for its colossal blunder of 1864 in declaring the war a failure and demanding a cessation of hostilities, for its steady and at times embittered opposition to those measures which looked to the destruction of slavery, and for its compromising entanglements with the disloyal elements of the North.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION

Lincoln's plan of reconstruction was not followed by the Republican party; instead of seeking as he had purposed to restore everything except slavery to the ante-bellum States, to reconcile North and South, and to maintain the friendly relations existing at the close of the war between the whites and the colored people of the South, the Republican party, under great provocation it must be confessed, took the control of government in the South out of the hands of the whites and placed it in the incapable hands of the ex-slaves. On its face the policy was monstrous and monstrous were its fruits. The old alienation between North and South was deepened, embittered, and given a long lease in which to work evil; an alienation unknown before was established between the Southern white man and the negro; and this is the source of that race issue, which more than all things else retards Southern progress.

In resisting the Republican reconstruction policy the Democratic party began to recover its moral tone and the confidence of the public; in advocating reform during the second adminis-

tration of General Grant it made a further advance; in 1876 the rehabilitation had progressed so far that it seemed for a time to have won the election.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY SINCE THE CLOSE
OF RECONSTRUCTION

Since the close of reconstruction the Democratic party has passed through two phases of experience, the first lasting into the second Cleveland administration, the other from then until now. The former phase, which covers some eighteen years, is marked by a return of the party to earlier ideas and policy; its greatest leaders, Tilden and Cleveland, may be characterized as conservative Democrats of the Jeffersonian school. In firmness and courage, as well as in his conception of the presidential office, Mr. Cleveland reminds us of Jackson. But before the close of his second administration, many signs began to appear of a party change of considerable magnitude; its nature and extent were made evident at the Chicago Convention of 1896, which declared for free silver, censured the judiciary and refused the complimentary vote of approval that is usually given by a party to a retiring President of its own political faith. The course of the party in the campaign of 1896, the speeches of Mr. Bryan, the re-issue in 1900 of the platform of 1896, the alliance with the Populists and with some of the labor organizations made it clear that the conservative party of Mr. Cleveland has become a radical one. To-day quite as in the days of Jackson the Democratic party is the party of the masses.

Turning now from the historical sketch let us ask how the Democratic party stands related to American politics in their entirety. The American people constitute one of the great democracies of the world. The Democratic party is the political champion of those elements of the democracy which are most democratic. It stands nearest to the people; through its agency the people have entered politics. The functions of every great party are three: teaching, giving shape to public

policy, and administration. In the discharge of the first the party has rendered inestimable service; it has gone out into the hedges and byways, and given instructions to multitudes that otherwise would have remained untaught; it is safe to say that the Democratic party has done more to Americanize the foreigner, to transform the alien into a citizen than all other parties. Corresponding with the importance of this function of the party, is the excellence of the teachers it has produced. The Democratic party has taught its pupils self-respect and love of freedom; it has kindled their ambition and introduced them to the opportunities and responsibilities of political life. The errors it has taught, — and they are many, — are of small account when compared with the lifting influence it has exerted.

In giving shape to public policy, the Democratic party has had only a qualified success; in political construction the greatest builders have not been Democrats. As a rule Democrats have succeeded better in tearing down than in building up. During the early period they were too afraid of strong government; in framing constitutions they were more intent to guard against the possible encroachments of government than to make it efficient. The Articles of Confederation illustrate well the early democratic idea of a general government. The chief contributions of the party to the fundamental law, state and national, are the provisions collectively described as bills of rights, which are restraints upon governments rather than sources of power. In that second field of public policy where the task is to deal wisely with the issues of the hour, what is the record of the Democratic party? Here, too, we find only a qualified success, and in periods of greatest peril and difficulty almost unqualified failure.

In the administrative function, the Democratic party has shown the characteristic merits and defects of its changing constituency. In periods when the party has included a large conservative element, it has succeeded well, but in the one period when its radical elements were in control, namely, that of Jackson, there was, to say the least, a degree of failure.

On the whole it seems fair to conclude that the greater services of the Democratic party have been in the line of political education; for the framework of our political institutions and for the wise conduct of government, especially in critical times, we owe more to other parties. But this does not justify the conclusion that the Democratic party should never be entrusted with office. To exclude the party of the people permanently from office is to destroy its usefulness as their teacher and to bring to an untimely end American democracy.

XII

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY ¹

F THE three important American parties which have called themselves Republican ² this article deals only with that one which was organized during the years 1854 to 1856 and has been in control of the government of the United States during the larger portion of the half-century since the Presidential election of 1860.

ORIGIN AND CHARACTER

Sectionalism, the movement which tended to break the Union into two separate republics, one based on free labor, the other on that of slaves, had gained before the middle of the nineteenth century such headway as to compel a reconstruction of the party system. The beginning of this reconstruction was heralded by the rise of the Liberty party, in 1840, its completion by the disruption in 1860 of the Democratic party along sectional lines, and the election of Abraham Lincoln by a sectional vote.

The event which determined the date of the birth of the Republican party was the repeal by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854 of that provision of the Compromise of 1820 which excluded slavery from national territory north of the geographical line 36° 30' and the formal substitution in that bill of "squatter" for national sovereignty, in deciding the question of slavery in the Territories. The enactment of this bill introduced a new and highly critical stage in the relations between North and South. Down to 1850 the differences of the

¹ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, eleventh edition, Vol. XXIII, p. 177, 1910-1911.

² The party organized by Thomas Jefferson; the National Republicans, 1824-1834; and the Republican party of the present.

two sections over slavery had always been arranged by mutual concessions. In 1854 this expedient was set aside. Without giving anything in return, Douglas and his supporters took from the free-labor section an invaluable barrier against the extension of slavery; and through the doctrine of "squatter sovereignty" denied to Congress the power to erect such barriers in the future. But this only hastened a crisis that could not have been greatly delayed. Calhoun had already discerned the true source and deadly nature of the growing sectional estrangement, and Lincoln was soon to utter the prophetic words: "This government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free."

The immediate result of the agitation over the repeal was to convince a large number — which soon became a majority — of the best citizens of the North, irrespective of party, that the restriction of slavery was essential to the well-being both of the North and of the Union as a whole. In order to give effect to this conviction it was necessary to form a new party. The agitation which prepared the way for its rise began in Congress during the debates on the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and spread thence throughout the North. The West was more quickly responsive than the East. But everywhere large elements of the existing parties came together and agreed to unite in resisting the extension of slavery. Before the discussion of the repeal in Congress had reached its later stages, a mass meeting of Whigs, Democrats and Free-soilers at Ripon, Wisconsin, resolved that if the Kansas-Nebraska Bill should pass: "They would throw old party organizations to the winds and organize a new party on the sole issue of the non-extension of slavery." The name Republican was formally adopted at a state convention of the new party held at Jackson, Michigan, on the 6th of July, 1854, and by other Western state conventions on the 13th of the same month.

The great majority of the new party had been either Whigs or Democrats. In two cardinal points they were agreed, namely, opposition to slavery and belief in the national, as opposed to the federative, nature of the Union. In other points

there was at the beginning much disagreement. Fortunately the issues on which there was agreement overshadowed all others long enough to bring about a fusing of the two elements. It was the union of the Whig who believed in making government strong and its sphere wide, with the Democrat who believed in the people and the people's control of government, that made the Republican party both efficient and popular.

HISTORY

Before its advent to power, from 1854 to 1860, the tasks of the Republican party were three: to propagate the doctrine of slavery restriction by congressional action; to oppose the extension of slavery under the operation of the doctrine of squatter sovereignty; and to obtain control of the federal government. In each it was successful. Throughout the North and under such leaders as Seward, Lincoln, Chase, Sumner, Henry Ward Beecher and Horace Greeley, all the resources of the press, the platform, the pulpit and (an institution then powerful but now forgotten) the lyceum or citizens' debating club, were fully enlisted in the propaganda. Other events that turned to the advantage of the Republicans were the brutal assault upon Charles Sumner in the Senate Chamber in 1856, the Ostend Manifesto, advising in the interest of slavery the acquisition of Cuba by force if Spain should refuse to sell, the enforcement — sometimes brutal and always hateful — of the Fugitive Slave Law, and the quarrel of Douglas with the administration and the South over the application of squatter sovereignty to Kansas. On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dred Scott, which the Republicans refused to accept as good law, and the raid of John Brown at Harper's Ferry, which they condemned, brought them into serious embarrassment.

In the prosecution of the third task, the attainment of office, the party followed wise counsels and was fortunate. In its first national platform, that of 1856, the party affirmed its adherence to the principles of Washington and Jefferson,

denied the constitutional right of Congress or a Territory to establish slavery, and declared that it was "both the right and duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery." At the close of the resolutions there was a demand for government aid to a Pacific railway and for the improvement of rivers and harbors.

The platform of 1860 was more comprehensive. It added to the planks of the first, an arraignment of the administration and the Dred Scott decision, and demands for a protective tariff and a homestead act. Although the popular vote for Abraham Lincoln was more than a half-million greater than that for John C. Frémont, the party's candidate in 1856, nevertheless it was the disruption of the Democratic party that made the Republican triumph possible. On the other hand, the Republican party was the strongest member of the new party system as reorganized on the sectional principle. Moreover, in character and purpose, as well as numerical strength, it was better qualified than its rivals to meet the impending crisis.

THE WAR PERIOD, 1861-1865

Between the election of Mr. Lincoln in November, 1860, and his inauguration on the following 4th of March, seven of the slave-holding states seceded, formed a Confederacy and withdrew their representatives from the national legislature. All attempts to arrange a compromise failed. The vacillation of President Buchanan, and the position taken in his annual message that the national government had no right to coerce a seceding State, gave strong support to the disunion movement. These events forced upon the Republican party a change of policy. Hitherto its efforts had been directed chiefly to excluding slavery from the Territories. Now the first duty was to save the Union from disruption. In order to do this it was necessary to unite the North, and to bring to the support of the Union a large proportion of those border slave States, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri, in which there was considerable Union sentiment. Hence the

party accepted as the sole issue of the hour the maintenance of the Union. Indeed, in order to secure more easily the co-operation of loyal Democrats, it even gave up its own name for a time and called itself the Union party.

During the early period of the war the President checked all efforts on the part of zealous subordinates, civil and military, to make the war for the Union even incidentally a war upon slavery. In his efforts to unionize the border States, Mr. Lincoln in March, 1862, urged that Congress should coöperate with any state in providing for a voluntary, gradual and compensated emancipation. Congress acceded, but not one of the border States would undertake emancipation. Many of the Republican leaders rejected the border state policy of the President and urged a more radical course towards slavery. In replying to Horace Greeley, who voiced the discontent in a public letter, to which he gave the title *The Prayer of Twenty Millions of People*, Mr. Lincoln in August, 1862, wrote: "My paramount object is to save the Union and not either to save or to destroy slavery."

But as evidence accumulated that slavery was a strong military support of the Confederacy the policy of destroying slavery as a means of saving the Union grew in favor. To this policy Mr. Lincoln, on the 22nd of September, 1862, committed himself, the Republican party, and the cause of the Union. The first response was distinctly unfavorable. The immediate effect was "to unite the South and divide the North." A considerable element of the Democratic party became disloyal, while the party as a whole opposed all measures looking to the destruction of slavery. The autumn elections greatly reduced the Republican majority in Congress. But the new policy steadily gained ground until the Republican party in its third national convention, which met on the 7th of June, 1864, resolved: "That as slavery was the cause and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion, justice and national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the republic." In the following year slavery was finally abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment.

On the Republican party, since it had an effective majority in each house of Congress, rests the responsibility for the legislation of the war period. The theory of loose construction of the Constitution was accepted. Throughout the Civil War, Congress, proceeding upon this theory, made prompt provision for the prosecution of the war. It passed legal tender acts; it established a system of national banks; greatly raised the tariff rates; and in order to hasten the settlement of the far West and to make that section an integral part of the Union, it passed a homestead act, and an act providing for a railway to the Pacific. For a time, while disloyalty was most rife in the North, there was a sharp curtailment of the rights of the individual citizen through the suspension, initiated by the President and approved by Congress, of the writ of *habeas corpus*. Most of the acts, which their opponents held to be violations of the Constitution, were in general acts of questionable utility. The results of the war, which came to a close early in 1865, vindicated in a signal way the principles, policies and leadership of the Republican party. It had saved the Union; it had established the national character of the Union so firmly as to bring to an end the doctrine of the right of secession; and it had destroyed slavery.

The party had been singularly fortunate in its founders and leaders. Of these three were pre-eminent: Horace Greeley, William H. Seward and Abraham Lincoln — Greeley in the field of journalism, Seward in the two realms of idealistic and practical politics, and, greatest of all, Abraham Lincoln, who won and held the people.

RECONSTRUCTION

The larger tasks of the period from the close of the Civil War in 1865 to the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877 were three: first, to accomplish with the least possible disturbance the transition from war to peace; second, to settle certain matters of dispute with France and England that had arisen during the progress of the war; and third, to recon-

struct the South. Full responsibility for the way in which these tasks were discharged rests upon the Republican party, for it was in control of the Presidency and the Senate throughout the period and of the House until December, 1875. In the first and second it was notably successful. The soldiers of North and South returned at once to the fields of productive labor. The colossal war establishment was quickly reduced to the requirements of peace. The French withdrew from Mexico. The Alabama Claims were submitted to arbitration. But the reconstruction of the South proved difficult in the extreme. The strain of a prolonged and exhausting war, the upheaval of emancipation, and the utter collapse of the Confederate government, had thrown the elements of social, economic and civil life in the South into almost hopeless disorder. To restore these to normal relations and working was but part of the task; the other and more important part was to apply those methods of reconstruction which would tend to make one nation out of hitherto discordant sections. In his third annual message, Dec. 8th, 1863, Lincoln brought forward the so-called presidential plan of reconstruction. This was rejected on the ground that reconstruction was a congressional rather than an executive function; and on the 4th of July, 1864, Congress passed a bill making Congress instead of the President the chief agent in the work of reconstruction. President Johnson adopted Lincoln's plan, and put it into operation with such vigor that when Congress met in December, 1865, all the States that had seceded were quite or nearly ready to demand the re-admission of their representatives to the House and Senate.

From the standpoint of party the situation was highly critical. The men whom the newly reconstructed States had sent to Washington represented the old South and would naturally join the opposition. Although the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, was assured, and a fortnight later was officially proclaimed, nevertheless the reconstructed legislatures were busy enacting police regulations which, in the opinion of most Republicans, threatened to re-

enslave the freedmen. With an earnestness like that which the party in earlier days had shown in opposing the extension of slavery, it now resolved to secure full civil rights to the freedmen. Another consideration of great weight in shaping party policy was the need of maintaining the rights of Congress against executive encroachment. Owing to the war and Lincoln's masterful personality, the Presidency had gained in prestige at the expense of Congress. The tendency thus established would be strengthened to a dangerous degree, it was thought, if the President were to take the leading part in reconstructing as well as in saving the Union. There now took place within the party a change of great importance. Hitherto the conservatives, represented by such leaders as Lincoln and Seward, had always won in struggles with the radical elements; but now the tide changed, and the radicals, who were more narrowly national and more strongly partisan, gained control, and ruled the party to the end of the period. This revolution within the Republican party between the years 1865 and 1867 was fostered by a marked recrudescence of sectional feeling in the North, and by the character of the successor of President Lincoln and of the party leaders in Congress. President Johnson, while eminently patriotic and courageous, was tactless and imprudent to the last degree. Mr. Sumner, the leader of the Senate, was not conciliatory in manner, and while incapable of revengeful feeling seemed more considerate of the freedman than of the Southern white. Thaddeus Stevens, whose influence over the House of Representatives was stronger than that of Sumner over the Senate, regarded the South as "a conquered province," and his personal feelings towards the ruling class of the South were harshly vindictive. The policy adopted by the Republican majority in each house of Congress was to refuse admission to the men chosen by the state that had been reconstructed under the presidential plan, until a joint committee of both houses should investigate conditions in the South. In this rebuff there was distinct intimation of a purpose to set aside altogether the reconstruction work of the President. Congress proceeded at once to enact

measures to continue and extend the earlier temporary provision for helpless freedmen whom emancipation had set adrift, and to give them full civil rights. By passing the Fourteenth Amendment in June 1866 Congress committed itself to the policy of securing the civil rights of the negro by constitutional guarantee. Each of these acts was vetoed by the President, between whom and Congress political disagreement ripened soon into bitter enmity. As the quarrel developed Congress ignored the recommendations of the President, repassed by the requisite majority and without due consideration of his objections each measure that he vetoed, took from him his power to remove subordinates which had been exercised by his predecessors, deprived him of his constitutional rights as commander-in-chief of the army, and finally in 1868 undertook to drive him from office by impeachment.

In 1867 Congress, under the control of the radical wing of the Republican party, set aside nearly all reconstructive work that had been accomplished previously and put into execution a plan of its own, under which the Southern States were reconstructed anew and admitted to Congress between the years 1867 and 1870. Inevitable consequences of the congressional plan of reconstruction were: first, the erection of state governments that were inefficient, corrupt, ruinously wasteful and shamefully oppressive; second, the extreme demoralization of the freedmen suddenly transformed from slaves into rulers of their former masters; third, the demoralization, in many cases also extreme, of the great body of the Southern whites by the expedients to which they resorted in order to escape from the rule of the freedman, led by the Carpet-bagger, his Northern, and the Scalawag, his Southern, white ally; fourth, the alienation of the white and colored races in the South, — an alienation which was to each a source of immeasurable evils; fifth, the speedy overthrow on the withdrawal of military support of the governments set up under the congressional plan, and the creation of a South "solid" in resentful opposition to the North and the Republican party. And sixth, as the outcome of all these results, an unfortunate delay in reuniting

North and South. The Republican party suffered during this period a moral decline, seen in the frequent efforts to gain party advantage by kindling anew the earlier sectional animosities, a growing arrogance, the increasing weight of the partisan and spoilsman in party management, and the widespread corruption that came to light in the scandals of the second administration of President Grant. The mismanaged Liberal Republican movement of 1870-1872 was a reaction against this moral decline and a protest against the Southern policy of the party and its support of the spoils system. The service of the Liberal Republicans consisted mainly in the aid they gave to the reform of the Republican party and in the influence they exerted to induce the Democratic party to accept the results of the war.

But despite the warnings it received, the prestige it had gained during the war and the popularity of President Grant, the Republican party lost ground steadily during the second half of the period. In the election of 1874 the Democratic party gained control of the House of Representatives; and in the election of 1876 came within a hair's breadth of winning the Presidency.

ELECTION OF MR. HAYES TO THAT OF
MR. MCKINLEY, 1876-1896

During these twenty years the subsidence of old and the rise of new issues led to a reconstruction of the party system, which, although less radical than that of 1840 to 1860, brought into existence several new parties and changed in important respects the character and policies of those already in the field. From the standpoint of party history the chief interest of these twenty years lies in the answer to the question, How did the discredited Republican party secure in 1896 a new and prolonged lease of power? The task was not easy. The reconstruction policy of the party had alienated many Northern supporters and had made the South solidly Democratic. The prevalence of the spoils system and the scandals

of the second administration of General Grant had hurt the prestige of the party as a guardian of public morals and of the national honor. What gave the Republicans a fighting chance were: its record down to the close of the Civil War; its proven aptitude for the tasks of government; and the growth among the people of a more vital national feeling which turned instinctively to the party that had saved the nation. Despite these substantial advantages over their Democratic rivals the Republicans lost the presidential election of 1884 and 1892, and the entire Democratic party — some Republicans agreeing — has always held that a just decision of the contested election of 1876 would have seated Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic candidate, instead of Mr. Hayes. In the Senate the Republicans were in a majority during fourteen years. In the House, whose members are chosen by popular vote, these figures were reversed, the Democrats having control during fourteen years. In each of five successive presidential elections, those of 1876, 1880, 1884, 1888, and 1892, the Democratic popular vote was larger than the Republican. Marked features of the party situation were the apparent similarity for a time of the principles of the two great parties, the influence on their policy exerted by the stronger minor parties, and the rise of the Mugwumps, not strictly a party, who claimed the right to vote for the best candidate independently of party and were in the main of Republican origin.

Of the issues of the period one, the reform of the civil service, was served by both of the great parties with imperfect fidelity. Each of the Republican presidents, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur and Harrison, gave it efficient and steadfast support; and so did Cleveland, the Democratic President, although under stronger pressure from party hunger. The same was true in the case of the more important question of foreign policy and, to a degree in its early stage, of the question of silver coinage. It was not so with the treatment of the South. President Hayes withdrew the national troops from South Carolina and Louisiana and thus brought to an end federal military interference with State governments. For this course a consid-

erable section of the Republican party gave him thereafter a support which was half-hearted and inconstant. Further disaffection resulted from efforts to reform the civil service of New York which brought the President into conflict with the powerful Republican party machine in that state.¹ The high character of the President and his firm, wise and upright course raised the reputation of the party. His veto of the Silver Bill and the resumption of specie payments tended to the same result. The failure in 1880 of the third term movement for General Grant worked for the health of the party. The struggle of President Garfield with New York spoilsmen and his assassination by a disappointed office-seeker, gave a fresh impetus to the movement for the reform of the civil service. President Arthur maintained the high standard established by Presidents Hayes and Garfield.

In the election of 1884 the old parties were competitors for the confidence of the conservative and reforming elements of the country. Mr. Blaine, the Republican candidate, who in brilliancy, popularity, patriotism, and disappointing personal fortunes recalled the Whig leader, Henry Clay, lost the election by a narrow margin because while meeting the requirements of the conservatives, he had lost in a measure the confidence of the reformers.

In the election of 1888 Mr. Cleveland, by making tariff reform the issue, turned the manufacturing interests to the support of Mr. Harrison, the candidate of the Republicans, who thereby won the election. Mr. Harrison, while not personally popular, maintained the best traditions of his Republican predecessors. The highly protective McKinley Tariff, framed in obedience to the people's mandate in 1888 proved somewhat disappointing, and in the election of 1892, Mr. Cleveland, as the champion of lower tariff rates, was successful for the second time, secured the repeal of the act for the purchase of

¹ In the course of this conflict, which continued to disturb the harmony of the Republican party until the death of President Garfield, the term "Stalwarts" was used to designate the supporters of Senator Conkling, who was in control of the Republican machine in New York state, and the term "Half-breeds" to designate the supporters of the administration.

silver, and thus strengthened himself with the conservatives of both parties. Democratic defection in the Senate nullified largely the downward revision of the tariff urged by the President and supported by the House.

The election of 1896 marked the close of the period of party readjustment. The leading issue was the free coinage of silver under conditions which would have made the monetary standard silver instead of gold, and would have lowered its value. The Democratic convention repudiated Mr. Cleveland, accepted free coinage, and nominated W. J. Bryan. The Republicans, at the cost of a formidable party defection, endorsed the gold standard and a highly protective tariff, and nominated William McKinley, whose record and character made him an exceptionally strong candidate. In doing this the Democratic organization became the party of radicalism, the Republican the party of conservatism. The committal of the Republican party to the maintenance of the gold standard, far more than its continued support of high protection, established its position in the reconstructed party system. In doing this it allied its fortunes with those of all the property-holding classes of the country, while retaining in a high degree the confidence of the wage-earners.

THE PERIOD OF 1897-1910

During this period there was first a rapid recovery from economic depression, and then ten years of almost unexampled prosperity, followed by two years of moderate depression. But the period is chiefly memorable for the war of 1898 with Spain; for the oversea territorial expansion that followed; for the rise of the so-called policy of imperialism; for the assumption of a far more prominent international rôle; for wide-reaching measures of internal reform; and, lastly, for the establishment of the policy of conserving the natural resources of the nation.

Throughout this period the Republican party had undisputed control of the national government. One of the earliest acts in the administration of Mr. McKinley was the enactment

in 1897 of the highly protective Dingley Tariff. The provision for Reciprocity proved at first of little use. But the need of foreign markets for the rapidly growing output of manufactured products, the rising demand that the interests of the home consumer, as well as those of the producer, should be considered, and the conviction that high protection fostered monopolies, brought about a change of sentiment in the party. Mr. McKinley, in his last speech, made at the Buffalo Exposition on the 5th of September, 1901, gave voice to this change; "The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of goodwill and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times. Measures of retaliation are not." These views gained headway against the strenuous opposition of the Stand-patters,¹ until revision of the tariff downward was demanded in the platform of 1908, and achieved to a moderate degree in the tariff act of 1909. The party has also fulfilled its promise to establish the gold monetary standard on a firm basis. During the war with Spain and in meeting the new problems of colonial empire, the Republican party has again justified its reputation for efficiency. Not less noteworthy has been the policy of the party initiated and urged by President Theodore Roosevelt and developed by President W. H. Taft for the regulation of railways and all corporations and trusts engaged in interstate business. The latest important event in the history of the Republican party is the rise of the Insurgents, a group of Senators and Congressmen whose professed aims are to resist centralization in both party and national government, to lessen the influence of the money power over public policy, to regulate tariff schedules largely in the interest of the consumer, and in brief to emphasize anew the subordination of party and government to the will and service of the people.

¹ Those members of the Republican party who would maintain as far as possible the high protective duties of the Dingley Tariff.

XIII

I EQUALITY IN TAXATION II COMMERCIAL UNION WITH CANADA

IN 1888 Mr. Albert Shaw of the *Review of Reviews* propounded the following questions to a group of economists, asking each to reply dealing with such portions of the general subject as seemed to him especially important.

“It being generally conceded that Congress must cut off some existing resources of revenue, and reduce the surplus income, in what way should the reduction be made, and upon what governing considerations?

“Should it be attempted, by refunding or in some other way, to bring the public debt into such form as to permit the continuance of a policy of somewhat rapid payment, or should we adjust the revenues upon a plan that will allow nothing for debt payment beyond sinking fund requirements?

“In a policy for the more immediate future should we contemplate the special encouragement of trade with Canada, Mexico, and the states of Central and South America, by means of a ‘commercial union’ or ‘*zollverein*’ arrangement, steamship subsidies, reciprocity treaties, or otherwise?

“What do you regard as the probable or proper future of the American protective system, and what would be the ideal sources of a national revenue?”¹

Professor Morse contributed his views on the two points following.

¹ The National Revenues, ed. by Albert Shaw, Chicago, 1888, pp. 112-123.

I

EQUALITY IN TAXATION

"It being generally conceded that Congress must cut off some existing sources of revenue, . . . in what way should the reductions be made and upon what governing considerations?"

The "governing consideration" should be, I think, to bring the national revenue system into accord with the maxim that "the subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities."

By far the larger part of the national revenue is raised on articles in common use, such as sugar, rice, fruits, and the products of wool, or on articles like tobacco, beer, and whiskey, the use of which is more common among the poor than the rich.

Is this inequality a hardship? Conclusions based on *per capita* apportionments are misleading, for the proper unit on which to base calculations is not the individual but the family. It is those wage earners who provide for large families on whom the burden of these taxes, whatever it may be, must rest most heavily; and it is towards this class in particular that public policy ought to be not only just, but humanely considerate. Perhaps the fairest way of determining the question is to find out how the expenditures of the poor are affected by the taxes on some articles of common use. According to the American standard of living, sugar is one of the "necessaries." In well-to-do families its cost considerably exceeds that of flour. It is, in fact, one of the heavy items of family expenditure. In order to have a basis of fact for conclusions, I have ascertained the outlay for sugar made by five families of the town in which I live:

1. Six persons	\$47.00
2. Four "	21.00
3. Six "	17.50
4. Four "	27.00
5. Five "	26.00

All these own comfortable homes, but derive their support in the main from wages. All are thrifty, and ambitious to educate their children. 1 and 2 are the families of skilled laborers; 3, 4 and 5 of unskilled, whose highest wages are \$1.50 *per diem*. Except in the case of (1) the expenditure is considerably less than in families of like numbers but of larger means. If we estimate that portion of the price of sugar due to the tax at forty per cent:

(1) pays	\$18.80
(2) "	8.40
(3) "	7.00
(4) "	10.80
(5) "	10.40

The average is \$11.08, an amount which families dependent on wages must feel as a serious addition to their necessary expenditures. The share of state, county, and town taxes of

(1) is	\$12.83
(2) "	15.24
(3) "	7.77
(4) "	9.65
(5) "	12.64

In two cases the sugar tax exceeds all these other taxes. The average is \$11.82, or .74 greater than the average sugar tax. It is evident that in the case of larger and less thrifty families, which do not own their homes, the sugar tax must considerably exceed what is assessed by state, county, and town. The only risk of error in the above calculations lies in the assumption of forty per cent as the portion of the price

due to national taxation. The figures can easily be corrected if that estimate should prove either too high or too low.

The enhanced cost of the products of wool must also be a heavy burden to the poor. Owing to the nature of our climate, these products must always constitute one of the largest items of necessary expenditure. A family may, without injury to health, economize closely in the use of sugar, but to do so in the case of woollens would not only sacrifice comfort but endanger health. Moreover, it is the extremely poor whose dependence upon them is greatest. Their very poverty deprives them of other defences against the cold, such as well constructed houses, abundance of fuel, and nutritious food. It would seem as if humanity as well as justice requires the abolition of all taxes which increase the cost of the products of wool and of articles of food in common use.

But it is objected that to abolish the duties on sugar, wools, and woollens, is to deprive important industries of needed protection. Mr. Sherman has suggested a reduction of the duty on sugar and an equivalent bounty to the American producer. Why not abolish the duty altogether and give a bounty large enough to give the requisite encouragement? This would enable the consumer to obtain sugar at the lowest natural cost, and the producers, both employers and employed, to continue their production on the same terms as before. If the fund for the payment of the bounties should be raised so that the taxed should pay in proportion to their respective abilities, the chief reproach of the protective system, namely, the inequality of its burdens, would be done away. Why not extend the plan so as to include rice, fruit, fish, wool and woollens, and, indeed, all commodities in common use? Why not extend it to all industries that deserve protection?

It is true that the cost of protection would in this way be revealed. But why not reveal it? The people pay for it — why not let them know how much they pay? The people submit willingly enough to justly levied taxation for justifiable objects. The foremost advocates of protection allege that it is a national system established for the promotion of the wel-

fare, not of a particular interest, class, or locality, but of the nation as a whole. But if the national good requires that a given industry or set of industries receive public aid, then every citizen should contribute to this, not in proportion to his wants, but in proportion to his means. In so doing, he would not suffer injustice, and his course as a citizen would be more intelligent and patriotic than under a system which takes his property by stealth, and apports what it levies in a grossly unequal way.

To oppose bounties as a method of encouraging home industries would seem to imply distrust either of the protective system or of the people. To contend that the laborer is the one chiefly benefited by protection, and that he therefore should pay the larger part of its cost, is, even if the premise be admitted, as irrational as it would be for Massachusetts to say that because the very poor receive the benefit of the public charities, they must bear the cost.

Direct taxes justly apportioned should take the place of the existing unequal indirect ones. A distinguished advocate of protection has recently said, "The genius of our scheme of general government and the spirit of our people are hostile to direct taxation for national affairs. The federal tax-gatherer has always provoked friction and lawlessness." This I believe is altogether erroneous. The federal tax-gatherer has never provoked lawlessness except when collecting excise duties, which are forms of indirect taxation. The system of indirect taxation has continued so long partly because inherited, and partly because the people have not yet become conscious of its injustice.

In regard to the taxes on whiskey, malt liquors, and tobacco, the case is more complex. The inequality is even greater than in the previous cases; but as offset to this, it is claimed that these commodities are injurious and that the taxes lessen the consumption. It seems necessary to concede that the commodities in question are injurious. But do the national taxes add enough to their cost to sensibly lessen their use? It is, of course, conceivable that much higher rates would do so;

but the question relates to present rates, the original design of which was revenue and not decrease of consumption. In answering the question, it is necessary to remember that the appetites for tobacco and liquors are usually formed under circumstances which are unfavorable to the exercise of prudential motives, and that these appetites, after becoming established, are almost as imperious — in many cases are even more imperious — than the natural appetites. If, notwithstanding the considerations just mentioned, it should still seem clear that these taxes do lessen the consumption of these injurious commodities, the further question would arise whether the good thus obtained compensates for the unavoidable and very considerable evils incident to the inequality of this species of taxation. It cannot be denied that these taxes do increase the poverty of the poorest classes, and that the consequent increase of suffering is borne not so much by the taxpayer in person as by his family. His self-indulgence may not be checked, but the share of his wife and children in the comforts and “higher goods” of life must thereby be lessened materially. The natural conclusion in respect to each of these taxes is that unless it can be shown to diminish in a considerable degree the use of the commodity to which it relates, it should, because of its inherent injustice, be altogether abolished.

Some of the friends of free trade or of tariff reform are inclined to retain the taxes just considered, as a leverage by which to overthrow the protective system. On the other hand, many of the friends of protection, while upholding these taxes, are willing to sacrifice one or all of them in order to strengthen their favorite system. It would seem as if each species of taxation should stand or fall on its own merits. A settlement reached in any other way can be neither just nor satisfactory.

II

COMMERCIAL UNION WITH CANADA

"In a policy for the more immediate future should we contemplate the special encouragement of trade with Canada?"

If tariff obstructions were removed, Canada would furnish a better market for our manufacturers than is now the case. Her products would sensibly lessen the cost of lumber and of some articles of food in the United States, and would check the too rapid destruction of our forests. It would also open to the northern sections of New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire, the markets of the Canadian cities.

If a line were drawn from Portland, Me., to some point in the northwest corner of Washington Territory, keeping just far enough south of the Canadian boundary to include a population equal to that of the Dominion and Newfoundland, and we should then ask ourselves whether it would promote the economic welfare of the people of this narrow but immensely extended belt, or of the people of the main division of the United States, to set up custom house barriers between them, very few would maintain the affirmative. It is clear enough that certain impoverishing influences would begin to operate. The people of each section in buying and selling would find themselves excluded from the best markets. Rochester and Buffalo would have to deal with Portland instead of New York. In order to create home markets and diversify industries in the northern sections heavy taxes in the form of protective duties would be laid, and these would divert labor and capital to relatively unprofitable employments. Probably most will agree that in the case supposed, protection (looking solely at its economic results) would hurt the larger section and cripple the smaller. But in what essential respect does this case differ from that between Canada and the United States? If our revolutionary ancestors had succeeded in their efforts to in-

once Canada to make common cause with the thirteen colonies, or if the hopes of annexing Canada by conquest entertained by many Americans in 1712 had been realized, we would now be approving free trade between the provinces and the United States, as we do approve it between New York and New England.

But the political side of our relation to Canada is more important than the commercial. There are strong grounds for the view that Canadians and Americans should come into political unity. The British Canadians are our near kinsmen. In character and institutions they and we are essentially one. The differences between them and us are of degree — they being the more conservative; or else they are artificial, based on jealousies and contentions which ought never to have arisen.

In looking at a map of North America it is difficult to believe that the entire population of the Dominion, together with Newfoundland, does not exceed that of the State of New York. For a long time to come, inhabited Canada must consist of a narrow immensely extended border-land — a situation highly unfavorable to real economic and political independence. The natural markets of the Canadians are in the United States, and the traffic of Canada should move on lines running more nearly north and south than east and west. The attempt to reverse this natural order explains the unfortunate financial condition of Canada. Moreover, the British Canadians are not solving the French problem. The province of Quebec breaks British Canada in two, and in the race contest within the province the French more than hold their own. Indeed, it is clear that New England is doing more than British Canada to Anglo-Americanize the Canadian French.

What useful or honorable thing can be named that Canada cannot better accomplish in full union with the United States, than in trying to maintain an independent career? There is nothing desirable signified by the term Canadian that is not also signified by the term American, and the latter has a certain additional significance which our neighbors need greatly to appropriate. Outside of the American Union, Canada must

remain essentially provincial. Many of her more enterprising and ambitious inhabitants will be drawn to the United States, and among these some of her most gifted sons.

To the United States, union with Canada is in every way desirable; the advantages in a military and commercial point of view are sufficiently obvious. Moreover, the conservatism of the Canadians would be an element of strength in the national life.

But what commercial policy is most likely to secure union? Restrictions might be effective if economic considerations alone determined the political conduct of peoples. But they do not. Least of all do they in the case of a high-minded and spirited people. The relation between Canada and the United States is in many respects analogous to that which used to subsist between England and Scotland. But it should be remembered that all efforts on the part of England to coerce Scotland served only to defer union and make it more difficult. If union with Canada ever comes, it should be in obedience to her wish as well as ours. The readiest way to create such a wish is to pursue a policy which recognizes the essential oneness of the two peoples. But even if we should not desire union, our true policy is not to drain but to develop Canada.

XIV

THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS OF AMERICAN COUNTRIES ¹

ZOLL VEREINS, or Commercial Unions — of which we hear much nowadays — are arrangements between politically independent countries by which, for purposes of trade, they become one country.

Free trade between the members, a common tariff toward the rest of the world, an equitable division of the revenue and import duties, made by a board in which each division is fairly represented, and systems of internal taxation sufficiently alike so as not to interfere with the common tariff, are the prominent features of such unions. Is a *Zoll Verein*, which shall include all important American countries, practicable? Not at present. The United States, Canada, and possibly Mexico could form one profitably; but the commercial relations of South America with Europe are closer than with the United States or Canada. To ask them, so long as this situation lasts, to enter into commercial unions with us, is idle; they could not afford to do it. Nevertheless they are wise who tell us that the people of the United States ought to extend their commercial relations with other American countries. Their views are based on the following facts: first, we need foreign markets, and for a long time to come must continue to need them for our surplus agricultural produce; and we are beginning to need them, and in the future must need them increasingly for surplus manufactured goods; second, we are being excluded from important continental European markets; third, the mar-

¹ The Chautauquan, March, 1889.

kets of American countries are, in important respects, naturally more favorable for us than those of Europe and if once secured would be more easily retained.

Let us look at these facts a little more closely. The idea of the sufficiency of our great home market is taking so strong a hold upon us that we are likely to forget that, great as it is, it can never release us from dependence on foreign markets. Our wealth and prosperity depend on the amount of our surplus of those products which we can produce to greatest advantage; but this surplus can be utilized only through the agency of foreign trade. We produce much more wheat, corn, meat, cotton, and petroleum than we can consume. In finding advantageous foreign markets for these products, all parts of the country and all classes are deeply concerned, for a very large proportion of the capital of the country is, through the medium of loans and deposits in savings banks, employed in their production. A second reason for turning to foreign markets is found in the situation and prospects of our manufacturing interests. At present they are in the main limited to the home market. But their development is, and should be, more rapid than the growth of that market. The people of the United States have a genius for manufacturing. Moreover a larger market would undoubtedly create a steadier demand for these products, and steadiness of demand is, in every industry, a prime condition of prosperity. But conceding the need of foreign markets the next question is, where can they be found? Europe hitherto has been our best customer. But other countries are making headway in the production of cotton, wheat, and petroleum. Of the continental states which have bought of us most largely, France, Germany, and at last Sweden have placed burdensome restrictions upon American pork and thereby corn, which is the most important of all our food products. England, against whom we are prone to rail, affords us our best foreign market. It is impossible to say to what extent the unfriendly movement in the continental markets will be carried; it is clear, however, that the forces behind it are far from being spent.

Summarized the situation is this: our surplus agricultural products are larger than ever before and promise to increase rapidly; the prime condition of the continued healthful growth of our manufactures is access to foreign markets; but at this very time, the markets of important states of continental Europe are being, in an increasing degree, closed to us. It behooves us, therefore, to find and develop foreign markets elsewhere, and one of the most promising in the fields, is the nearest — that among our American neighbors. To some of them we can furnish flour and petroleum, and to all of them manufactured goods, and they can furnish us certain important food products and raw materials; while this would not release us from the need of trading in Europe, it would prevent the possibility of excessive dependence. In the development of our subject, it will conduce to clearness to discuss separately the commercial relations of the United States to Canada, Mexico, the Central American states — in which because of the isthmus we include Colombia — the West Indies, and South America.

Previous to the Civil War, the United States held a large share of the South American trade. But now, judged by the imports from the different countries, we have fallen to the fourth, fifth, and in some cases to the sixth place. How did we lose the South American trade? Among the causes, I believe that the destruction of our shipping, and the enhanced cost of manufactures, owing to the tariffs of the last twenty-five years, are the most important. How can we regain this trade? First, by the restoration of our shipping, thus permitting our merchants to own and sail foreign built vessels under the American flag, and through proper encouragement to American ship-building, and American participation in the foreign carrying trade; second, by modifying the tariff so that our manufactures in respect to the cost of machinery, buildings, raw materials, etc., can compete on equal terms with foreign manufacturers; third, by treaties through which the obstacles to trade could be removed. Since we consume more Brazilian coffee than any other people, we have a greater in-

terest in the abolition of the Brazilian coffee export duty, and we ought to have greater influence in efforts to that end. We ought for our own sakes, as many of us think, to abolish our import duties on sugar, wool, and tobacco, and after having done so, we could justly demand, and probably obtain, the removal or reduction of those South American imposts which affect our manufactured goods most unfavorably.

In No. 93 of the "Reports from the Consuls of the United States," there is an interesting study of the relation of the United States to the trade of South America, by Mr. J. E. Bacon, consul at Montevideo. In this, an international railway connecting our markets with Buenos Ayres and opening the central portions of South America to our trade is proposed as a method by which the United States can regain her lost commercial position. Without doubt an American international railway will be built and will be of advantage to the United States. But if the influence, direct and indirect, of our tariff upon our shipping interests, and upon the cost of manufacturing, is, as has been claimed, the real cause of the loss of the South American trade, an international railway system can do but little to bring back that trade to us. It would prove more useful to European than to American manufacturers. Even now European goods are transported in bond from New York to Mexico, over American railroads. We cannot keep certain features of our tariff, if we would regain for our manufacturers the markets of South America. Nature has made the West Indies geographically, and therefore commercially, a part of the United States — as much as Sicily a part of Italy, or Ireland, of Great Britain. We can supply them, and they us, on better terms than other countries. Formerly the West India trade played a great part in the diplomacy as well as the commercial development of the United States. Had they advanced as rapidly as the United States, they would still hold their old prominence among our foreign markets. Their trade is still important for us. We should in every legitimate way extend our commercial relations with them, and through these our influence over them.

There is no better America, the extension of our flag is the best realization of our best, and together with our rapidly increasing sea the most promising means.

The interests of the United States in the matter of Central America, including Colombia, grow out of their position in the proposed inter-oceanic waterways. The control of these is so essential to the United States as the control of the Suez Canal to England. Indeed, when we think of the propositions which our interests in the Pacific have already attracted, and reflect that their development has only begun, it seems hardly extravagant to suppose the interest of the United States in Central American waters, with that of England in the Suez Canal. This interest, wholly apart from our interest in the trade of the six millions who inhabit Central America and Colombia, grows out of its position in the future commercial relations with them, and the United States' connection with their political independence. Our trade with them is already considerable. Its progress would be best promoted by the canal already contemplated in the case of the South American waters and the West Indies, and by the extension of the Mexican railway system.

Mexico is almost one fourth the size of the United States, contains all Mexico, and has a population not quite one fifth as large. Much of her soil is comparatively waste, her people are industrially backward, her manufactures are unimportant, her public debt is unacceptably burdensome. The economic inferiority of Mexico is reflected by the fact that in 1881 — which, however, was one of the most prosperous years for us — her foreign trade was only about one-fifth-fourth as large as that of the United States. Mexico suffers from political as well as from economic evils. The revolutions and revolutions which have characterized her history from the beginning have been due in great measure to the fact that her political system, copied in its main features from that of the United States, has been better adapted to her aspirations than to her actual conditions. Even now the clergy, owing to the conservatism of the property of the church, and the reaction against

owing to conservatism and sympathy with the clergy, are estranged from the government. Still in spite of these and other serious disadvantages, marked progress is being made. The new railroads, which American capital and enterprise have built, are helping the country greatly. The people are patriotic. The administration is wise and firm and the conditions which favor stability are increasing.

Our fortunes are closely bound up with those of Mexico. She is our neighbor. The boundary line between the two countries, if we follow the windings of the Rio Grande, is not far from two thousand miles in length. The condition, social, moral, and political, as well as economic, of our people in western Texas, southern California, Arizona, and New Mexico will always be greatly affected by the condition of the people across the border. For the prosperity of this large and important division of the United States, nothing is more essential than the prosperity of contiguous Mexico. If smuggling, general lawlessness, poverty, and semi-barbarism prevail there, they will infect in a considerable degree the neighboring American population. Looked at merely from a commercial standpoint, the more our Mexican neighbors produce, the more they will want of our products, and the more they will be able to pay for them. The prosperity of our great western cities, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Minneapolis, and St. Paul, is due to the rapid development of tributary regions. But Mexico is, in an economic sense, naturally tributary to our southwestern distributing centers, and her development, therefore, is a matter which concerns us intimately. The reciprocity treaty which has been negotiated, ought, therefore, to have been confirmed. Indeed, it is difficult to find one valid objection to full commercial union with Mexico. Such a union, through developing her resources, would do more than anything else to increase her demand for our goods and her capacity to supply our wants.

But there is another ground which should lead us to seek closer commercial relations with Mexico. It is the view of many of our best citizens that we did Mexico a great wrong

through making war upon her some forty years ago, and wresting from her on our own terms more than half her territory. To right this wrong is now impossible; to make atonement therefor is within our power, and the best way of doing this is through intimate and friendly commercial relations to do what we can to develop the natural resources of the country and the industrial capacities of the people. This of course should be associated with a just, considerate, and magnanimous treatment of their rights as an independent nation. We should seek to make her feel toward us as the Gladstonian policy taught Greece and Italy to feel toward England.

The relations of the United States to Canada differ in important respects from her relations to other American countries. The majority of the Canadians have the same language and are of the same blood. The political system is in reality, though not in form, more like our own than that of any other American country. Their productions are like those of our northern states and territories. Moreover, the several provinces are in different ways separated from one another and united closely with us. A glance at the map will show that the maritime provinces, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick, form a group by themselves. Comparing them with the three nearest New England States, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, they have an area greater by some two thousand square miles, and a population less by one third. Their natural markets are in the United States. Boston and Portland are naturally their ports as well as Halifax and St. Johns. This group is separated from the other provinces by the thinly settled and inhospitable region at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The province of Quebec extends on both sides of the St. Lawrence from the Gulf to the Ottawa River. It has an area some twenty-three times that of Massachusetts, and a population about seven ninths as large. Extending from the Ottawa River to west of Lake Superior lies Ontario, the most populous of the provinces. In area it is about four times the size of New York, in population about three eighths as large. According to the census of 1880 the population of

the entire region west of the province of Ontario, including Manitoba and British Columbia, was 171,859. It has increased rapidly since. In Manitoba it has nearly doubled. Geographically, Quebec and Ontario are contiguous, but Quebec is French and Ontario is British, and neither nationality is strong enough to assimilate the other. Vast stretches of almost unbroken wilderness isolate the people of Manitoba from the populated sections of Ontario as well as from British Columbia. It is true that there is water communication, Lake Superior eastward, and that this is supplemented by a continental railway system. But the St. Lawrence is closed to navigation fully five months of the year, and so far as the main traffic of Canada is concerned, this expensive railway system is useful only because after being excluded from near and good markets, it gives access to those which are distant and relatively poor. Nature has made British Columbia commercially a part of our Pacific coast region. Manitoba should trade with Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth; Ontario with Detroit, Chicago, and cities of the state of New York; Quebec and the maritime provinces with Portland and Boston. Naturally the great lines of Canadian traffic run south or southeastward, instead of east or northeast. To ignore this is to fight against nature — and to be beaten. But that is precisely what the policy of both countries is compelling Canada to do. Their tariffs are contrivances by which each country either drives away its most desirable customers or makes the conditions of trading unnaturally and needlessly hard.

That the loss entailed thereby is very great is indicated by two facts: first, that Canada, in spite of tariff barriers, imports more from the United States than from Great Britain; second, that notwithstanding the cost of the Civil War the economical situation of Canada is greatly inferior to that of the United States. "The Canadians are a thoroughly industrial and frugal people; yet the difference in commercial prosperity between the continent at large and these isolated and excommunicated blocks of territory strikes every traveler crossing the line. Our debt is rising as fast as that of the United States

is falling. It is nearly three times as large as theirs per head, though we have had no great Civil War, and our necessary taxation is fifty per cent higher than theirs. The value of farms in Canada is everywhere going down.”¹

For this situation the only adequate remedy is commercial union. There is no greater error than that which assumes that the situation of our neighbors is a matter of indifference to ourselves. We cannot help sharing in their prosperity and their misfortunes. We are poorer because Canada is poor; with the increase of Canadian wealth we shall grow richer.

Commercial union would give on the best terms the great and growing trade of Canada to our merchants and manufacturers, our railroads and canals, our seaports and interior commercial centers, and, what is not less important, cheaper food and lumber to our people. Moreover, the removal of the tax on Canadian timber and lumber would check appreciably the too rapid destruction of our own forests. The fisheries’ question would be settled. There would be no occasion for the petty and belittling quarrels in which we and our northern kinsmen too frequently engage. A reciprocity treaty would be better than the present arrangement; but our experience has shown that such a treaty does not exclude jealousies, and may be temporary. Full commercial union once established could not be easily overthrown and would afford little chance for bickerings. Commercial union would stimulate, it is true, the development of Canada more than that of the United States; but her gains would be ours as ours would be hers.

The fact is, that nature and history have made the Canadians and ourselves economically one people; and the loss which the denial of this fact entails, Canada is less able to bear than we. Our developed and available resources are continental, hers are those of a narrow, very irregular, and vastly extended borderland. One way by which the injurious tendencies of the existing situation can be made clear, is to suppose a line drawn from Portland, Maine, to some point on Puget’s Sound so as to cut off a narrow strip of territory with

¹ Goldwin Smith, Letter to *The London Times*, Nov. 4, 1887.

a population equal to that of the Dominion, say about five millions. Such a line would pass through Southern New Hampshire and Vermont, central New York, and from there quite close to the boundary line between the United States and Canada, until it reached its western terminus. Would it be profitable for the inhabitants of this narrow immensely extended belt or for the people of the main division of the United States to have custom-house barriers set up between them? It is evident that such a step would impoverish the smaller section and seriously lessen the wealth of the larger. The people on either side of the line would find themselves excluded from the best markets. Rochester and Buffalo would have to deal with Portland instead of New York and the natural lines of traffic would generally have to be disregarded. The northern section in order to secure industrial independence would need to diversify its industry and build up a home market by means of heavy protective duties; and these would divert labor and capital to relatively unprofitable employments. In no way, in an economic sense, could either section be benefited; and in several ways each would suffer heavy loss. But in what essential respect does the supposed case differ from that of the United States and Canada? In one respect it would be more favorable, for it is considerably shorter from Eastport to Puget's Sound than from Cape Breton to Vancouver's Island. If our Revolutionary ancestors had succeeded in their efforts to induce Canada to make common cause with the thirteen colonies, or if the hopes of annexing Canada by conquest, entertained by many Americans in 1812, had been realized, we would now be approving free trade between the provinces and the United States, as we do approve it between New York and New England.

But the political services of commercial union would perhaps outweigh its economic benefits — it would at least lead both peoples to consider without prejudice the great issue of political union.

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